

Planetary Citizens: U.S. NGOs and the Struggle Over Globalization, 1972-1989

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In January 1997 Jessica Matthews, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote an article for *Foreign Affairs* magazine titled, “Power Shift,” arguing that after centuries of international relations defined by nation-states as the central actors, global politics was experiencing a fundamental transformation into a world of multiple influential players. Nation-states, in her estimation, would increasingly have to share their power with international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and multinational corporations. Furthermore, Matthews stated that non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as international human rights and development organizations would, despite their often small sizes and budgets, “increasingly . . . push around even the largest governments.”¹ Matthews’ article was not alone in viewing a growing role for NGOs in international affairs; particularly in the 1990s, many international relations and political science scholars discussed this trend. However, relatively little has been written by historians on the growth of NGOs as a global presence. As the diplomatic historian Akira Iriye has argued, this is problematic, because “the bulk of the political science literature remains nonhistorical . . . tend[ing] to focus on very recent developments or current phenomena,” without providing a broader historical context.²

The dissertation I am researching, *Planetary Citizens: U.S. NGOs and the Struggle Over Globalization, 1972-1989*, represents one small step in addressing this scholarly gap. This project focuses on U.S. NGOs engaged in political advocacy on issues of global development during the 1970s and 1980s. Specifically, I am interested in NGOs whose advocacy advanced a vision for the global economy that challenged the policies promoted by the major institutional drivers of globalization. U.S. groups such as the Institute for Policy Studies and the Sierra Club launched efforts in these years to confront institutions such as multinational corporations and the World Bank, which NGOs saw as promoting policies leading neither to economically equitable nor environmentally sustainable development in the Global South.

As part of my research I spent a week combing the archives at the Rockefeller Center (RAC), with particular attention to the records of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF). During the 1970s and 1980s the RBF proved an important source of funding for a myriad of U.S. NGOs. My work in these archives served two main purposes in advancing the broader project. First, a number of the NGOs that I am focusing on do not have their own archives; thus the records at the RAC represent an invaluable repository of primary source documents. Second, as part of exploring NGO advocacy, one must understand the various factors that influence NGO behavior. Critical among these is NGOs' access to and relationships with funders, especially major philanthropic foundations. As part of my research, I hope to further explore these dynamics, relying on primary sources to better understand the nuances of the relationships between NGOs and foundations.

For the purposes of this report, I divided my findings into three sections. Initially I discussed my research regarding U.S. environmental groups, particularly the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and the Sierra Club. In the 1970s, each of these organizations became

involved with global environmental issues, and increasingly with the intersection of the environment and Third World development. In the 1980s, these concerns blossomed into a coordinated campaign aimed at reforming the environmental practices of the World Bank.

Second, I examined the records of NGOs whose driving mission was to engage U.S. citizens and institutions on global issues. For this purpose, I focused primarily on the United Nations Association of America (UNA) and the Overseas Development Council (ODC). These NGOs also provide a contrast with the organizations that are the centerpieces of my study, for they consciously avoided political advocacy, favoring a cooperative relationship with government and industry.

Finally, one of the main historical episodes that my dissertation explores is the campaign by U.S. NGOs to change the practices of multinational corporations with respect to the marketing of infant formula in the Global South. This campaign found a critical base of support in religiously-affiliated NGOs, some of which the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) had relations with. Two NGOs in particular whose records proved relevant are the National Council of Churches (NCC) and its affiliate, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR).

Environmental NGOs

Beginning in the early 1960s, environmental issues increasingly entered the national and international consciousness, inspiring a flurry of new community and political organizing and activism.³ Of course, concern over protecting the natural world did not begin in the 1960s; there existed a number of conservation organizations, such as the Sierra Club, dating back to the late nineteenth century. However, such organizations tended to focus on protecting undeveloped lands and did not address how human activities (particularly in an industrial era) damaged both the natural ecology, as well as human health.

In the late 1960s a new wave of NGOs emerged in the U.S., staffed mostly by well-educated professionals, particularly lawyers devoted to working through courts and congress to institute policies promoting environmental sustainability. Expanding their focus beyond preservation of natural lands, these groups took on a wide array of issues, such as air pollution, nuclear power, and the dangers of pesticides. One of the most prominent of these new NGOs was (and continues to be) the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), which in many ways epitomizes the new wave of the late 1960s public interest NGOs.⁴ Founded in 1969, in part by a group of Yale law graduates, NRDC embraced what founder John Adams termed “responsible militancy,” working within the established system to improve it.⁵ In focusing on NRDC, the files at the RAC proved to be quite valuable, particularly in reference to the NRDC. While the Sierra Club maintains its own archives at the University of California-Berkeley, NRDC thus far has no repository for its records. However, because the RBF was a crucial funder of NRDC, in particular its international program, the records at the RAC provide a rich collection of primary source documents concerning NRDC in the 1970s and 1980s.

Given that ecological degradation is a global concern, it was not long before U.S. environmentalists began to expand their outlook and operations to become more transnational. A critical event in bringing a more global perspective for U.S. environmentalists came in June of 1972, with the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. Several U.S. environmental groups sent representatives to Stockholm and participated in forums and other events during the conference, including the Sierra Club, one of the first U.S. environmental groups to establish an international program, which it formally launched in May of 1972.⁶ While U.S. environmental groups came to Stockholm principally concerned with “preservationist” issues, such as protecting the oceans and tropical forests, the Stockholm conference, and

particularly a series of speeches by leaders and delegates from Global South nations, forced U.S. NGOs to consider more seriously the tensions and links between environmental protection and economic development.⁷

In the early and mid 1970s, social and economic development represented merely one among a long list of global environmental challenges the Sierra Club and NRDC's international programs sought to address. For example, in its first RBF grant proposal for the international program, NRDC stated that it would tackle, among other issues, nuclear energy exports, offshore oil drilling, water pollution, and corporate responsibility.⁸ The desire to work on so many efforts raised concerns about overextension among the RBF staff as they considered NRDC's requests for financial backing of the project. For example, a memo from RBF consultant Gene Setzer to program associate Gerald Barney, commenting on NRDC's initial proposal to create an international program, cautioned that "historically each of them (environmental and public interest NGOs), has started with a fairly narrow area of interest, and then, finding that 'you can't do only one thing,' additional items are added seriatim, usually on a 'project' basis."⁹

Concerns such as these, point to some of the core issues and tensions arising from NGO-foundation relations. Given that foundations do not have unlimited sums of money, there is naturally a demand for forms of accountability from those receiving grants. One method for foundations to create mechanisms for accountability emphasizes funding specific projects with concrete goals, achievable within a year or two. As Barney commented in a memo on funding environmental NGOs, the RBF "should not become involved in general support of US NGOs. We may want to help on specific projects, but in general these organizations haven't shaken down and become as effective as they should."¹⁰ Such attitudes help make sense of the support NRDC did and did not receive in the 1970s from the RBF. In 1976, NRDC's international

program received a grant to investigate ways in which U.S. environmental NGOs could better coordinate efforts with foreign NGOs. However, in general, the program found itself relying primarily on general support money NRDC received, rather than specific grants for global projects.¹¹

A major step forward for U.S. environmental groups to engage in global development concerns began in the mid-1970s when several NGOs coordinated an effort to push for environmentally-minded policies to be incorporated into the work of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In 1975, the Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and NRDC launched a lawsuit against USAID, demanding that it comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), with specific reference to USAID's funding of exports of the pesticide DDT to Global South nations. A major goal for the environmental groups centered on getting USAID to agree to conduct environmental impact assessments (EIAs) on all projects.¹² USAID settled the lawsuit, and by 1976 had commenced a serious program of reform to make its operations more environmentally conscious.¹³

The USAID effort provided a framework for U.S. environmentalists to push for reforms of other institutions involved in environment and development; as an internal RBF memo from William Moody pointed out, this effort "opened the door for many NGOs to encourage . . . international financial and technical assistance agencies to give more attention to sustainable development."¹⁴ However, reforming USAID would prove a relatively easy task compared to the NGOs' next campaign. As a federal government agency, it was susceptible to many legal and political pressures that multilateral institutions are not. Furthermore, many of the major environmental reforms enacted by USAID came during the Carter administration, which took a generally sympathetic line in responding to environmentalists' demands. Far more difficult

would be the next set of institutions U.S. environmentalists would turn to as part of promoting global sustainable development: the multilateral development banks (MDBs), such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank (ADB) and most notably, the World Bank.

In the early 1980s environmental advocates at NRDC, the Environmental Policy Institute (EPI), and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) began to look for a project they could undertake jointly that combined concrete short-term objectives, while also allowing environmentalists to make a major impact on global policymaking. This search led them to the World Bank and the other MDBs.¹⁵ The World Bank, the largest development organization in the world, also serves as a center of policy thinking about development issues. It had long promoted itself as a leader in incorporating environmental protection and sustainability in its lending programs. However, as the environmentalists emphasized again and again, the World Bank's rhetoric far exceeded its actual implementation of environmentally sustainable policies. One example environmentalists invariably pointed to was the fact that, even into the early 1980s, the World Bank employed only six staff working on environmental matters out of a workforce of more than six thousand.¹⁶

The environmentalists adopted a multi-pronged strategy in confronting the World Bank. In part, the campaign involved traditional lobbying in which NRDC, Sierra Club, EPI and other groups, helped to organize and gave presentations on the MDBs and the environment at congressional hearings, seventeen of which were held between 1983 and 1986 alone.¹⁷ Furthermore, the environmentalists allied themselves with sympathetic staff at the Treasury Department, which possesses great influence over U.S. policies towards the MDBs. U.S. NGOs (with the strong encouragement of RBF staff) also worked to build ties with NGOs in Europe

and the Global South, which served the dual function of giving U.S. groups access to more information about the on-the-ground impacts of MDB projects, as well as additional sources of political pressure. As the campaign gained both momentum and concrete achievements, it became an ever greater focus of U.S. environmental NGOs' international efforts. Whereas NRDC's first report on its international activities included a broad sweep of issues, their funding report for 1987 focused entirely on efforts aimed at the World Bank and USAID. Similarly, after over a decade of being based in New York and centering its work on the U.N., the Sierra Club moved its international program to Washington, D.C., with the explicit mission of engaging in "action campaigns to influence the international policies and activities of the U.S. government."¹⁸

By the end of the decade, EPI, NRDC, Sierra Club, and their allies around the world could point to a record of measurable achievements. Among these included the 1987 re-organization of the World Bank's structure, under new president Barber Conable, which included the formation of a much expanded Environment Department. Furthermore, the Sierra Club drafted legislation that was passed in 1989, requiring the U.S. executive director at the World Bank to vote against any World Bank loan which lacked an environmental impact assessment. The World Bank also began reaching out more systematically to NGOs, and in particular, recognized the significance of the environmentalists' effort. In a 1988 speech for example, World Bank Senior Vice President for Operations, Moeen A. Qureshi, acknowledged the environmentalists' accomplishments, stating that "[e]nvironmental NGOs have helped us become more keenly aware of natural resource and resettlement issues. I am grateful to them for that, even though their criticism has sometimes been harsh."¹⁹

The MDB campaign made a very strong impression on the RBF staffers working with the environmental groups. Corresponding in regard to the Sierra Club's booklet, *Bankrolling Disasters* (which served as a primary source of educational literature for the campaign), RBF consultant Thomas W. Wahman exclaimed in a letter to Larry Williams, of the Sierra Club, that reading the report made him "proud to know you and everyone else associated," adding that he felt this "document will also serve to undergird the Sierra Club's commitment to its international program. If I were a member of Sierra, I would say 'Right On!' I might even join."²⁰ The campaign's rapid growth and record of success provided the RBF staff with funding proposals that showed concrete successes and clear goals, two key elements in creating a favorable impression for receiving funds. This was reflected in future grants, as NRDC for example, received a three-year grant for its MDB work at a level of \$25,000 a year, and the Sierra Club's international program obtained a \$25,000 grant for use in 1987.²¹ Summing up the MDB campaign and the RBF's role in an April 1988 internal memo, Wahman, proclaimed that "[t]his was one of the best grants I've been associated with at the RBF. The grant was in the hands of dedicated and competent leadership, was timely, was used effectively with great leverage . . . to produce a credible initiative regarding the multilateral development banks (MDBs)."²²

The UNA and the ODC

Two other sets of NGO records I examined were those of the United Nations Association of America (UNA) and the Overseas Development Council (ODC). Both of these organizations came into existence with the explicit mission of moving both U.S. policy elites and ordinary citizens to become more aware of global issues. The UNA grew out of an earlier organization, the American Association for the United Nations (AAUN), which itself was decades old by 1945, having initially been founded to support U.S. involvement with the League of Nations.

While the AAUN and UNA focused on more traditional diplomatic issues of war and peace, even in the early 1950s they were taking note of development concerns. Rhetorically at least, the AAUN embraced a sweeping vision in which a “well-timed universal disarmament program” would be implemented, one that would allow “various countries [to] . . . finance a United Nations program of world economic and social development.”²³

Whereas the UNA built a network of “regular” Americans interested in promoting the U.N. and global piece, other organizations also emerged attempting to ensure sustained interest among U.S. citizens and governing elites in the affairs of the world, particularly the Global South. Among these was the Overseas Development Council, founded in 1968 as a “national citizen’s organization . . . to carry on a continuing program of reappraisal and education on the problems and needs of the less developed countries.”²⁴ ODC grew into an influential think tank by the early 1970s, publishing reports and organizing conferences on global development issues.

While in numerous ways very different, the UNA and ODC share some key traits. Although the thrust of both of these organizations was generally liberal, both strongly supporting foreign aid and expressing skepticism of foreign policy that emphasized military force, neither saw themselves as political advocates. In particular, both emphasized the need for consensus and dialogue among various interests, rather than any kind of hostility or political confrontation among interests.

This perspective can be seen, for example, in examining UNA and ODC’s boards of directors and major financial supporters. In 1978, ODC’s list of contributors included not only major philanthropic foundations, but also a wide array of multinational corporations, including Raytheon, Philip Morris, and Cargill, as well as a number of the major MDBs such as the World Bank.²⁵ Similarly, ODC accepted funds from USAID, and its relations with that agency became

intertwined to the point that one RBF staffer, James N. Hyde, expressed in a memo that he hoped ODC would become “less of an uncritical cheering section for USAID.”²⁶ On a similar note, in the mid-1970s, when the UNA moved to create a council of business and labor leaders, an RBF internal letter (unfortunately without names attached), asked bluntly whether such an initiative “is really needed?” – going on to question why more initiatives were needed amplifying the voice of “establishment leadership” and not towards less represented voices such as “young people” or “radicals.”²⁷

The general attitude of groups like UNA and ODC toward political change made them uncomfortable with efforts that involve hostility and confrontation between NGOs and international institutions. One example of this comes from ODC’s perspective on the environmentalists’ MDB campaign. By the late 1980s, while acknowledging that the environmentalists’ lobbying had produced positive results, ODC staff also expressed concerns regarding the often confrontational approach the environmental groups took towards the MDBs. Complaining that environmental NGOs depicted the World Bank in their efforts as a “near satanic institution with a seemingly insane desire to raze tropical forests,” ODC went on to see its role as bringing the sides “together to sort out their differences and overlapping interests.”²⁸

Religious NGOs and Infant Formula

One of the most significant NGO campaigns tackling development concerns in the 1970s and 1980s targeted multinational corporations, and their promotion and marketing of infant formula in the Global South. While a multifaceted effort, this campaign became most strongly associated with the international boycott of Nestlé. In the U.S. an important basis for this campaign came through mainline Protestant churches, in particular the National Council of Churches (NCC).

The RBF maintained a relationship with the NCC since the early 1950s. However, by the late 1960s, these relations had grown increasingly strained. These tensions primarily reflected the RBF's growing skepticism of the NCC's shift towards a greater emphasis on activism in this period, and its political shift to the left. While the NCC long possessed a liberal reputation, through the late 1960s the leadership moved towards more radical politics, including involving itself, albeit indirectly, with support for leftist guerilla movements in southern Africa.

RBF staff looked skeptically at the NCC's shift, primarily because they did not see the NCC as a good vessel for carrying out such a program. As RBF staffer Yorke Allen, Jr. wrote in a June 1968 memo to John D. Rockefeller 3rd, while he felt that "promotion of concepts such as 'justice', 'peace' and 'world development' fall within the purview of the Churches' outlook . . . they are not central to the main thrust of a religious organization."²⁹ By 1974, while the NCC would still send program proposals to the RBF, it appears most of these were rejected.³⁰

However, at the same time, the RF built a solid relationship with one of the main offspring of the NCC's increased political engagement, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), founded in 1970 as an NCC sponsored NGO. ICCR's mission centered on channeling the institutional strength of churches (especially through their stock holdings in major U.S. companies) to bring pressure on corporations to adopt better policies on issues ranging from hiring discrimination to environmental impacts to workers' rights issues. By the mid-1970s, ICCR came to increasingly focus on the controversy over multinational corporations' marketing of infant formula in the Global South.³¹ Corporations such as Nestlé and Bristol-Myers aggressively promoted infant formula in the Global South as a modern alternative to breast-feeding. However, as author and activist Andrew Chetley points out, safe use of infant formula requires a number of prerequisites, including sanitary conditions and literacy on part of

the mother, because if formula is used absent from these and other conditions, it can easily “lead to a lethal mix of weak contaminated fluids, which in turn leave infants with gastroenteritis, diarrhea . . . malnutrition and even death.”³² Activists in the U.S., Europe, and the Global South saw the infant formula issue as vital, both for its direct public health effects, as well as symbolic of larger issues of the interplay between people in the Global South and Western multinational corporations.

Before this campaign transformed into the boycott of Nestlé, the primary tactic employed by ICCR was the shareholder resolution, with ICCR helping to coordinate churches to introduce resolutions before companies they held stock in. In 1975, as it attempted to find shareholders with significant sway with companies such as Bristol-Myers, ICCR reached out to both the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, which were both major investors in Bristol-Myers. Presenting the evidence about the harmful impacts of infant formula and its marketing, ICCR succeeded in obtaining important support from both foundations. On April 21, 1975, Dr. John Knowles, president of the RF, sent a letter to Gavin MacBain, chairman of Bristol-Myers, requesting that the company publish “all relevant information to the outer limits permitted by competitive considerations” about their marketing and promotion of formula.³³ The RF also organized a number of meetings between company and NGO representatives to further efforts to find a solution. Furthermore, both the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations gave five-hundred dollar donations to help augment ICCR’s research of the negative health effects associated with misuse of infant formula in the Global South.³⁴ Unfortunately, I could not locate documents indicating what role the RF played in the infant formula controversy after 1977, the year that the boycott of Nestlé began.

Concluding Thoughts

The materials I examined at the RAC proved to be quite valuable as I continue to research and begin to write my dissertation. For one, they provide needed information and insight into other organizations that have archives and those that do not. In addition, they are a window into the crucial relationship between NGOs and foundations. While some critics portray foundations as a force of moderating and co-opting activist groups, my research points to a more complex relationship, in which many competing demands and interests, both on the parts of NGOs and foundations come into play. I deeply appreciate the RAC providing me with the opportunity to conduct this research.

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The ideas and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and are not intended to represent the Rockefeller Archive Center.

ENDNOTES:

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- ¹ Jessica T. Matthews, "Power Shift." *Foreign Affairs* 76: 1 (January-February 1997), p. 53.
- ² Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2002, p. 4.
- ³ See for example: Adam Rome, "'Give Earth a Chance': The Environmental Movement and the Sixties." *The Journal of American History* 90: 2 (September 2003), p. 525-554.
- ⁴ Rita McWilliams, "The Best and Worst of Public Interest Groups." *The Washington Monthly* 20: 2 (March 1988), pp. 19-27.
- ⁵ John H. Adams, "Responsible Militancy – The Anatomy of a Public Interest Law Firm." *Record of the Association of the City of New York* 20 (1971), pp. 631-645.
- ⁶ "Sierra Club Establishes New Office of International Environmental Affairs," May 8, 1972, Folder 5586, Box 922, RG 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York (hereafter designated RBF).
- ⁷ Patricia Rambach, "Report from Stockholm." *Sierra Club Bulletin* 57: 7 (July-August 1972), p. 19.
- ⁸ "Funding Proposal for NRDC International Project," January 9, 1975, Folder 4168, Box 696, RG 3.1, RBF.
- ⁹ Gene W. Setzer to Gerald O. Barney, "NRDC – International Project," March 20, 1975, Folder 4168, Box 696, RG 3.1, RBF.
- ¹⁰ Gerald O. Barney to William S. Moody and Russell A. Phillips Jr., April 23, 1976, Folder 4169, Box 696, RG 3.1, RBF.
- ¹¹ William S. Moody to RBF Files, "Natural Resources Defense Council—Grant Control Sheet—Recommendation to October 1985 Executive Committee Meeting," pp. 1-2, September 10, 1985, Folder 4175, Box 697, RG 3.1, RBF.
- ¹² "AID Publishes NEPA Regulations." *NRDC World Environment Alert*, 1: 2, April 1, 1976.
- ¹³ Robert O. Blake, Barbara J. Lausche, S. Jacob Scherr, Thomas B. Stoel, Jr., Gregory A. Thomas, "Aiding the Environment: A Study of the Environmental Policies, Procedures, and Performance of the U.S. Agency for International Development," p. 25, February 1980. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAH452.pdf
- ¹⁴ William S. Moody to RBF Files, "Natural Resources Defense Council-Grant Control Sheet-Recommendation to October 1985 Executive Committee Meeting," pp. 1-2, September 10, 1985, Folder 4175, Box 697, RG 3.1, RBF.
- ¹⁵ There already exists a sizeable political science literature on the MDB campaign, much of which focuses on the policy implications for the World Bank rather than how NGOs helped achieve the gains they did. See for example: Robert Wade, "Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment, 1970-1995." In *The World Bank: Its First Half Century* 2 Perspectives, editors Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1997, pp. 611-734.
- ¹⁶ Bruce Rich, *Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Development*. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1994, p. 111.
- ¹⁷ Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists. Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998, p. 139.
- ¹⁸ Douglas P. Wheeler to Board of Directors, "Re-Orienting of International Program," p. 1, September 11, 1985, Folder 5591, Box 923, RG 3.1, RBF.
- ¹⁹ Moeen A. Qureshi, "The World Bank and NGOs: New Approaches," p. 4, April 22, 1988, Folder 7747, Box 1249, RG 3.2, RBF.
- ²⁰ Thomas W. Wahman to Larry Williams, September 25, 1986, Folder 7744, Box 1249, RG 3.2, RBF.
- ²¹ "A Report to Rockefeller Brothers Fund on NRDC's International Program," November 1987, Folder 4177, Box 697, RG 3.1, RBF and "From Agenda and Docket for RBF Executive Committee Meeting—Sierra Club Foundation," April 14, 1987, Folder 8928, Box 1427, RG 3.2, RBF.
- ²² Thomas W. Wahman to RBF Files, "Environmental Policy Institute-Final Evaluation," April 6, 1988, Folder 7746, Box 1249, RG 3.2, RBF.
- ²³ "Statement of Policy for 1951 Adopted by the Board of Directors of the American Association for the United Nations," p. 5, 1951, Folder 339, Box 47, RG 3.1, RBF.
- ²⁴ "Overseas Development Council: Prospectus," July 1968, Folder 4854, Box 807, RG 3.1, RBF.
- ²⁵ Overseas Development Council Annual Report, 1978, Folder 4869, Box 809, RG 3.1, RBF.
- ²⁶ James N. Hyde to RBF Files, p. 3, November 29, 1977, Folder 4866, Box 809, RG 3.1, RBF.
- ²⁷ Letter about UNA Business and Labor Council, April 6, 1976, Folder 6197, Box 1018, RG 3.1, RBF.
- ²⁸ John W. Sewell to Stephen Viederman, April 6, 1987, Folder 8672, Box 1388, RG 3.2, RBF.

²⁹ Yorke Allen, Jr. to Mr. John D. Rockefeller 3rd, "Department of International Affairs–National Council of Churches," p. 2, June 20, 1968, Folder 3823, Box 639, RG 3.1, RBF.

³⁰ Raymond B. Knudsen to Dana S. Cree, May 10, 1974, Folder 3831, Box 640, RG 3.1, RBF.

³¹ A good overview of the founding and early activities of the ICCR can be found in: M. David Ermann and William H. Clements II, "The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility and Its Campaign against Marketing Infant Formula in the Third World." *Social Problems*, 32: 2 (December 1984), pp. 185-196.

³² Andrew Chetley, *The Politics of Baby Foods: Successful Challenges to an International Marketing Strategy*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986, p. 8.

³³ ICCR, "Chronology–The Baby Bottle Lawsuit: The Sisters of the Precious Blood vs. Bristol-Myers," 1977, (A81), 200A, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York (hereafter designated RFA).

³⁴ Rockefeller Foundation to Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, December 21, 1976, (A81), 200A, RFA.