Medievalism in American Culture: The Cloisters

by Sabine Tischer

The branch of the Metropolitan Museum of Art known as The Cloisters, located in Fort Tryon Park in New York City, was one of the major philanthropic projects of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. (JDR Jr.) and it bears the stamp of his active personal interest. In the history of American cultural patronage, this project stands out in three ways. First, JDR Jr. donated not only an art collection to the museum but also an endowment and the building in which the collection would be housed, thus creating one of the first branch museums in the United States operating with its own funds. Second, the collection is the only public collection in this country devoted exclusively to Western European medieval art and architecture. Finally, the choice of an architectural style based on medieval prototypes and thus sympathetic to the collection represented a marked departure from contemporary museum designs.

All these aspects have been acknowledged in standard accounts of The Cloisters. Little attempt has been made, however, to illuminate what motivated JDR Jr. to make this remarkable donation. JDR Jr.’s records in the Rockefeller Family archives clarify the correlation between the genesis of The Cloisters, his philanthropic vision, and his aesthetic interests. My study examines the ideas that both motivated the stupendous growth and shaped the installation of Western medieval art and architecture in American public collections in the first half of this century. In particular, this study is concerned with what these ideas reveal about the perceptions of medieval art and architecture in American culture. JDR Jr.’s records suggest that his ideas for The Cloisters were rooted in the antimodern thought that took hold among the educated and affluent at the end of the 19th century. Within antimodernism, the artifacts of medieval culture were understood as witnesses to a bygone civilization rich in those qualities that modern, stable, and progressive civilization lacked, but which it ought to possess if it was not to be doomed.

The idea of creating a park in northern Manhattan that overlooked the Hudson River and contained a museum devoted to medieval art dates back to 1916. In that year, JDR Jr. bought a hundred Gothic pieces from the sculptor and collector George Grey Barnard, who had amassed a collection of medieval art and architectural elements from churches and monasteries in southern France and northern Spain. Unable to sell them, Barnard in 1914 opened the Barnard Cloisters, a museum located at 190th Street and Fort Washington Avenue in Manhattan. JDR Jr. acquired the Gothic pieces from Barnard with the idea of establishing a museum of his own, but his plans were interrupted by World War I. In 1925 JDR Jr. offered to fund the purchase of the entire Barnard Cloisters by the Metropolitan Museum,
while retaining the right to later change the location of the collection and to construct for it a new museum building at his own expense. Despite the Great Depression, the project gradually took shape. In 1930 JDR Jr. gave the Fort Tryon property to the city, reserving four-and-a-half acres as a site for the museum, and the following year architect Charles Collens of Boston submitted plans, which in general were approved by both JDR Jr. and Metropolitan officials. In 1935 Fort Tryon Park was opened to the public, and in 1938 The Cloisters opened, with parts of both the Barnard collection and JDR Jr.’s Gothic pieces forming the core of the new museum’s collection.

In offering his collection to JDR Jr., Barnard stressed the significance it would bear for American sculptors unfamiliar with European techniques of stone cutting. The Metropolitan Museum welcomed the donation for its educational value for a public with little awareness of the history of the art and architecture of medieval Europe. However, JDR Jr. bore a different goal in mind. In his speech at the opening of The Cloisters, he commented on the theme of leisure and the value of beauty: “With the changes that time has brought, the wholesome and profitable use of leisure...is one of the great problems of the day. In its solution the cultural and uplifting value of beauty, whether apprehended with eye or ear, is playing an increasingly important part.” He expressed his hope that “The Cloisters in their new environment, surrounded by nature at her best, will become another stimulating center for the profitable use of leisure.” He was clear about the spiritual profit that he intended modern visitors to find in the museum’s environment he helped create: “If what has been created here helps to interpret beauty as one of the great spiritual and inspirational forces of life, having the power to transform drab duty into radiant living; if those who come under the influence of this place go out to face life with new courage and restored faith because of the peace, the calm, the loveliness they have found here; if the many who thirst for beauty are refreshed and gladdened as they drink deeply from this well of beauty, those who have built here will not have built in vain.”

The correspondence between JDR Jr. and art dealers, as well as records of the ways he furnished his homes, make it clear that artistic beauty was for him a category defined in scope. Fitting in general the pattern of antimodern aesthetic interests, JDR Jr.’s taste reveals, on one hand, a deep appreciation for Western medieval and antique oriental decorative arts, characterized by balanced design and superb craftsmanship; and, on the other hand, little interest in painting and no interest at all in modern art. The antimodern pattern of taste in general implied the notion that the artifacts of medieval and oriental cultures — whether sacred or profane — embodied an intense spiritual experience. That JDR Jr. valued medieval art and architecture and its revival because of the spiritual impulse that they represented is revealed by the records of his support of both neo-Gothic church structures and the restoration of the cathedrals in Rheims and Chartres.

Antimodern sentiments not only motivated The Cloisters but also shaped the installation of its
collection. It is clear that JDR Jr. wanted neither a place of worship nor one too suggestive of a church. He vetoed partially the exterior plan developed by the Metropolitan’s curator, Joseph Breck, who thought that the origin of the collection demanded a structure similar to a southern French medieval monastery, which would be dominated by a church. In its final form, the exterior combines the castle-like structure preferred by JDR Jr. with monastic but not church forms. It is interesting that at the same time that he argued against a church-like exterior, JDR Jr’s visions for the interior reveal his desire that the building provide an intimate and emotionally stimulating shell for the collection similar to the earlier candle-lit, church-like setting of Barnard’s Cloisters.

The interior design developed by the curators followed their educational considerations and resulted in a spacious and well-lit display of the objects, but in the Tapestry Hall JDR Jr. requested an alteration that resulted in the division of the hall into two rooms with subdued light. Rockefeller had protected his vision of the museum at the outset by giving it only the property sufficient for its construction, thus eliminating the possibility of expansion. He also vetoed the incorporation of educational facilities into the design; these, he thought, could be offered at the main museum. These restrictions continue to arouse debate, yet, from the perspective of the donor, they can be understood as restrictions that preserve The Cloisters as a citadel “for spiritual and inspirational forces” by means of intense aesthetic experiences.

The idea of creating a place in the city for withdrawal and rest to promote spiritual and creative aspects of life is recurrent in JDR Jr.’s thought and philanthropy. This idea is an outgrowth of liberal Protestantism’s reaction against the secularizing tendencies of a culture of consumption. Embracing the anitmodernists’ perception of medieval culture, JDR Jr. appreciated medieval artifacts for representing a more intense spiritual experience that put religion at the center of daily life, not on its periphery.
“appraisal and plan” was appointed by the trustees to examine the purpose and future direction of the various Rockefeller boards. In its massive report submitted in 1934, the committee implicitly criticized the “cloistered kind of research” that the HD had previously supported. It recommended instead that rather than focusing on a small number of scholars “as interpreters of the past,” the officers of the HD were to turn their attention to “widening the area of public appreciation” and “reaching minds” more effectively through the new media of mass communications. Responding to these suggestions, as echoed by the sentiments expressed in memoranda and position papers, Marshall and Stevens began to examine how the HD could cut back its support of “antiquarianism” and “the traditions of the polite learning and exact scholarship” in favor of “those men and methods able to influence contemporary taste of large masses of population.”

The move towards communications can be seen as part of a challenge to the “monopoly of knowledge” held by the traditional humanistic disciplines. The new humanities program, with its emphasis upon how culture could be cultivated through general education, implied a closer working relationship between Rockefeller philanthropy, media producers in the private and public sectors, educational and consumer groups, as well as government officials. Correspondingly, relations with the sites of humanistic scholarship, namely the traditional and classical departments of elite universities, were to be attenuated. Implicit within this shift was the view that the organization of production within these universities was narrow and elitist, with little bearing on broader patterns of culture and understanding. Accordingly, the HD set its sights on mobilizing thought and action in a variety of sites, largely outside of the university system, with a view to increasing public appreciation of culture. By its very nature, this ambitious agenda involved greater attention given to communications.

The interest of the HD in communications embodied the overall concern with social control that underpinned the “structural unity” of the RF divisional realignment. The medical sciences division, as its director Alan Gregg wrote in his 1932 annual report, was to give special attention to both psychiatry and psychobiology. The field of neurology was singled out for particular emphasis, as it was held that through understanding and control of the nervous system, “physical pain and mental stress” could be relieved. Similarly, the division of natural sciences, in the hope of Max Mason, was to focus on “man and his problems of the mind.” In the same way that the natural science and medical science divisions were to address issues of control in relation to the mind, the nervous system, and the microbiological processes of the human body, the Humanities Division was to turn its attention to how minds were reached — and controlled — externally, through the intricate web of communications.

In this sense, the HD’s concern with the cultural and communicative aspects of control was to complement the social or “human relations” aspects of control that had become the mandate of the social sciences division under the direction of E.E. Day. To a considerable extent, the Humanities Division worked in tandem with the General Education Board (GEB), another Rockefeller philanthropy with whom it shared areas of concern. This coordination of tasks was simplified by the fact that John Marshall, in addition to holding the position of “assistant director for the humanities,” in the RF, was also “assistant director in general education” in the GEB.

The combined communications program of the HD and GEB encompassed a broad range of initiatives, practices, and research projects, including support for meetings, fellowships, publications, and research projects. And despite the strictures against involving itself in propaganda and direct political and social intervention, Rockefeller philanthropy supported a variety of institutions and practices which were considered to be inherently communicative in nature, and relevant to how the public appreciation of culture developed. These included not only broadcasting and motion pictures, but also drama, music, handicrafts, printing, illustrating, museums and libraries. Moreover, consistent with its mandate...
to help improve international understanding, the program in communications sought to overcome national partisanship and encourage international cooperation. Support also was given to ventures in short-wave radio transmission, to microphotography, and to establishing English as a universal language through the Basic English program pioneered by I.A. Richards.

What the various forms of communication practice and technology had in common was the potential to bring the highest values of civilization to the contemporary world. To be sure, it was maintained that mass communications were increasingly becoming vehicles for mass entertainment, to the detriment of elevating public taste. Yet the officers of the HD did not believe that the mass media were destined to provide only the banal and trivial material that the public seemed to demand. They did not agree with those who claimed that the educational and cultural potential of communications technology could only be realized within a publicly supported non-commercial sector; they held that the media could elevate the cultural tastes of the public within a largely commercial framework, provided that the fundamental changes were undertaken.

Nevertheless, it was believed that mass communications, as they had developed within the commercial sector, had become overtly concerned with controlling the largest and most widely dispersed audience possible. Correspondingly, the material transmitted was oriented towards short-term gratification rather than towards cultural elevation. The HD took the position, consonant with the ideas of Harold Adams Innis, that the development of mass media within a commercial framework had led to a bias towards the “space-binding” aspect of communications to the detriment of the “time-binding” aspect of communications.

One of the major goals of the communications program was to encourage the time-binding aspect of communications, thereby bringing it more into balance with the predominate space-binding aspect. Specifically, this involved the support for initiatives in mass communications oriented towards a more informed and discriminating citizenry. In order to help develop the time-binding aspect of communications technology, the HD underwrote projects which would produce countervailing knowledge about communications. This explains why the support for public institutions as sites for communication formed such an important component of the Rockefeller program.

It was through schools, universities, museums, libraries, archives, public broadcasting organizations, and drama societies that the space-binding bias of new technologies could be balanced and corrected. The glue that held this together was new forms of knowledge, which would pressure private institutions to be more publicly responsible, while at the same time generating a reservoir of knowledge that would make publicly rooted media practice possible.

The Rockefeller Foundation and the Tuberculosis Program in France, 1917-1922

by Andrés Horacio Reggiani

In July 1917, just a few months after the United States had entered the First World War, a small group of American public health experts appointed by the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) arrived in France to develop and coordinate administrative and technical measures to curb the spread of tuberculosis. The fundamental goals of the Commission for the Prevention of Tuberculosis in France — also known as the Rockefeller Mission — were aimed at hygiene education and the modernization of health-care services.

The records of the RF’s International Health Board (IHB) offer a detailed account of the activities carried out by the tuberculosis program and provide an insightful perspective on public health conditions in France. The most relevant sources in this collection include the regular reports from the Mission’s Director to the Executive Committee of the IHB. They also contain American health officials’ confidential impressions of French methods of handling fundamental problems of social hygiene. Also included in the collection is an extensive set of propaganda and educational material.
Over two hundred American private charities and philanthropic organizations participated in various types of war-relief operations throughout Europe during World War I. More than forty of these institutions were devoted to assisting French war victims, and by 1916 as many as eight different organizations were concerned specifically with the aid of French tuberculous civilians and military. The Rockefeller Mission was thus one among a large group of organizations seeking to help the disease-ridden populations, but in terms of the nature and goals of its assistance, the RF followed an independent course of action whenever possible. The major exception to its independent approach was the educational and propaganda operations it conducted with the American Red Cross. The IHB discouraged the seemingly widespread view that the Mission would be a source of financial support for the various worthy, yet mostly uncoordinated and competing, tuberculosis relief agencies. American and French field personnel warned the Board’s Executive Committee that providing such support risked not only wasting valuable resources, but also would compromise the RF’s reputation. Any undertaking was to be grounded, therefore, on a concrete set of feasible goals and a carefully laid-out plan to assure an efficient use of the funds that the RF was willing to commit.

The idea of a tuberculosis program came out of a report submitted in the fall of 1916 by Warwick Greene, director of the RF’s Commission for War Aid, who warned about the catastrophic increase of the “white plague.” In early 1917 the IHB sent Herman Biggs, Commissioner of Health of the State of New York, to assess the situation in France and to inquire about the feasibility of providing some sort of assistance. A few months later, the Board established the Commission for the Prevention of Tuberculosis in France and appointed as director Livingston Farrand, President of the University of Colorado and Executive Secretary of the National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis.

The Mission’s direct involvement in France extended over a period of almost six years, from 1917 into 1922. Its main field operations comprised three major undertakings. It set up and reorganized a network of health care services in rural and urban areas. It conducted a nationwide campaign of health education using five motorized travelling units staffed by physicians, nurses, and technicians, and equipped with audio-visual and printed material. The Commission also established and supported a school of public-health visitors based upon the Anglo-American model and introduced a centralized statistical method to keep track of all reported cases of tuberculosis. Its work also involved political persuasion: Right after the war, the Mission’s top officials began lobbying French political and medical leaders to convince them of the need to adopt a comprehensive national health policy.

In 1922 the Mission transferred most of its programs to the French Comité National de Défense contre la Tuberculose and to the various local
tuberculosis associations. This transfer of responsibilities to local authorities did not mean, however, the end of the RF’s involvement in France. As they became more familiar with their host country, American officials grew increasingly skeptical about the possibility of effecting any enduring change in health policy-making unless the work already done was continued by selective assistance to those institutions decidedly committed to the methods introduced by the Americans. Thus, through the Paris Office of the IHB, the foundation continued to channel funds to a few carefully chosen programs, mostly in the form of subsidies to schools of public-health visitors in Paris, Lille, Nantes, Bordeaux, Strasbourg, Marseille, and Lyon. It also provided scholarships for nurses and physicians to undergo special training in tuberculosis at the Pasteur Institute, and subventions for propaganda and popular education campaigns carried out by French organizations. Another, less overt yet very important form of influence consisted of bringing promising young physicians to the U.S. for training in new methods of public-health administration and organization. The IHB also invited prominent doctors and hygiénistes to visit some of the most advanced medical centers in America.

What was the legacy of the RF’s public health program in France? I find its historical significance in two distinct sets of issues. First, the medical, educational, technical, and administrative methods introduced by the Mission made even more evident than before the flaws and shortcomings of French public-health policies. This contrast in policy and medical styles was manifest in the different attitudes towards concrete issues, such as the compulsory reporting of tuberculosis, adopted by French and American doctors. While RF officials never hid their pessimistic views of French bureaucratic and cultural attitudes—they just restricted them to confidential reports—it is undeniable that their physicians and nurses began or stimulated the modernization of health-care structures and medical practices. The short-term impact of the Mission’s activities can be seen in the creation of local tuberculosis associations and social hygiene boards; the successful introduction of a newly conceived dispensary, staffed full-time; and the establishment of schools of public health visitors in most of the major cities. Moreover, by bringing some of the most talented French students, physicians, and nurses to work together with their American counterparts, the Mission initiated and encouraged a process of socialization among medical experts that would have a lasting impact upon their formative experience and professional careers. It will be of little surprise, then, to find that some of the most persistent criticisms of France’s health policies in later years came from those who had either worked with the Mission or visited American institutions.

Secondly, the RF’s role in the modernization of French public health necessarily addresses the larger, more contemporary debate about “Americanization.” In recent years the topic has received the increasing attention of historians, political scientists, and economists on both sides of the Atlantic. Most of these studies have concentrated on post-World War II political, economic, diplomatic, or cultural issues. The study of the Commission for the Prevention of Tuberculosis offers three distinct perspectives through which to test current arguments about American influence in France and elsewhere. First, we can see the reaction generated by the arrival of American views, methods, technology, and human resources into a society that had contributed some of the most important discoveries and innovations in the history of Western medicine. Second, the Rockefeller Mission stood out to their French hosts, above all, as an “American” enterprise—indeed, the French called it la Mission américaine. To nearly all the peasant and working-class families and schoolchildren of the villages visited by the travelling units, these “soldiers of science” were their first objective “encounter” with America. Third, the tuberculosis program was conceived and conducted as a private, independently run, philanthropic opera-
tion, even after the U.S. had entered the war on the French side. The Mission's staff reported only to the Executive Committee of the IHB in New York and had no formal ties to American governmental agencies. These issues might help expand our understanding of the process of the construction of the welfare state by focussing our attention to its fieldwork, where state policy intersects with modern philanthropy, French and American mutual perceptions, and technocratic claims to rational administration.

Research Grant Program

For 1997 the Rockefeller Archive Center will have two components to its program of Grants for Travel and Research. In addition to the regular competitive program that is open to researchers in any discipline engaged in research that requires use of its collections, the Center will award between five and ten grants to support research on topics related to the continent of Africa. The competition for these targeted grants will use the same application form and follow the same guidelines as the general program.

Applicants from within the U.S. and Canada may request support of up to $1,500; because of the additional cost of travel, applicants from other nations may request up to $2,000. The deadline for applications is November 30, 1996; grant recipients will be announced in March 1997. Application forms and additional information are available from the Center’s director, Darwin H. Stapleton.

Forty-two scholars have received stipends to conduct research at the Rockefeller Archive Center during 1996. These grant recipients, their institutions, and research topics are listed below.

Rima D. Apple
Professor, Department of Consumer Science and the Women's Studies Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
“The Perfect Mother: Mothers and Scientific Mothering, 1850-1990s.”

John Baick
Ph.D. Candidate in History, New York University.
“Reorienting Culture: New York Elites and the Turn toward East Asia.”

Cheryl Barkey
Ph.D. Candidate in History, University of California-Davis.
“Gender, Science and Modernity: Reproduction in Republican China.”

Josep Lluis Barona Vilar
Honorary Professor of the History of Science, University of Valencia.
“The Rockefeller Foundation and the Promotion of Science in Spain, 1913-1939.”

Jayne Beilke
Assistant Professor, Secondary, Higher and Foundations of Education, Ball State University.
“The Role of the General Education Board Fellowship Program in the Production of a Black Educational Leadership Cadre.”

Heather Bell
Ph.D. Candidate in Modern History and Rhodes Research Fellow, St. Hilda’s College, University of Oxford.

Anne Bowler
Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Delaware.
Laura Briggs  
Ph.D. Candidate, Department of American Civilization, Brown University and Visiting Scholar, Department of Anthropology, University of Arizona.  
“Reform, Medicine, and Empire: Puerto Rico and the Development of Birth Control and Social Hygiene in the U.S., 1910-1960.”

William Haas  
Assistant Professor, Department of History, Fort Lewis College.  
“Red and Expert: The Life of Robert Hodes.”

Rebecca Hayes  
Ph.D. Candidate, Social Foundations of Education, University of Virginia.  
“George Edgar Vincent: An Intellectual and Professional Journey through the Progressive Era and into the 20th Century.”

Soma Hewa  
Professor, Department of Behavioral Sciences, Mount Royal College, Calgary.  
“Philanthropy and Cultural Context: Rockefeller Philanthropy and Cultural Dialectics.”

Rogers Hollingsworth  
Professor, Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison.  
“Why Some Universities and Medical Centers Make Major Discoveries in Bio-medical Science, but Most Make None.”

Clifton Hood  
Assistant Professor, Department of History, Hobart and William Smith Colleges.  
“The Political Economy of New York City.”

Meg Jacobs  
Ph.D. Candidate in History, University of Virginia and Predoctoral Fellow, Smithsonian Institution.  

Elizabeth Janetta  
Teaching Fellow, Department of History, University of Pittsburgh.  
“From Independence to Revolution: Public Health in Cuba, 1895-1959.”

Shirish Kavadi  
Senior Research Officer, The Foundation for Research in Community Health, India.  
“Public Health and Medical Research in India: The Role of the Rockefeller Foundation, 1913-1971.”

Otniel Dror  
Ph.D. Candidate in History, Princeton University.  

Dianne Glave  
Lecturer and Fellow, Department of History, Loyola Marymount University.  

Richard S. Glotzer  
Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Africana and Latino Studies, SUNY Oneonta.  
“<h2>Rockefeller Philanthropy, Anglo-American Relations, and Post-War Africa.</h2>
This dispensary, its staff, and their specially equipped bus in Bordeaux in 1923 were part of the public health campaign conducted by the Comité National de Défense contre la Tuberculose with Rockefeller Foundation support. Public health in France is among the topics that will be examined by researchers at the Archive Center this year.

Yanek Mieczkowski
Ph.D. Candidate in American History, Columbia University.
“Gerald Ford and America in the Age of Limits.”

Lion Murad
Associate Researcher, Centre de Recherche Médecine Maladie et Sciences Sociales, Paris.

Suzanne Newman
Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Art History, University of New Mexico.
“Institutionalizing Taste: The Indian Arts Fund and the Aestheticization of Pueblo Pottery.”

Manon Niquette
Assistant Professor, Department of Communication and Information, Université Laval, Quebec.
“Exhibitions as Media: The Rockefeller Foundation’s Support for Science Museums, 1934-1943.”

Rebecca Pels
Ph.D. Candidate in History, University of Virginia.

Rebecca Plant
Ph.D. Candidate in History, The Johns Hopkins University.
“Governing the Unconscious: Psychoanalysis and American Culture in World War II and the Cold War.”

Anne Marie Rafferty
Senior Lecturer and Director, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, University of London.

Jonathan Rees
Ph.D. Candidate in History, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
“Managing the Mills: Labor Policy in the American Steel Industry, 1892-1937.”
The Republican Party in the South in the 1968 Presidential Election

by Elena Vorobiova

For my dissertation about the development of the Republican party in the South and its attempts to attract Southern voters to its ranks in the 1968 presidential election, I visited the Rockefeller Archive Center to examine the Nelson A. Rockefeller papers and the papers of political analyst Graham Molitor. The main focus of my research was the Molitor papers. Graham Molitor had been hired by Rockefeller in 1964 primarily to monitor Barry Goldwater during Rockefeller’s campaign for the Republican presidential nomination. The Molitor papers from 1964 introduced me to the situation within the GOP and to the reasons for the conservatives’ success during the second half of the 1960s. They also contained abundant material concerning the 1968 presidential election, such as Republican party briefing books and newsletters, voting participation analysis, political profiles of the states, Republican national convention material, newspaper clippings, and material on the positions taken by the main contenders from both parties, including Hubert H. Humphrey, Robert F. Kennedy, Richard M. Nixon, and Ronald W. Reagan.

Material from the Nelson A. Rockefeller Gubernatorial Press Office Public Relations files gave me firsthand information on many positions taken by Governor Rockefeller during his campaign in 1968. The press office maintained a binder of positions which the Domestic Research Staff recommended to Rockefeller and examples of answers to questions that reporters might ask at press conferences. Rockefeller’s staff did a great job putting together information on the points of view of different candidates, comparing and contrasting their positions, analyzing the current situation, and giving advice about how to approach certain issues and how to use opponents’ weaknesses for Rockefeller’s own benefit. These materials allow researchers to reconstruct political portraits of the major candidates in the 1968 bid for the presidency.

A preliminary analysis of these materials reveals that the Republican party had serious plans to win Southern voters in 1968. However, this GOP “southern strategy” was not its main emphasis and, as documents show, there were many other parts of the country, such as the Northeast, that Republicans considered important for their victory in November and into which they channeled their resources. The efforts of Alabama Governor George C. Wallace to form an organized protest movement among Southern
that fall the GOP’s nominee for president, Richard M. Nixon, concentrated only on the Border Southern states, leaving the rest of the region to Wallace.

The material I examined at the Rockefeller Archive Center indicates that in 1968 Rockefeller had no special plans to attract Southern voters and concentrated his main efforts on the regions of traditional Republican support, rather than pursuing a risky path to the former Confederacy. His positions, compared with Nixon’s and especially Reagan’s, were too liberal to attract white conservatives in the South and not liberal enough to attract Southern blacks, who viewed the Democrats as their advocates on such issues as civil rights. The documents also indicate that Rockefeller considered Nixon to be his main opponent for the nomination, and accordingly he criticized Nixon on social and foreign relations issues.

Party unity was one of the main themes in the Republican campaign for the presidency. The documents reveal that Rockefeller and other GOP candidates were very dedicated to preserving party unity, and even strong disagreements between the conservative and moderate wings of the party were not allowed to obstruct this objective. The party had learned from its mistake of 1964 and sought a moderate candidate capable of attracting a wide range of voters all across the country.

My research at the Rockefeller Archive Center has substantially enriched my knowledge and understanding of the positions of the major Republican presidential contenders in 1968. For a Russian scholar it was a rare opportunity to see primary sources firsthand. With additional information from the Richard Nixon archives, the Republican party National Committee papers at the National Archives, and the George Wallace papers at the Alabama Department of Archives and History, I now have a more comprehensive picture of the political events in 1968 and the Republican party’s successful efforts to win the once solidly Democratic South.

whites were viewed as a potential threat to Republican efforts to capture Southern votes for their column. But there is no indication that the GOP or any of its candidates had plans to negotiate with Wallace or to organize a strong attempt to contest his stronghold in the Deep South. Southern Republicans played an important role at the party’s national convention in Miami Beach as they influenced both the adoption of the platform and the selection of the vice-presidential candidate, Spiro Agnew. But in the three-party race

Why I Run.

America cries out for a leader. Events overwhelm us. Change outruns us. Headlines deliver us our daily jolt. “Things are in the saddle, and ride mankind”—this warning we have let come true. I run for President because I do not believe this must happen to us.

I believe we can recapture control of things. I believe we can end the drift, the doubt, the division. I intend to say how, in person, in newspapers, on television. I intend to state what course I believe America must follow.

My beliefs will not be tailored to please the voters of this region or that. What I believe in New York, I believe in Nebraska. And I will answer for it throughout the campaign.

I do not take my case to Republicans alone. It is a nation and not just a party which needs leading, healing uniting.
Rockefeller Public Health Assistance in Chile

by Vicki Weinberg

Research into the records of the Rockefeller Foundation’s activity in Chilean health care suggests two points. The Rockefeller Foundation (RF) was basic to development of the medical system in Chile, helping to make it the largest state-sponsored health-care system in the Americas. Equally significant, indigent women and their infants were fundamental to Chile’s medical system. The combination of Chilean specialization with the Foundation’s desire to establish community-based, social, preventive medicine made Chile one of Latin America’s centers in providing for maternal and infant health. The lives of impoverished women and children, therefore, were key to international and national medico-political interactions.

The RF’s work in Chile had inauspicious roots. In 1919, an RF representative conducted an informal survey of Chilean public health. He underscored with amazement the high level of infant deaths in Chile. This represented a new challenge for the RF, for in Brazil, where the RF had focused its public health work in South America, the main problem was epidemics of disease, such as yellow fever. Epidemics were less of a problem in Chile, and the fact that Chile’s high rate of infant and maternal mortality did not result from epidemics raised questions about community health programs. In the 1930s, as part of a larger institutional redirection, the RF reviewed its Latin American policy outside of Brazil and, seeing no improvement in Chile, undertook what became a forty-year commitment to preventive community health care in Chile.

RF leaders at first envisioned Argentina as the focus of its expanded South American health program in the 1930s. But turbulent politics in Peronist Argentina, coupled with perceived anti-Semitism and independence among Argentine physicians, prompted Lewis W. Hackett, RF advisor for South America, to rethink further investment there. In contrast, political stability, eager state and medical leaders, pressure from U.S. scholars, and the tremendous rate of infant mortality were all factors which drew the RF’s interest towards Chile. Chile had one of the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in the Americas. Approximately 300 out of every 1,000 infants died before their first birthday. After years of addressing these issues without success, Chileans welcomed RF involvement. Elite Chileans encouraged RF efforts, for they saw infant mortality as a profound threat to the country’s development and as a source of national shame. Public health for poor mothers and children became a major social issue.

In the eyes of the RF’s leaders, Chile offered free reign to implement their ideas about solving basic social problems, like infant mortality, using fewer resources than were required for massive epidemiological control. Underlying the RF’s thinking were implicit expectations that, unlike epidemics, solving infant mortality would be politically noble and also would have an eventual, natural conclusion. Babies would not continue to die after the RF introduced modern medicine, health training, and maternal education. A relatively small investment, they hoped, would result in great success. RF officials did expect that Chile would be an important site for their medical activity in South America. They understood their role to be that of a modest benefactor until Chileans were trained to take over public health themselves.

With financial support from the government of Chile, foundation representatives and reformist physicians began to look for ways to teach Chilean medical personnel how to ameliorate Chilean health care. First, RF and Chilean personnel constructed a community health clinic in one of Santiago’s poorest barrios, Quinta Normal. Unlike previous clinics, Quinta Normal was to act as a social medical clinic geared toward preventive and community care. It specialized in adult tuberculosis and in child and maternal care. Rockefeller personnel planned for Quinta Normal...
to address infant health less on an individual basis and more as a social issue requiring community-oriented nutritional and vaccination programs, maternal education and infant-maternal health care.

Along with the Quinta Normal clinic, RF officials established the Chilean Institutes for Public Health, Public Health Nursing, and Sanitation. They revamped the medical school curriculum, previously based on surgical and curative care, and provided U.S. fellowships, equipment, and representatives to enact changes in medical training. Foundation and Chilean leaders correlated Quinta Normal activity and Institute education to furnish hands-on experience to newly trained public health nurses, physicians and Chilean fellows. This coordinated approach eventually proved relatively successful in offering community-based public health care.

In the short run, however, U.S. public health nurses sent to Chile expressed frustration at conditions in Quinta Normal. They lacked sufficient resources and were overrun with clients. Nurses like Elizabeth Brackett faced conflict and difficulties from several directions. “Although I have read about the living conditions of the poorer classes in Chile,” Brackett wrote in her diary on July 26, 1942, “I had to see them to grasp their significance. I have seen isolated instances of the stark poverty observed today among the people with whom I have worked in New York, but where there it is an exception, here it is the general rule.” For Brackett and U.S. physicians, the shockingly high rate of infant deaths in Santiago was understood less by empirical data than by personal observation. Their provocative reports pressed issues of infancy and motherhood to the forefront of RF considerations and further politicized them in the U.S. and Chile.

In addressing infant health, RF personnel, Chilean physicians, and U.S. public health nurses like Brackett experienced both problems with conditions in Quinta Normal and conflict among themselves. Benjamin Viel, the first Chilean RF fellow and later head of Quinta Normal, exemplifies such friction. Like many male physicians from Chile, Viel made clear to the North American female nurses that domestic nurses were unnecessary and ignorant, and that they came from the wrong “class of girls.” Previously, Chilean social care had been provided by female social workers; as a result, Chilean doctors thought that nurses were women who proved incapable of working as social workers. To make matters worse, the few Chilean nurses in practice specialized in surgery rather than communicable diseases or pediatrics, and had no public health experience. While Chilean physicians distrusted nurses from both countries, the RF required that they treat North American nursing personnel as equals. From the RF’s perspective, modern medicine required public health nurses who could undertake clinical work independently, without the constant, expensive involvement of doctors. Moreover, RF leaders presumed that Chilean mothers would share their maternal activity more freely with female health practitioners. Understanding infant health as intimately related to maternal conduct, gendered access to indigent homes was considered essential by RF representatives. Once again, concentration on infant and maternal health influenced social and medical relations in Chile.

The experience of one North American nurse in Chile is instructive. Mary Elizabeth Tennant, a public health nurse with international experience, was sent to evaluate the possibility of founding a Public Health Nursing Institute in Chile. Within three months, Tennant sent her analysis of Chilean nursing and general medical conditions to RF leaders as well as to principal Chilean state, academic and medical figures. Nursing students received almost no practical training and theoretical instruction at the University of Chile’s nursing program, she explained, and they lacked textbooks and such basic facilities as a library or a laboratory. Tennant argued that nursing was taught as if it were of little concern to “modern” medicine, and she vehemently criticized physicians’ practice of educating Chilean nurses predominantly in surgical nursing, a practice that helped doctors but did little for the community.
Tennant concluded that nursing could effectively be taught only by other nurses, and not by patronizing and disinterested doctors.

Tennant's main point was simple: Since Chile's national health problems were infant mortality and tuberculosis, then nurses should be taught at an institute, by other nurses, and given practical experience at Quinta Normal in the areas of pediatrics, obstetrics and communicable diseases.

Tennant's report prompted the RF to act but was not received with enthusiasm by many Chilean physicians. Against these doctors' wishes, the Chilean government and the University of Chile followed Tennant's suggestions.

As the presidential election of 1942 approached, relations between the RF and Chile became more clearly political. Following what Chileans considered to be the first, leftist-oriented, reformist presidency, the election was seen by many as crucial for the future of domestic politics, and health care was understood to be a decisive political issue. But there was little agreement about how to expand or fund health care. The RF's involvement in health care, key analysts concluded, would improve the medical system and diminish its politicization because these improvements would not be undertaken by a specific domestic faction. Moreover, RF participation would limit state expenditures. As Minister of Health, Dr. Salvador Allende spoke for many when he advocated RF activities in Quinta Normal.

Sawyer's diary suggests that heated domestic politics helps to explain why the RF received such a warm and desperate welcome in Chile.
Hoping to separate politics from medicine, RF leaders searched for medico-politicians that they considered to be “apolitical.” The logic was twofold: First, they assumed an apolitical physician could withstand sharp changes in governments and thus maintain policy continuity, and second, the RF considered itself to be an apolitical, solely philanthropic organization. Explicit in Hackett’s records is the RF’s deep-seated desire to depoliticize health care, but also clear is the implicit recognition that health care, particularly in Chile, was itself a fundamentally political issue. The dilemma created by searching for an apolitical health policy would plague RF leaders in Chile through the 1970s. In 1941-1942, facing a contentious presidential election which would alter essentially future medical care in Chile, RF leaders did not remove themselves entirely from politics. In 1941, Hackett and Sawyer agreed not to place additional funds in Chile until after the 1942 election. Apoliticism for Rockefeller staff in this instance translated to support for centrist politicians, and to forewarn Chilean elites that further RF aid was dependent upon a favorable electoral outcome.

Perhaps to preserve their vision of apoliticism, RF officials justified their opposition to certain medico-politicians by conceiving of them as politicians first and physicians second. Physicians like Allende were described as politicians and only nominally as doctors, meaning that they were too political, too leftist, and too independent for RF support. Not only did Chileans understand the importance of the RF in domestic politics, but they also appreciated the importance of Chilean politics to RF programs.

Happy with what they saw as a centrist-reformist shift in government in 1942, RF representatives expanded their involvement in Chile. They chose Dr. John J. Janney to be their representative in Santiago and gave him funding, equipment, fellowships and increased personnel for Quinta Normal. Janney was a fantastic choice, for Chileans perceived him to be less a foreigner and more of a “Chilean” born in the U.S.; indeed, when he was recalled to the U.S. years later, the Chilean elite protested in a letter signed by the most important medical and political leaders. Becoming even more a part of Chilean medico-politics, the RF in 1954 supported the construction of the National Health Service, which was the largest state-sponsored medical system in the Americas. Rather than having a short-term, light involvement in health politics in Chile, the Rockefeller Foundation became a critical and respected player.

The Rockefeller Foundation’s Support of the Institute of Pacific Relations

by Lawrence T. Woods

Since the student of any nongovernmental organization is well advised to examine the sources of the funding for that operation, I reviewed the holdings of the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) to collect material for a study of Canadian participation in the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) via the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), which served as the secretariat for the Canadian national council of the IPR. Both organizations received significant support from the Rockefeller Foundation (RF). There have been many critical assessments of the philanthropic practices of institutions like the RF, but my research suggests that foundation decisions may sometimes be less than sinister, and that the efforts of foundation officers to carry out their fiduciary responsibilities may well be admirably thorough and evenhanded. The RF’s support of the IPR is a case in point.

The Rockefeller Foundation is depicted often as a prime villain in the death of the IPR as a result of the decision to discontinue its funding of the international IPR and the American IPR (AIPR) beyond 1952. This move has been seen as what one might call the ultimate act of political influence and is one which continues to spark tinges of consternation from IPR veterans. The IPR was dissolved shortly after losing its RF fund-
ing and the CIIA, which also saw its RF grants cease in the early 1950s, has been unable to maintain the profile such funds had helped it attain. The fate of these two organizations tells us something about the dangers which loom when non-governmental organizations become dependent upon funding from a single source, philanthropic or otherwise.

Between 1925 and 1952, the IPR received approximately $1.5-1.8 million from Rockefeller sources in support of its general operating expenses and international research program. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. began contributing to the international and American activities of the IPR in response to an application received prior to what became the inaugural conference of the Institute in 1925. Other family members soon became involved: his wife Abby became an AIPR member in 1926; one son, John D. Rockefeller 3rd, served on the staff of the American delegation to the 1929 IPR conference in Kyoto; and another son, Laurance S. Rockefeller, joined his mother and brother as a member of and financial contributor to the AIPR. In 1927 the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial became an additional Rockefeller source for the AIPR and the Pacific Council (PC), the Institute’s international executive body; this support was taken over by the RF in 1929 following a reorganization of Rockefeller corporate philanthropy.

Records show that during the years 1929 to 1940, the RF annually accounted for between 30% and 56% of the PC’s total receipts, with the highest figures occurring towards the end of this period. These figures do not even include a sizeable and separately managed $90,000 grant received in 1938. As early as the 1930s RF personnel had expressed concern about the apparent dependence of the PC on the foundation. Indeed, the duration of RF funding for the PC and IPR was unusual: many other groups funded by the RF had their support phased out over a much shorter timespan. But not until 1946 did the RF begin the process of tapering off and eventually ending support for the PC and AIPR.

With the end of World War II in 1945, the RF sought to curtail its commitments to non-universi-ty international agencies around the world, arguing that such organizations should receive support from sources within their own national clienteles. The desire to taper off IPR grants is thus neither unusual nor surprising when we remember the relatively long run of RF support the IPR had enjoyed, but this policy change makes the decision to phase out grants to the IPR even more predictable. In 1946 the RF provided the IPR what was understood to be a tapered terminal grant running through 1950, and in 1950 provided a two-year extension at the IPR’s request.

Having thus been associated with the IPR for a quarter-century and having been by far the Institute’s most generous and consistent philanthropic supporter, the RF, one might think, could only be regarded in a positive light by the Institute and its followers by the early 1950s, but the RF’s decision not to consider further funding after 1952 has stolen the spotlight and negated earlier contributions.

My review of RF records shows this negative focus to be misplaced, but it also suggests where it may have originated. Foundations typically change their funding priorities over time and thus prefer to provide seed grants of limited duration in order to avoid creating the expectation that the donor will or should provide continuous support. This sort of expectation appears to have been created in the RF-IPR case. The seeds of later misunderstandings and errant expectations may have been sewn as early as August 1929, when Jerome D. Greene, chair of the AIPR board, incorporated into his plea for additional funding the idea that, whereas it was plainly undesirable for an international organization like the IPR to continue to rely largely on funding from one country, the diplomatic and political circumstances of the day made it “more important to have the [1929 IPR] Conference [in Kyoto] adequately prepared for and carried through than to insist on a proper sharing of the burden. Such insistence would very probably have wrecked the organization at a time when its failure would be peculiarly unfortunate.” Somewhat prophetically, this logic seems to have remained in the minds of IPR leaders who followed Greene, despite his warning.
Sensing a rare and potentially invaluable opportunity, I invited William (Bill) L. Holland, the Institute’s last secretary general, to join me at the RAC. Upon the dissolution of the IPR at the end of 1960, Holland became head of the Asian Studies department at the University of British Columbia. He and other researchers of the IPR story have tended to characterize the RF as the proverbial villain, giving in to the surrounding hysteria cum political pressures prompted by McCarthyism and the McCarran commission, a U.S. Senate judiciary subcommittee on internal security which examined the IPR in detail in 1951-1952. Often the key offender in their version of the story is Dean Rusk, an RF trustee from 1950-1952 while also serving as U.S. deputy undersecretary of state, and, more importantly, the RF president from 1952-1960, under whom the RF grants to IPR ceased.

Holland had come to understand that a positive reference from Rusk suggesting that the IPR’s activities were in the American national interest was the major factor in securing the RF trustees’ approval to continue funding the IPR beyond 1950. Holland surmised that these assessments were later used against Rusk by RF trustees when the allegations of communist sympathies within the IPR became public and brought into question the propriety of RF support. Having played a central role in getting the RF into this position, Rusk was likely told that he now had to extricate it. Resisting pleas for further support for the PC and AIPR would have been the most effective way for Rusk as RF president to avoid further controversy.

The correspondence we viewed confirms the reports that only one RF trustee, Robert A. Lovett, a former U.S. undersecretary of state, raised questions about the propriety of RF funding for the IPR in 1950, after Senator Joseph McCarthy began to accuse the IPR officials of aiding or participating in the communist conspiracy. Yet it also shows that Rusk was the most prominent supporter and defender of the IPR as the 1950s began. His opinion was likely based in part upon the assessments of RF officers, who had been paying special attention to their IPR dossier since May 1945, when the FBI arrested employees of the IPR’s New York-based international secretariat. The two bulky RF files containing correspondence with Alfred Kohlberg, a disaffected AIPR member who likely later prompted McCarthy to set his sights on the IPR, begin in November 1944 and are largely comprised of Kohlberg’s criticisms of RF support of the IPR, alongside the RF’s polite acknowledgements of his letters and internal memos refuting his claims. By 1950, as the result of domestic political circumstances and Lovett’s reservations about the IPR, RF personnel were continually seeking reference checks from persons at the highest levels of academe, business, and government — including J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI — with regard to the worthiness of the IPR and its officers, especially Holland. Favorable responses outnumbered negative comments by an overwhelming margin, leading RF officials to confidently and repeatedly recommend the extension of funding to the IPR.

The RF tried to withstand the various pressures and to support the IPR through to the scheduled end of its grant extension in 1952. Rusk, in particular, comes across as more than supportive of the IPR. Rusk was for a time the IPR’s best protector and to expect him, upon becoming RF president, to overturn or ignore an earlier decision to end an unusually long series of grants seems misguided.

Our understanding of the RF’s role with respect to the IPR has been clouded by the fact that the internal RF concerns about the IPR’s dependency upon it reasserted themselves during the early stages of McCarthy’s anti-communist crusade. Against the backdrop of McCarthyism, the understandable philanthropic desire to preclude dependence seems to have been forgotten. Indeed, rather than being portrayed as the villain for ceasing contributions, the RF’s record of support should allow it to be seen more properly as the IPR’s long-time lifeline. The real tragedy is that, amidst the changing winds of American politics, no alternative source
of funding could be found in the U.S. or elsewhere to fill the gap created by the RF’s decision to step aside, thereby leaving the IPR’s precarious financial status fully exposed and ultimately beyond recovery.

**About the Contributors**

**William J. Buxton** is Professor of Communication Studies at Concordia University. He has recently completed (with Charles R. Acland) *American Philanthropy and Canadian Libraries: The Cultural Politics of Knowledge and Information*. It will be published (accompanied by Charles F. McComb’s “Report on Canadian Libraries,” submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation in 1941) by the Graduate School of Information and Library Studies at McGill University. His current research interests include the history of communications studies and the development of the social sciences at Harvard. Inquiries can be addressed to him at the Department of Communication Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, H4B 1R6 or through e-mail: buxton@gemini.concordia.ca.

**Andrés Horacio Reggiani** is a doctoral candidate in Modern European History at SUNY Stony Brook. He is a researcher in the Program of Modern European Studies at the National University of Buenos Aires and teaches at the Torcuato De Tella and Palermo universities (Buenos Aires). His dissertation, “State Policy and Public Health in France, 1920-1950,” investigates the nature and significance of modern policies of health reform and demographic planning within the context of welfare state-building in France. It seeks to integrate long-term social analyses within a debate that assesses the impact of two world wars and the role of medical and demographic experts as producers of relevant social knowledge. He has published “Procreating France: The Politics of Demography, 1919-1945,” *French Historical Studies* 19:3 (Spring 1996), and is co-editor of the humanities and social science journal, Sociedad y Cultura. Address inquiries to him at 3 de Febrero 1841-1ro. F, (1428) Capital Federal, e-mail: arreggina@utdt.edu.ar.

**Sabine Tischer** holds a Ph.D. in art history from the University of Tübingen, Germany. She is currently writing a monograph focusing on the reception of European medieval art and architecture in the United States in the early part of the twentieth century. The book examines *The Cloisters of New York as paradigm for the perception of medieval art and architecture, and its function during the economic and social upheavals between the two World Wars*. Please send inquiries to Srollstrasse 47, 70597 Stuttgart, Germany. Fax: 011-711-724-624.

**Elena Vorobiova**, a Ph.D. candidate in history at Auburn University, is currently writing her dissertation, “The Republican Party in the South in the 1968 Presidential Election.” Her research examines attempts by Republicans to develop a successful strategy in the South to switch Southern voters to the GOP in the 1960s. The 1968 presidential election was one of the fundamental steps in achieving this goal. She presented a paper on her work at the International Historical Conference in Moscow, Russia, in the winter of 1994. She can be contacted at the History Department, 310 Thach Hall, Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama 36849-5207.

**Vicki Weinberg**, a graduate student in history at the University of Arizona, has travelled to Chile several times for research on her dissertation, “Intricate Details of Intimate Matters: Public Health, Women, National and International Politics in Chile, 1910-1989.” She will present her work at the prestigious Berkshire Conference on women’s history.

**Lawrence T. Woods**, is Associate Professor of International Studies at the University of Northern British Columbia. The author of *Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International Relations* (UBC Press, 1993), he is a member of an international research network of scholars exploring aspects of the Institute of Pacific Relations and its various national councils. Inquiries about his work and the IPR research network may be addressed to him at the International Studies Programme, University of Northern British Columbia, 3333 University Way, Prince George, BC, Canada, V2N 4Z9 or via e-mail at woods@unbc.edu.
A researcher at the Central Agricultural Experiment Station in Debre Zeit, Ethiopia examines sunflowers, "a recent introduction which shows promise for Ethiopia," according to the caption in the Rockefeller Foundation report. To promote scholarship in its collections related to Africa, the Archive Center will make a number of special grants in 1997 to researchers studying Africa. For details of this program, see page 8.

Rockefeller Archive Center
15 Dayton Avenue
Pocantico Hills
North Tarrytown, NY 10591-1598
Telephone: (914) 631-4505

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