

The Fracturing Human Rights Consensus: Uruguay's Contested History of Human Rights

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Two crucial referendums bookended the 1980s in Uruguay. On November 30, 1980, Uruguayans headed to the polls for the first time in over seven years to cast their ballots on a constitutional plebiscite intended to give the armed forces a permanent and more sizeable control of power in the country. Since Juan María Bordaberry dissolved parliament and declared a State of Emergency in 1973, the Uruguayan military had, in the words of a leading human rights organization, established with “unprecedented sophistication . . . a hushed, progressive repression measured out in doses until it gained absolute control over the entire population.”¹ During that time, the military shut down the press and imprisoned one in every fifty people, resulting in the highest rate of political incarceration in the world. Hundreds more disappeared, both in Uruguay and neighboring countries and over ten percent of the Uruguayan population fled the country in fear.²

With human rights advocates opposing these repressive conditions, including exile groups, international non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International, and the Carter administration, the military viewed the plebiscite as a way to appease this international outcry. The military regime had watched Augusto Pinochet decisively win a referendum in neighboring Chile just three months prior, and believed they would similarly emerge on top to affirm the regime's legitimacy. However, when the results finally surfaced, no such victory emerged—

Uruguayans rejected the constitution. As one Uruguayan who worked against the plebiscite noted, it “seemed like a miracle.”³ While the military dictatorship continued for another five years, the vote opened space for renewed political activism and pressure that ultimately resulted in a five-year ‘pacted’ transition back to democratic rule.⁴

Yet, in some ways the miracle was deceiving because Uruguay proved unable to build upon this earlier success. Just nine years later, in 1989, Uruguayans returned to the polls to vote on another measure that would impact the direction and strength of the human rights culture in the reemerging democracy. This excitement following the 1980 referendum had waned considerably during the slow transitional process as the military initiated a new wave of repression, shutting down emerging human rights organizations, newspapers, as well as arresting and torturing hundreds more citizens.⁵ Even after the first democratic elections in over a decade finally occurred in 1984, the military and new civilian government struck a deal that included a series of political compromises, such as giving the military shared power with the new government and passing an amnesty law that protected all those involved in the regime from 1973 to 1985, from prosecution for human rights violations. The year 1989, however, provided new hope for human rights in the country. Uruguayans collected enough signatures to put the amnesty law on the ballot in a measure that would, if passed, overturn the law and establish the primacy of human rights and promise of the rule of law. It was therefore devastating to those who had worked on this initiative when, with a fifty-six percent majority, Uruguayans upheld the law and a culture of impunity. The reaffirmation of amnesty and the protection of officers from prosecution felt like, as one activist explained, “the ultimate defeat,”⁶ or as another pointed out, that “justice [came] to a standstill ... that we [were] no longer equal under the law.”⁷

These two referendums ultimately stand in contrast to one another as the high and low points of human rights in Uruguay within a much longer trajectory of the sometimes contradictory visions of social justice, human rights, and progress in the nation's history. The 1989 defeat raised questions about the catalysts underlying the 1980 victory and what changes in the intervening decade kept Uruguayans from building on the triumph of 1980. This mystery moves beyond discussions of an accountability gap and speaks to a larger puzzle in Uruguay about the shifting meaning and impact of human rights during this critical period.

My dissertation is centrally concerned with investigating what role human rights played in Uruguay both during the dictatorship and throughout the transition back to democratic rule. It examines how a consensus emerged in the 1970s concerning human rights, as Uruguayans struggled for survival under incredibly repressive conditions. However, during the transitional period, my dissertation explores the fracturing of this human rights consensus as different groups of Uruguayans placed different priorities on various sets of rights concerns, most particularly justice initiatives and socio-economic rights that were based on individual experiences, ideological commitments, and access to power. Uruguay's experience challenges an often teleological, if not congratulatory, chronicle about the making of human rights culture in the international sphere, which addresses crucial academic debates over the origins, meanings, and trajectories of human rights, at both the local and global level.

The Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) contributes in two fundamental ways to my dissertation. First, of all, when Richard Nixon asked New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (NAR) to consult with Latin American countries to reassess U.S.-Latin American policies, and inform future foreign policy in 1969, the subsequent report, the *Rockefeller Report on the Americas*, helped provide a staging ground for U.S. policy towards the region for the following

half decade. This report shows a critical stage of the evolving U.S. policy towards the region as a whole, and includes an analysis of a trip to Uruguay which demonstrates how the U.S. viewed the developing tensions in the nation from a Cold War framework. The analysis of this time period provides an important baseline to examine how different U.S. administrations dealt with the emerging turmoil in the region, from the Nixon to Ford to Carter administration, a development which my dissertation traces.

Second, the Ford Foundation's reports provide an essential window into the evolution of international human rights concerns during the decade of Uruguay's transition. As Uruguayan human rights groups emerged as a dominant force in civil society, their reports and application for funding specific programs help provide a crucial lineage as to the most pressing rights concerns for justice and the rule of law. In addition, the Ford reports also illustrate the waning of these concerns during the latter part of the decade, as these groups shifted their core activity areas to apply for more funds to provide for community organizations and schools, and to address other socio-economic concerns. While the most useful RAC sources focus on two fundamentally different parts and arguments of my dissertation, both are critical towards my larger goal of looking at the convergence of human rights during the 1970s and divergence during the 1980s. I will address each in turn.

Rockefeller's Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere

The 1970s provided a rare moment of agreement in Uruguay, and internationally, around the idea that human rights encompassed the very basic necessities of survival, including stopping torture and arbitrary political imprisonment during a repressive and deadly dictatorship. This consensus emerged at various levels, including Uruguayans in exile, international NGOs, and even the highest reaches of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. As early as 1975,

the fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders illustrated the rising importance of these issues noting the “increase in the number of alarming reports that torture is being practiced” in countries such as Uruguay.⁸ By the end of the session, the Congress approved a declaration on the right to protection of all persons from being subjected to torture and other cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.⁹

The United Nations rhetoric and actions reflected the rising international concern over events in the Southern Cone, as emerging networks for human rights fled the repressive conditions in Uruguay and largely moved abroad during this decade. My dissertation will analyze how the emerging international language of human rights both influenced, and was influenced by, events in Uruguay. Current academic literature tends to place the origins of human rights in a European context, locating these beginnings from European thinkers and systems of states.¹⁰ However, my research from a non-Western perspective sees the origins of human rights as interrelated to the struggle against dictatorships, particularly in the Southern Cone. My dissertation will challenge the idea that human rights were born in Western societies and eventually gained momentum in the perceived ‘periphery.’ Instead, I will discuss how these ‘peripheral’ experiences contributed to, changed, and shaped the global human rights narrative.

This is particularly true with respect to U.S. foreign policy. Although current historiography often assumes that President Jimmy Carter’s human rights platform brought a moral agenda to the rest of the world, the reality is that the United States was indeed late in joining a broader, global human rights movement. Indeed, the U.S. was brought at times kicking and screaming to the international agenda by activists’ and Congressional pressure in the latter part of the decade. My dissertation will thusly engage and challenge the historiography of international relations history. The history of human rights in U.S. foreign policy needs

reevaluation from the idea that Carter, seeking to bolster his campaign and express his personal moralism in policy-making, brought human rights to the forefront of his presidency in an uneven and largely unsuccessful experiment that disappeared under the more pragmatic-minded Reagan administration.¹¹ Historians like Barbara Keys represent an important change in this historiography as they begin to explore the roots of human rights in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, dating back to the 1960s, where Congress pressured presidents to begin to account for human rights abuses as a foundation for foreign policy decisions.¹² My dissertation will add to this new examination of international relations history by investigating not only an earlier timeline, but also one that was responsive both to a more forceful Congress, as well as international struggles. Rather than assume that U.S. foreign policy is made solely within the confines of Washington D.C., this research points to critical international voices that inspired and influenced fundamental shifts in foreign policy.

Rockefeller's mission to the region to help reassess U.S.-Latin American relations provides a key piece in the story of U.S. foreign relations, establishing fundamental baselines as to how the U.S. dealt with the beginning of Uruguay's repression and the unrest in the region. Nixon sent Rockefeller on a mission to Latin America to prepare a report on inter-American relations that would help structure U.S. foreign policy towards the region.¹³ NAR himself said that the trip to Uruguay was a "turning point" for the presidential fact-finding mission he was heading, wherein a pattern of consultation provided the points of view, information, and counsel, which the president wanted to hear in order to formulate U.S. foreign policy in the region.¹⁴

NAR's trip to Uruguay, however, was clouded in controversy. In the weeks leading up to his trip, violence erupted around the capital city of Montevideo. The meat industry went on strike and students and workers protested the government's closure of *Extra*, a leftist paper. However,

all these groups were rallying against both the immediate conditions imposed by an increasingly repressive government, and also NAR's impending visit, who many Uruguayans saw illustrative of the outside influences compounding the nation's economic woes. As a result, protesters stoned and firebombed U.S. businesses, threw a Molotov cocktail at a site of the U.S. military mission, and broke the windows of U.S. officials' cars.¹⁵ In addition, the day before NAR arrived the Tupamaros destroyed the General Motors display room, on the grounds that company had sold one hundred police cars to the Uruguayan government for the "repression of Uruguayan students." Flyers left at the scene also affirmed that the destruction was meant to protest the visit of "the agent of Yankee imperialism, Nelson Rockefeller."¹⁶ The damages were estimated to be around one million dollars.¹⁷

Opposition within the Uruguayan Senate used the upheaval to try to pressure President Jorge Pacheco Areco to cancel NAR's visit. Main figures, such as Francisco Rodriguez Camusso and Zelmar Michelini, proposed a resolution that would require Pacheco to rescind the invitation for NAR's visit.¹⁸ However, Pacheco was insistent that the visit would go on as planned; he wrote to NAR:

In Uruguay, street violence does not write laws, nor administer justice, nor formulate foreign policy. Laws are enacted by the parliament, justice is administered by the courts, and foreign policy is formulated by the foreign ministry. Envoys of the government of the United States have always been welcome in Uruguay. The visit will take place in accordance with the program to be coordinated by the working groups.¹⁹

Some details of the visit did shift as a result of the unrest. Uruguayan officials asked NAR to keep the visit a secret as long as possible, and the location of the meetings was changed from Montevideo to Punta del Este, a beach town that was largely abandoned during the cold, winter months of NAR's trip. The move was meant to isolate him from possible violence and protest.²⁰

In the end, the change of venue did keep NAR isolated from the general population, but not from the key policymakers he sought to consult. By the conclusion of the short visit, NAR had met with dozens of ministers and high ranking officials in the more secluded beach town. Both Uruguayan and U.S. officials regarded the trip a success.²¹ NAR insisted that the trip allowed him to gather “an enormous amount of special information, much thoughtful advice, and fresh perspective on inter-American relations.”²² The U.S. report on the mission focused on technical and managerial training for agriculture, a possible increase in Uruguayan export products, and the continuation of military assistance programs.²³ Although, in the end, not a single mention of human rights or the ensuing social justice struggles that were engulfing the nation made it into any of the trip’s reports or documents.

In large part, this absence stems from Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s approach to foreign policy, which centered on the idea that power was the primary force in international politics.²⁴ In Uruguay and Latin America, the Rockefeller reports attest to the fact that Nixon’s policy focused on preserving stability, countering radical leftist challenges to authoritarian rule, building the economy, and strengthening military exchanges, even as the complications with the trip plans themselves attested to the deteriorating domestic climate in the South American nation.²⁵

Ultimately, NAR’s trip to Uruguay reveals important features of U.S. foreign policy towards the region during the late 1960s. First, it shows the intransigence of the Nixon administration’s Cold War focus, economic priorities, and overall disregard for human rights, particularly in what lead up to the human rights collapse in the region. By the time of NAR’s trip in 1969, Uruguay had already begun its descent into military rule. Pacheco was waging a war against the Tupamaros and using increasingly repressive measures against the population to

control the unrest. His trip illustrated the instability, but this factor was not addressed in any concrete terms. Therefore, this moment is an important launching point for my analysis of how, when, and in what way, human rights in U.S. foreign policy would evolve towards the region.

It was only a few years later that even Kissinger could not ignore the torture that was occurring in the Southern Cone, because indeed, by the mid-1970s, a human rights consensus was emerging. Human rights activists, including exiled Uruguayan groups and international NGOs made such an impact that in 1975, Kissinger made a public statement at the United Nations that “one of the most persistent and serious problems is torture, a practice which all nations should abhor. It is an absolute debasement of the function of government when its overwhelming power is used not for people’s welfare but as an instrument of their suffering.”²⁶ Whether Kissinger believed this statement to his core is up for debate. However, the fact that he was forced to address the issue at the United Nations, which his administration was able to completely ignore just a few years earlier, illustrates a fundamental shift in the international human rights scene due to the pressures on the U.S. foreign policy establishment and the increasing international advocacy networks, both of which my dissertation will examine.

The Ford Foundation

One of the genuine surprises during my visit was the abundance of Ford Foundation materials that are an essential addition to my project. I had applied for a Grant-in-Aid in the fall of 2011, before Ford’s documents were transferred to the RAC. The Ford Foundation proved to be one of the international leaders funding the emergent Uruguayan human rights groups during the nation’s transition to democratic rule in the 1980s, including the Uruguay Institute for Legal and Social Studies and the Center for Law and Social Policy. When I conducted my initial field research in Montevideo in 2012, tracing these groups’ funding, shifting priorities, and acquiring

many published reports proved to be impossible since the Uruguay archives are not always available to the public, nor are many of the groups still in existence.

These documents are essential to my project and provide evidence of the fracturing of the human rights consensus during the decade, particularly with regard to justice issues. Human rights concerns moved from justice goals and recourse for the families of victims during the dictatorship, towards more general societal ills, such as education and assisting poor neighborhoods, essentially social and economic rights. For example, one human rights group that is emblematic of this shift was the Uruguay Institute for Legal and Social Studies (IELSUR), which by the time of democratic transition, applied for funding from the Ford Foundation to support a legal services program for human rights victims from the dictatorship.²⁷ Ford's Lima office had begun exploring the human rights situation in Uruguay in 1984 and recognized that its efforts should focus on "a broader, long-term approach to human rights problems that would permit [human rights groups] to continue to play a useful 'watchdog' role after power was transferred back to civilian authorities."²⁸

IELSUR met this role since its work centered on defending the rights of former political prisoners, the disappeared, former public employees dismissed by the military government for political reasons, as well as the mentally handicapped. IELSUR received continual support from Ford in the coming years and proved incredibly successful at first, for a number of reasons. First, working with other human rights groups in the country, particularly the Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ), IELSUR secured financial settlements for former political detainees. They also successfully concluded dozens of torture cases, brought charges against former members of the military regime, and turned up evidence of a clandestine cemetery for those killed in

detention. Furthermore, IELSUR helped reform the state's mental institutions, many of which were populated by former tortured detainees.

Many of these activities were critical in the first year of the grant cycle (1985-1986), but the organization's more essential services halted after the amnesty law was passed in 1986, wherein trials and judicial action against the military government was shut down. IELSUR attempted to find a useful place for their watchdog approach in society, but the trappings of democratic rule made their important work for justice more elusive under the Sanguinetti's government's rule, which ceased the possibilities of accountability. As a Ford report noted, IELSUR had troubles "establishing a clear identity and coherent program strategies in the context of a civilian, constitutional rule." Ford noted that while IELSUR attempted to shift its focus to acceptable rights-based activities, such as undertaking an alternative legal service program in Montevideo's poor neighborhoods, Ford withdrew support of the organization, believing that with limited resources, Ford's Lima office would cease funding any more human rights projects in Uruguay in 1990.²⁹

These are fundamental developments for a few reasons. First of all, it illustrates the change in funding priorities from an international perspective. International funding agencies refocused their efforts on hot zones, and the Lima office by 1990 decided to stop funding all human rights activities in Uruguay. While reports about this decision do not explain the exact reason, the cut off was made immediately following the defeat of the amnesty law referendum. IELSUR illustrates that local commitments also felt a pressure to abandon their continued activism towards justice issues in favor of broader socioeconomic rights to appeal to funding sources. However, secondly, this example reveals the changing concerns of many Uruguayans. There are a host of reasons that human rights and justice concerns took a backseat, some of

which include the extraordinary political nature of human rights in the new civilian government, the restructuring of power alliances within the country, the fear of recurrence of military coups, and a desire among many survivors to try to move on and forget the painful period of their lives, all of which I address in more detail in my dissertation.

Without a sustained consensus pushing for human rights accountability, an appearance of relative security returned to Uruguay, even though under the surface there were deep and continual struggles to deal with the crimes and harms caused by the dictatorships. Ford however, saw a ‘successful’ democratic transition and a return to civilian rule, while other nations around the globe began to experience more pressing human rights concerns, particularly in Colombia and Peru, which required Ford to reevaluate their funding priorities. This reflection of the fracturing of human rights on the ground is essential to show the way global and local dynamics of change affected the political will on the ground for the waning human rights struggle in the latter part of the decade, a subject my dissertation will explore in more detail.

Conclusion

The RAC ultimately provided two essential pieces of insight into my dissertation. First, it offered an on-the-grounds approach to how the Nixon Administration dealt with the growing unrest in the Southern Cone, and exemplifies the slow evolution of human rights concerns in U.S. foreign policy, as these issues were subjugated to Cold War concerns, particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Second, the Ford Foundation holdings provided crucial information, because they allowed me to look at the reemergence of civil society groups in Uruguay during the transition back to democracy and the spectrum of their concerns domestically. There are crucial documents that I was unable to attain during my field research in Uruguay due to its poorly kept archives. In addition, these groups’ reports, as well as Ford’s commentary and

funding priorities exemplify the difficulty of defining human rights priorities in the region during the transition back democracy, as the consensus of human rights discourse over stopping political imprisonment and torture gave way to battles over access to political power, pressing socio-economic concerns, and competing justice issues. What this fracturing meant for immediate transitional justice versus long term goals of the movement are issues that are essential for this project. I am deeply grateful to the RAC for providing me with the opportunity to conduct this essential research.

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Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports Online is a periodic publication of the Rockefeller Archive Center. Edited by Erwin Levold, Research Reports Online is intended to foster the network of scholarship in the history of philanthropy and to highlight the diverse range of materials and subjects covered in the collections at the Rockefeller Archive Center. The reports are drawn from essays submitted by researchers who have visited the Archive Center, many of whom have received grants from the Archive Center to support their research.

The ideas and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and are not intended to represent the Rockefeller Archive Center.

ENDNOTES:

¹ Servicio Paz y Justicia, *Uruguay, Nunca Más: Human Rights Violations, 1972-1985*. (translation Elizabeth Hampsten) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 1992, p. 9.

² Between 300,000 and 400,000 people, out of approximately three million in the entire country, went into exile during the dictatorship. As journalist Lawrence Weschler noted, "the sheer scope of this emigration, detention, and incarceration ... only begins to suggest the extent of the military's absolute rule of Uruguayan daily life during the military dictatorship." Lawrence Weschler, *A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers*. Illinois: University Of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 88.

³ Efrain Olivera, "Sigue valiendo la pena." *Si decimos Derechos Humanos...* (May 2006), available at <http://www.serpaj.org.uy/serpaj/index.php/documentos-de-interes/file/8-si-decimos-ddhh-i>, accessed June 8, 2012.

⁴ Sikkink explains that 'pacted' transitions are, when no main political actors can impose a solution, so instead they negotiate an agreement with the outgoing regime about how the transition will proceed. In this sort of transition, power holders from the previous regime typically retain much more power to determine policies in the new government. Stern, however, notes the limits of the idea of 'pacted' transition, asking scholars to refine the term and boundaries of a pact by noting the power dynamics involved. For the purpose of this proposal, the term 'pacted' is useful for understanding that in Uruguay, the transition was negotiated in which the military did maintain substantial power in the new government. My dissertation, however, takes into account not just the negotiations, but also the power dynamics and countervailing pressures at work. See Kathryn Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2011, p. 32; Steve J. Stern, *Reckoning with Pinochet: The Memory Question in Democratic Chile, 1989-2006*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010, pp. 364-368.

⁵ "Amnesty International Urges End to Torture and Jailing of Prisoners of Conscience in Uruguay," Amnesty International News Release, November 9, 1983, Folder 15, Uruguay, 1983-1996, Box 260, Amnesty International U.S.A National Office, Series IV.I, Amnesty International Papers, Columbia University Archives.

⁶ Author Interview with Felipe Michelini, June 14, 2012.

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- ⁷ “Justice of Amnesty,” *Globe and Mail*, April 18, 1989.
- ⁸ Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,” September 1-12, 1975, A/Conf.56/10, p. 39.
- ⁹ AI Action Memo on Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Folder: United Nations, RG II: Executive Directors Files 1967-1997; Series 1: David Hawk Files, 1972-1978, Box 5, Amnesty International-U.S.A. Papers, Columbia University Archives.
- ¹⁰ Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009; Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010.
- ¹¹ Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years*. New York: Hill & Wang, 1986.
- ¹² Barbara Keys, “Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History* 34: 5 (November 2010), pp. 823–851, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2010.00897.x.
- ¹³ “Rockefeller Shifts Uruguay Talk Site,” *New York Times* (June 20, 1969), p. 1.
- ¹⁴ United Press International, “Rockefeller Ends Third Latin Trip: He is ‘Heartened,’” *New York Times* (June 23, 1969), p. 1.
- ¹⁵ Report from Security Division; June 19, 1969, Telegram Foreign Service of the U.S., Folder 83, Latin America Mission-Uruguay, Box 10, James Cannon Files, RG 15, Series 7, Latin American Mission, Rockefeller Family Archives (RFA), Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York (RAC).
- ¹⁶ “Uruguay Raiders Burn G.M. Offices,” *New York Times* (June 21, 1969), p. 1.
- ¹⁷ Nelson A. Rockefeller, Personal, Washington D.C.; 1969 Latin American Mission, RG 15, Series 7, Folder 904, Uruguay-NAR Notes, Box 116, RAC. Adjusted for the price of inflation, it would be over six million dollars in 2012.
- ¹⁸ Telegram, Rockefeller Mission, American Embassy in Montevideo to Secretary of State, June 16, 1969, Folder 83, Latin America Mission-Uruguay, Box 10, James Cannon Files, RG 15, Series 7, Latin American Mission, RFA, RAC.
- ¹⁹ Confidential Memo, June 10, 1969, Folder 83, Latin America Mission-Uruguay, Box 10, James Cannon Files, RG 15, Series 7, Latin American Mission, RFA, RAC.
- ²⁰ Confidential Memo, June 13, 1969, Folder 83, Latin America Mission-Uruguay, Box 10, James Cannon Files, RG 15, Series 7, Latin American Mission, RFA, RAC; “Rockefeller Shifts Uruguay Talk Site,” *New York Times* (June 20, 1969), p. 1.
- ²¹ Letter, Robert M. Sayre to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, July 1, 1969, Folder 83, Latin America Mission-Uruguay, Box 10, James Cannon Files, RG 15, Series 7, Latin American Mission, RFA, RAC.
- ²² Sylvan Fox, “Latin Tours Over: Rockefeller Urges New U.S. Policies,” *New York Times* (July 7, 1969), p. 1.
- ²³ Country Report: Uruguay, Report of the U.S. Presidential Mission—Nelson A. Rockefeller, Folder 901: Uruguay Documents, Box 116 Latin American Mission, RG 4, Series O, RFA, RAC.
- ²⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 273–281; John Howe to the Vice President, Memorandum, Kissinger Speech on Asia, July 22, 1976, RG 26, Nelson A. Rockefeller-Vice Presidential, Series 19: Foreign Affairs and National Security; Secretary Kissinger Press Conferences and Speeches 1976, (II, 26, 19), Box 8, Folder 215.1.
- ²⁵ Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 281.
- ²⁶ Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Three Hundred Fifty-Fifth meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 22, 1973, Folder: United Nations, 1975, Box 5, Series 1, RG II, Amnesty International-U.S.A., Columbia University Archives.
- ²⁷ Letter, Will Saint to Antonio Serrentino, May 20, 1985, Grant 08550674, Reel 5703, Ford Foundation, RAC.
- ²⁸ Inter-Office Memorandum, A. Gridley Hall to William D. Carmichael, “Delegated Authority Grant,” May 20, 1985, Grant 08550674, Reel 5703, Ford Foundation, RAC. IELSUR was also deemed as attractive for the Ford Foundation, since the core staff of lawyers included membership of all three of Uruguay’s major political groups: the Blancos, Colorados, and Frente Amplio.
- ²⁹ Inter-Office Memorandum, Michael Sifter to Jeffrey Puryear, “Final Evaluation and Recommendation for Closing: IELSUR,” January 12, 1990, Grant 08550674, Reel 5703, Ford Foundation, RAC.