

U.S. Foundations in Weimar Germany: Asymmetries and Misunderstandings

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Introduction

The research period that I spent at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), generously supported by a RAC Grant-In-Aid, provided important information toward the completion of my dissertation on “Conceptions of Civil Society during the Weimar Republic: Civil Discourse, Leadership Principle, and People’s Community.” The files I have consulted at the RAC complement the material I have already analyzed at the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin, Germany) on the “German College for Politics,” (*Deutsche Hochschule für Politik* or DHfP) which was supported by the Laura Spelmann Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM) and the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) in the inter-war period. I will be able to fully evaluate the implications of the records of the RAC once I complete the investigation of additional archival material from other German archives—Staatsbibliothek Berlin Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Landesarchiv Berlin, and Deutsches Bundesarchiv.

Accordingly, in this preliminary research report, I place the relationship between the DHfP and the LSRM and the RF within the broader dynamics analyzed in my dissertation. From this perspective, the relationship between the German thought-leaders at the center of my study and U.S. philanthropic foundations serves as a vantage point for an analysis of the asymmetries between an American understanding of liberal democracy and the realities of Germany’s

political culture. Secondly, I detail how my preliminary findings relate to the broader debates on the role of philanthropic foundations in supporting democracy and transferring research models. While partially dismissed, Foucaultian and Gramscian approaches still serve—as a recent publication has shown—as interpretative models for the analysis of philanthropic activities. In my work, by drawing on the programmatic contributions in the 2003 special issue of *Minerva*, I emphasize the key role of program officers, local (in this case, German) advisors, and grantees. Finally, through a preliminary analysis of the RAC records I will point out some intriguing dynamics in the relationship between the officers of the LSRM and RF and German grantees.

Part I

In my work, I analyze the activities of two groups of German intellectuals who between World War One and the Nazi seizure of power struggled with finding solutions to the tension between private interest and the common good (the civil society debate).¹ Both groups agreed on the necessity to legitimize new forms of societal organization in front of the masses;² in fact—in their analyses—the cause of the lost war and revolution was found in the Wilhelmine Empire’s failure to integrate the working class into the German nation. This common search for more democratic bases for political society, however, should not overshadow disagreements on competing conceptualizations of democracy.

The group of liberal intellectuals around Ernst Jäckh saw in the notion of “civil politics” the means by which to solve the tension between private interest and the common good, and at the same time, preserve a realm of individual freedom in the context of a liberal, parliamentary republic.³ By contrast, the so-called “young conservatives” around Arthur Moeller van den Brück, Max H. Boehm, and Heinrich von Gleichen, rejected parliamentary democracy as

“formalistic” and proposed corporatist, as well as leadership principles, to integrate the masses in the national body.⁴

Noteworthy, both groups did not limit their activities to the cloudy world of political philosophy, but rather aimed to move from theoretical conceptualizations to organizational experimentations. In the eyes of these intellectuals, “nonpartisan” political education became the solution to the problems of the time, and in a two-week period, in the fall of 1920, two rival educational institutes—the “German College for Politics” and the “Political Courses” (*Politische Kolleg-PK*)—were established in the midst of acrimonious polemics.⁵ For both groups, these two institutes were the most promising endeavors to transform into reality their conceptualizations of forms of societal organization. Controversially, these two institutes merged for a brief period during the second half of the 1920s, and the LSRM started supporting the DHfP in the same period.⁶

Since the constitutional debates in the spring of 1919, the United States had become a point of reference for liberals’ search for models of societal organization able to guarantee levels of individual liberty while strengthening the national bonds of Germany’s fragmented society.⁷ Implicitly, both positive and negative references to “America” primarily had a domestic function. Interestingly, while Ernst Troeltsch characterized as a dangerous “Americanization,” the growing influence of German economic elites in political decision-making, Arnold Wolfers praised America’s economic system’s alleged ability to contain class struggles.⁸ Furthermore, American philanthropists’ and foundation officials’ open sympathies and—at times—unrealistic hopes in Germany’s political leadership before the war, had paved the road to hostility and enmity during the war.⁹ Against this background, the relationship between American philanthropic foundations and the leadership of the DHfP serves as an historical case study for the analysis of the

(asymmetric) connections between American ideals of democratic processes and the realities of the German political system, and hence raises more general questions about the role of trans-national philanthropy in support of democracy and civil society.

Part II

In an influential edited volume, Robert Arno and his contributors argue that philanthropic foundations “have played the role of unofficial planning agencies for both a national American society and an increasingly interconnected world-system with the United States at its center.” By using a Gramscian approach, the authors use the notion of “Cultural Imperialism” to capture the ethnocentrism of the elites who controlled U.S. philanthropic foundations, their use of political and economic power to spread their “culture,” and the relationships between their educational policies and concepts such as “classical colonialism,” “internal colonialism,” and “neocolonialism.”¹⁰ Undoubtedly, the merit of these and similar contributions lies in drawing attention to inevitable power dynamics at play in the relationship between grantors and grantees, which—as these scholars claim—much of the earlier literature had consciously downplayed.¹¹

A second—often overlooked—merit of this critical turn in the literature was to spur a new interest in the activities of philanthropic foundations. By extensively relying on the records at the RAC, scholars have addressed the issues raised by this critical scholarship. While primarily focusing on the American context, Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz convincingly have dismissed Gramscian as well as Foucaultian interpretative models.¹² Karl, in particular, has argued that philanthropic foundations’ main role was the training of leadership when industrialization and massification of society weakened the balance between democracy and mass society.¹³ Nonetheless, Inderjeet Parmar’s recent work testifies to the attractiveness—and

ultimately also to the theoretical fruitfulness—of more nuanced and sophisticated critical approaches.¹⁴

As Katharina Rietzler, however, suggests in a recent review, much of the literature on philanthropic foundations is constrained by the limited use of non-American sources.¹⁵ Furthermore, a better understanding of the relationship between grantor and grantee requires an awareness of the key role of foundation officers, as well as of other individual actors. In line with Volker Berghahn's work on Shepard Stone and the Ford Foundation,¹⁶ Giuliana Gemelli and Roy MacLeod have pointed out that foundation officers operated “on the borders of continents, cultures, and disciplines” and acted as “bridge-builder” between “people, cultures, and disciplines.”¹⁷ Hence, they suggest the fruitfulness of researchers to analyze the (at times) relative freedom of officers to maneuver when negotiating the asymmetries between grantors and grantees.

While scholars have investigated the institutional development of the DHfP and the contribution of American philanthropy, less attention has been paid to placing the relationship between German thought-leaders and American philanthropy beyond the level of the DHfP and its institutional existence (1920-1933).¹⁸ By integrating traditional printed primary sources and archival materials, I provide a more nuanced understanding of the interactions between international philanthropy, political culture, and practical experimentations in Germany in the first three decades of the twentieth century. In addition, the biographical focus on Ernst Jäckh, the director of the DHfP, and on August Wilhelm Fehling, the German advisor of the RF for the social sciences, offer fresh insights on the activities of American philanthropic foundations in Germany's contentious public sphere.

During my research at the RAC, I have consulted the records of both the RF and the LSRM on the institutions in which Jäckh and his closest associates played a central role— DHfP, Abraham-Lincoln Stiftung, and New Commonwealth Institute. These records include grant actions, administrative and financial correspondence, and reports and reviews; hence, they provide insights on foundation officers’ analyses of the political situation in Germany, as well as of the personalities of the grantees. Particularly interesting is the role of Fehling, who became a gatekeeper in the relationship between RF officers and German scholars in the field of the social sciences. In addition, the RF’s non-grant related general correspondence, its program and policy files, and selected officers diaries—specifically the officers diaries of Geoffrey W. Young, Thomas B. Appleget, and John Van Sickle—have provided important information. Also of crucial relevance were the files detailing the RF’s support to Jäckh’s activities in both England, in the second half of the 1930s, and later in the United States, where he secured—with the help of the RF and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—a position at Columbia University.

Part III

In supporting the DHfP in the second half of the 1920s, “Rockefeller philanthropy” soon was trapped between its programmatic goals of funding the development of empiric social sciences and its program officers’ conviction that the DHfP and its leadership represented one of the few genuinely democratic forces in Weimar Germany.¹⁹ In a widely cited confidential report, Fehling had stressed that although “from the viewpoint of research in the fields of political science” the DHfP was “up to now of no great importance,” it should not be overlooked that the Institute was “a foundation of the republican time with the aim of creating among German youth a spirit of understand of the republic and its needs.”²⁰

Jäckh, the founder of the DHfP, was a skillful organizer, who, although close to Germany's political leadership during the first three decades of the century, had always avoided political office in order to maintain his independence.²¹ Between 1924 and the winter of 1925-1926, he devoted much energy and time to court potential foreign investors. During numerous lecture tours in both the United States and England, he and his closest associates publicized the "New Germany" and emphasized the democratic convictions of Germany's government and society.²² While the democratic outlook (in addition to potential future scientific research) was crucial for securing an initial grant, the analysis of the correspondence between the leadership of the DHfP and the officers of the LSRM, highlights both Jäckh's skills as a fundraiser and the role of LSRM officers in negotiating between program requirements and the realities of Germany's political context.

Jäckh and his associates repeatedly likened the DHfP to other grantees of the LSRM, in particular to the London School of Economics, which—in Walther Simons' words—was the DHfP's "sister institution in London," and for Jäckh was the "English parallel of our German institute."²³ Furthermore, in his letters, Jäckh celebrated the international successes of the DHfP, claiming that financial support would enable "us to fulfill our endeavors for an international education and for the world peace," and expressed the intention to extend its activities, "particularly the organizing of relations with the United States as the biggest and most important democracy."²⁴ In his response dated January 14, 1926, Beardsley Rummler noted that in an earlier meeting Jäckh had justified the need for external funds with a "temporary falling-off of your contributions" rather than with the intention to expand the activities of the Institute.²⁵ In a letter also dated January 14, 1926, Jäckh, who at the time was in Chicago during one of his numerous American lecturing, as well as fund-raising tours, emphasized the "consequence of the great

[economic] crisis in Germany.”²⁶ On January 24th of that year—while stressing that the two letters of January 14th had “crossed each other”—he confirmed again the financial difficulties of the DHfP and justified the expansion of the DHfP’s programs with “the current of events, the natural developments of our work, the necessities of the New Germany, internationalized education, and work for World Peace.”²⁷

Although this two-year grant was considered by the LSRM a one-time appropriation made “in consideration of the emergency situation now existing,”²⁸ it represented—by not being strictly driven by scientific considerations—a precedent in the relationship between Rockefeller philanthropy and the DHfP. The leadership of the DHfP skillfully courted LSRM representatives and emphasized the scientific and research work supported by the grant.²⁹ In the spring of 1928 the LSRM renewed the grant for an additional year, although Fehling again commented, “Most of the items for which funds are requested cannot be classified as research; some are purely instructional in nature and others are definitely political in implication.”³⁰ In communicating the renewal of the grant, Ruml stated that, besides the regular annual report, no public announcement should be made regarding the appropriation.³¹ In their analysis of the LSRM, Martin and Joan Bulmer have argued that under Ruml’s leadership the Memorial recurred to this wording when a grant was considered potentially controversial.³²

After the reorganization of the Rockefeller philanthropies, Jäckh approached RF officers for further funds in the spring of 1929. In a now established strategy, Jäckh presented an impressive list of personalities from the academic, diplomatic, and philanthropic worlds supporting his endeavor, emphasizing the international achievements of the DHfP, and pointing to the need to expand its programs because “our work and duties” have increased, and he preemptively noted, “These duties are not duties created by ourselves, but duties arising out of

the needs of the times and the world, the creatures of the necessities of a new age and a new world.”³³ When the application was rejected,³⁴ the DHfP’s leadership stressed that, with Germany’s difficult financial situation, the institute would have to struggle to survive rather than expand.³⁵ Hans Simons argued that since its establishment in 1920, the DHfP had been planned both as an educational and a research institute. He then claimed that the current crisis had renewed the emergency situation that had warranted the initial support of the LSRM, hence risking limiting the research activities of the institute.³⁶ Therefore, suggesting that without a new grant the leadership of the DHfP would have to curtail the research work that had been supported by the LSRM grants in order to balance the budget. This time, however, the RF officers rejected the application because of the “restrictions that our program necessarily imposes upon us.”³⁷ Probably, this decision reflected a more general change in policy that had emerged with the reorganization of the Rockefeller philanthropic institutions. In fact, during the brief existence of the LSRM, the directorship of Ruml had enjoyed a significant level of independence, which had been criticized within the RF.³⁸

Besides the ability of Jäckh and his associates to frame applications for financial support according to the expectation of the RF (hence, striking the right cords with foundation officers), Jäckh’s capacity—as a gifted networker—to win the support of individual RF officers is remarkable. In his 1929 application, Jäckh explicitly mentions as references Beardsley Ruml, Raymond B. Fosdick, and John D. Rockefeller Jr. (JDR Jr.)³⁹ Ruml, Thomas B. Appleget, and Selskar Gunn became advocates of the DHfP within the RF,⁴⁰ and in 1931 Jäckh was even able to guarantee the private financial support of JDR Jr.⁴¹

The RF officers were, however, caught between the program directives and the sympathies for the DHfP. On February 4, 1932, after a dinner conversation with Jäckh and

Wolfers, Selskar Gunn wrote Edmund E. Day (director of the RF's Social Sciences Division) expressing a positive opinion of the DHfP and pointing out that, although the institute was chiefly "devoted to teaching, ... the essential point seems to be that students of all political fields can mingle in this school and consider political facts in a real objective manner."⁴² In his reply, Day noted that in a recent meeting the RF Trustees had loosened the research requirements for awarding funds, and therefore he was inclined to support the DHfP, because it was "doing work of far-reaching importance in the development of objective attitudes in international relations."⁴³ After several meetings in Berlin with Jäckh and Wolfers in March 1932, Gunn (the vice-president of the RF in Europe) expressed a positive opinion of the DHfP. Although he noted that "the orientation is more and more in the direction of research," Gunn pointed out that some of this research "could hardly be considered research in the sense that we use the word." Nonetheless, he identified potential bases for significant future research and—in supporting Jäckh's application—argued, "One of the most vitally important phases of the whole question is that this Hochschule represents in the best sense of the word a liberal spirit in Germany."⁴⁴ In April 1932, a new appropriation was made to the DHfP.⁴⁵

This relationship, however, has to be contextualized in the broader framework of the institutional development of the DHfP and the original goals of its leadership. Founded in October 1920, the Hochschule was in the intentions of its leaders, a tool to educate Germans to democracy. Notwithstanding later (understandable in the context of the relationship between grantor and grantee) claims with RF officers, original research did not prominently figure in the plans of the intellectual leadership of the institute. In fact, political science was conceptualized as the objective study of political facts and processes that ultimately aimed to de-radicalize political

discourse by juxtaposing undisputable facts to the appeal of party propaganda.⁴⁶ Hence, education rather than research was placed at the center of the DHfP.

Recent critical scholarship has dismissed the notion that the DHfP was the foundational seed of German empirical political sciences, and has supported this argumentation by citing Fehling's reports and by accepting the later statements of the Hochschule's leadership. It is doubtful, however, that the academization and increasing emphasis on research was the natural development of the DHfP. Rather, this transformation suggests the need of its leadership to adapt to the interests of financial supporters. While, in light of the crucial role of officers, Foucaultian interpretations need to be rejected, it cannot be underemphasized that the DHfP's progressive turn to research was contingent on the need for financial support. Consciously, Jäckh and his associates developed the research and the academic programs of the Hochschule at the cost of relegating to a marginal role political education. During the final phase of the DHfP, political education was almost completely relegated to the "Civic Seminar," one of the regular seminars organized at the DHfP.⁴⁷ In the early 1930s, as the only course that was still explicitly aimed at strengthening Germany's weakening democratic state, this seminar and its director were increasingly attacked by both conservative faculty members of the DHfP and the conservative media.⁴⁸

In addition, one of the implicit goals of American philanthropic foundations in inter-war Europe had been the creation of cross-national networks among European research institutes. This policy was guided by faith in empirical social sciences as the solution to political, as well as social conflicts of the time.⁴⁹ By supporting the scientific cooperation between European institutions, U.S. foundations aimed to address the climate of suspicion among European elites, which they believed had been the main cause of World War One. From this perspective, the RF

was also supporting the short-lived Abraham Lincoln Stiftung, in which the leadership of the DHfP was deeply involved.⁵⁰ Probably aware of these broader goals, in his correspondence with foundation officers, as well as in public speeches in front of an American audience, Jäckh repeatedly claimed that the Locarno Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact had been spurred by international cooperative efforts organized by the DHfP.⁵¹

The scientific internationalism supported by American philanthropic foundations, however, did not reflect the goals of the internationalism of the DHfP's leadership. In fact, in the inter-war period, as Gemelli argues, "scientific cooperation ... [did] not mean necessarily scientific integration" because "asymmetries" developed between American and European institutions, as well as among European participants.⁵² In the first half of the twentieth century, scientific internationalism was based on the idea of acknowledging national scientific accomplishments by measuring them by international standards ("Olympic internationalism").⁵³ "Science as a power substitute [*Macht-Ersatz*]" was, therefore, implicit in the notion of internationalism, and in the aftermath of Germany's military defeat and revolution the emphasis shifted from a passive to an active "cultural and educational policy" (*Kulturpolitik*).⁵⁴

After the Treaty of Versailles, concerns about Germany's international role were at the center of the reflections of the DHfP's founders. Comparing Germany to Prussia after the Napoleonic invasion, Theodor Heuss saw in the new College "an important tool for the restoration of the German state."⁵⁵ While contributing to the understanding between nations, the College aimed to secure Germany's role in the international arena. The role of science was not conceived in relationship to a recovery of industrial and economic competitiveness, but as the only field where German dignity could be re-asserted.⁵⁶ From this perspective, the prestigious relationship with American institutions was functional to break Germany's international isolation

and re-establish German (at least cultural) prestige. Therefore, the records of the RAC have provided invaluable information on the relationship between Rockefeller philanthropy and its unofficial representatives in Germany—Jäckh and his closest associates—Arnold Wolfers and Hans Simons. Goals, priorities, and expectations of grantors and grantees, did not coincide and ultimately a basic asymmetry of intents characterized this relationship.

Interestingly, however, RF officers became progressively aware of this asymmetry. After the Nazis seizure of power, for several months Jäckh tried to keep alive his institute by making several concessions to the new regime. Initially RF officers seemed to believe in Jäckh's capacity to ingratiate Germany's new political leadership. On February 22, 1933, John Van Sickle (fellowship secretary for the social sciences at the European Office in Paris) commented:

Jäckh has been clever in adjusting the School to changing political situation by going further and further to the Right in selecting his lecturers, without sacrificing the old Left element in his permanent staff. [Hans H.] Lammers—Hitler's right-hand man—now lectures at the School. Some further concessions will have to be made, but they need not to destroy the validity of the School. It is a Forum, and one of the few in Germany, where fundamental differences in political views and aspirations can be debated without excessive passion, and where evidence is demanded in support of argument.⁵⁷

A month later Sickle noted in a memorandum on the DHfP that “Jäckh is to have an interview with Hitler one of these days, and if we may judge by his past successes, he will win over the new Chancellor. In return, Jäckh will doubtless have to sacrifice some of his Jewish and Left teachers and considerable teaching freedom.”⁵⁸

When, however, the news reached Sickle that Wolfers (Director of Academic programs from 1925 to 1930, and then—when Jäckh became President—Administrative Director of the DHfP) was leaving Germany, he immediately cabled Day, “Wolfers definitely leaving Germany Doubt wisdom definite support Jäckh proposal till further information available.”⁵⁹ This reflects the hesitancy of officers based in the Paris Office to end the RF's activities in Germany because

of the (also personal) relationships they had developed with German grantees. Furthermore, this hesitancy also depended on the conviction—supported by Fehling—that withdrawing too early would be counter-productive.⁶⁰ In a report on RF activities in Europe in the area of the social sciences, however, Sickle warned, “every proposal coming from Germany will require an unusually thorough and skeptical scrutiny.”⁶¹ By the summer of 1933, the trust in Jäckh also started to decline. In an internal memorandum, Sickle reported impressions that “Jäckh was maneuvering, or was being maneuvered into the post of an intellectual ambassador for the new regime” and Sickle himself thought it necessary to add that he “had cause to wonder in the last few months at the extraordinary capacity of adaptation shown by Jäckh.”⁶²

Nonetheless, these officers continued to recommend RF support to Jäckh during his exile in Great Britain and the United States. As the director of the new, London-based New Commonwealth Institute, Jäckh aimed to address problems in the field of International Justice and Security and by working with important personalities in more countries to seek out “logical conclusions, ... a formulation of this solution in terms acceptable to the various countries,” and “a procedure by which the theoretical solution could be brought into the realm of realization.”⁶³ After internal debates on the research value of the new Institute, the RF agreed to support Jäckh by complementing his salary.⁶⁴ Also, in 1940/1941, when Jäckh moved to the United States, the RF would contribute to his stipend as Visiting Research Professor of Public Law at Columbia University.⁶⁵ In the summer of 1940, internal correspondence pinpointed Jäckh’s peculiar relationship with the RF. Joseph H. Willitts (head of the RF’s Social Sciences Division from 1939 to 1954) noted that although he “would not be regarded as the greatest scholar on the continent of Europe, ... For some years Jäckh was the RF representative in Germany.”⁶⁶ For several years throughout the early 1940s the RF would renew its commitment to Jäckh, because

although his research was “not of a type to warrant Foundation support, because of his former positions as unofficial advisor to the Foundation in Germany ... the officers feel that certain pension protection for him is justified at this time.”⁶⁷

Part IV

The relationship between the leadership of the DHfP (in particular Ernst Jäckh) and the officers of the LSRM and the RF, point out two interesting dynamics. First, a basic affinity existed between the goals of the DHfP and Rockefeller philanthropy. Both shared a fundamental faith in the objectivity of science as the solution to controversial social, as well as political issues. In the particular context of the Weimar Republic—and of the peculiar origins of Germany’s young democracy in the wake of a military defeat and an attempted communist revolution—the leadership of the DHfP emphasized the primacy of (objective) political education over empiric research in the social sciences in the sense supported by Rockefeller philanthropy. The relationship with Rockefeller philanthropic institutions slowly changed the focus of the DHfP. In addressing similar issues, Martin and Joan Bulmer have dismissed the argument that philanthropic support shifted the original focus of universities by noting that foundations only reinforced an existing trend towards empirical research.⁶⁸ While this may have been the case in the United States, the particular political context of Germany’s young democracy warrants caution. In addition, the RF’s emphasis on international scientific cooperation was not fully aware of the self-serving approach to internationalism of Germany’s cultural elite. The case of the DHfP highlights the development of a clear asymmetry between the goals and priorities of a German institute and its American financial supporters.

Secondly, the focus on the officers of Rockefeller philanthropic institutions and on Ernst Jäckh shows how the development of a highly personalized relationship created spaces of

maneuver beyond the strictures of programmatic requirements. In skillfully cultivating his relationship with the officers of the LSRM and of the RF, Jäckh established personal connections that lasted for over two decades and were stronger than his ambiguities toward the Nazi regime during the 1930s. Foundation officers felt a duty and responsibility to support Jäckh and his endeavors that also proved to be stronger than questions—already raised in the summer of 1935—on the “personal relationship involved.”⁶⁹ Although they acknowledged the limits of his scholarship, officers continued recommending support on Jäckh’s behalf.

The cases of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik and of Ernst Jäckh serve as historical case studies for an analysis of the dynamics, as well as challenges of American philanthropy in inter-war Germany. The archival material at the RAC has provided important information on key issues discussed in my work. By broadening the focus of my analysis to the activities of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), which during the same period supported the DHfP and Jäckh, I will discuss in a more comprehensive manner the impact of American philanthropy on Germany intellectual elite. A focus on the German advisors of both the RF and the CEIP—Fehling and Foerster—will provide an additional level of analysis.

I wish to thank the archivists, in particular Erwin Levold, and the staff of the Rockefeller Archive Center for their assistance during my research. Everyone at the RAC created a collegial atmosphere that is ideal for scholarly research.

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The ideas and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and are not intended to represent the Rockefeller Archive Center.

ENDNOTES:

¹ In my work, I define civil society as an open public sphere that is free from constraints limiting human actions and where individuals can institutionalize conflicts and thus mediate between competing interests. Civil society is therefore part of an ongoing debate over the ways modern (that is, economically as well as politically independent and self-interested) individuals participate in public affairs and still identify with the common good.

² Jan-Werner Müller, *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2011.

³ Ernst Jäckh, "Zwei Jahre Deutsche Hochschule für Politik." In Ernst Troeltsch, *Naturrecht und Humanität in der Weltpolitik*. Berlin, Germany: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1923; and Wilhelm Haas, "Political Education." *The Hibbert Journal* 25: 4 (1927), pp. 595-609.

⁴ Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, *Germany's Third Empire*, edited by E. O. Lorimer, New York: Howard Fertig, 1971; Max H. Boehm, "Körperschaftliche Bindung." In Moeller van den Bruck, Heinrich von Gleichen, and Max H. Boehm, editors, *Die Neue Front*. Berlin, Germany: Verlag Gebrüder Paetel, 1922, pp. 35-46; Heinrich von Gleichen, "Führer und Gemeinschaftsgedanke." *Das neue Deutschland* 7 (1919).

⁵ *Politische Bildung: Wille, Wesen, Ziel, Weg. Sechs Reden gehalten bei der Eröffnung der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik*. Berlin, Germany: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1921; Cf. Hutten, "Politische Professoren." *Gewissen* 2: 40 (October 20, 1920), p. 1; Heinrich von Gleichen, "Das politische Kolleg." *Deutsche Rundschau* (1921).

⁶ With the progressive expiration of an original grant by the German philanthropist Robert Bosch, between 1926 and 1928, Jäckh and his associates reorganized the DHfP along the lines of the traditional German university in order to receive academic recognition in Prussia (and the associated public funds) and to become more attractive to American philanthropic foundations that Jäckh had been courting since 1924. At the same time, however, upon pressures from the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, the DHfP reluctantly started a "cooperation" (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*) with the conservative *Politische Kolleg*.

⁷ During the constitutional debates, Friedrich Meinecke explicitly referred to the American presidency as a model. Friedrich Meinecke, "Verfassung und Verwaltung der deutschen Republik." *Die neue Rundschau* 30 (January 1919), pp. 1-16; for the fascination of German elites with American models see Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; and Charles S. Maier, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

⁸ Ernst Troeltsch, *Spektator-Briefe: Aufsätze über die deutsche Revolution und die Weltpolitik, 1918/1922*. Tübingen, Germany: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1924, pp. 240-243; Arnold Wolfers, "Amerikanische Demokratie: Versuch einer Positiven Würdigung." *Blätter für religiösen Sozialismus* 6 (1925), pp. 1-17; Rainer Eisfeld, "Amerikanische Lösungen für Weimarer Probleme? Amerikabilder und ihre Folgen bei Ernst Jäckh und Arnold Wolfers." In Manfred Gangl, editor, *Das Politische* Hamburg, Germany: Peter Lang, 2008, pp. 181-189.

⁹ During the two decades before the outbreak of World War One, Andrew Carnegie and Nicholas M. Butler (who would play a leading role in shaping the European policies of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in the inter-war period), repeatedly stressed the pacifist intentions of the German state, and in particular, of Kaiser Wilhelm II. See Andrew Carnegie, "Kaiser Wilhelm II, Peacemaker." *New York Times*, June 8, 1913; and Nicholas M. Butler, "The International Mind." *International Conciliation* (June, 1912), pp. 3-14. While the war broke Carnegie's notorious optimism, the pragmatic Butler soon endorsed the cause of the "war for democracy" and stated that U.S. war aims were "to punish the Central Powers and put them in such a position that they will never be able to repeat the offence." Nonetheless, he also expressed America's internationalist commitment by stressing the responsibility "to bind up the war's wounds, to soften the war's animosities, and to lead the way in the colossal work of reconstruction." See, respectively, *New York Times*, "Butler Says War Aim is to Punish Germany." (February 3, 1918) and Nicholas M. Butler, "The Great War and Its Lessons," *International Conciliation* (October, 1914), pp. 3-14.

¹⁰ Robert F. Arnove, editor, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 2 and p. 17.

¹¹ Merle Curti is rightly considered a pioneering figure in the field of philanthropic studies. His work, however, was part of a project on the history of American philanthropy at the University of Wisconsin supported by a Ford Foundation grant. Therefore, it has been suggested that, as a result of the power dynamics between grantor and grantee, he uncritically assumed the altruistic and disinterested motives of American international philanthropy. Merle Curti, *American Philanthropy Abroad*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1963.

¹² Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, "Foundations and Ruling Class Elite." *Daedalus* 116 (1987), pp. 1-40.

¹³ Barry D. Karl, "Philanthropy and the Maintenance of Democratic Elites." *Minerva* 35 (1997), pp. 207-220.

¹⁴ Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power*. New York: Columbia University Press 2012.

¹⁵ Katharina Rietzler, "Rezension zu: *Philanthropy in America. A History and Foundations of the American Century. The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power*." *H-Soz-u-Kult* (February 26th, 2013), <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2013-1-127>.

¹⁶ Volker Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy and Diplomacy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001.

¹⁷ Giuliana Gemelli and Roy MacLeod, "Introduction." *Minerva* 41 (2003), pp. 96-98.

¹⁸ The institutional history of the DHfP has received much attention during the 1980s and 1990s. The records of the RAC, however, have been used only to complement other archival material in order to write a more comprehensive history of Jäckh's institute. In a dissertation thesis and a later article, Steven D. Korenblat has used the RAC's records to detail the network of international connections of the DHfP. Influenced by Korenblat's dissertation, German scholars have drawn on the files of the LSRM and of the RF to revise the role of the DHfP in establishing empirical political sciences in Germany and to point out the compromises between Jäckh (and his closest associates) and the Nazi regime. While these scholars have provided a better picture of the institutional development of the DHfP, they have not placed—and in truth this was not the goal of these studies—the relationship between American foundations and the DHfP in the broader "philanthropic dynamic" of grantors and grantees. Among the many contributions to the history of the DHfP, see Steven D. Korenblat, *The Deutsche Hochschule für Politik: Public Affairs Institute for a New Germany, 1920-1933*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, Illinois, 1978; Rainer Eisfeld, *Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt: Deutsche Politikwissenschaft, 1920-1945*. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991; Detlef Lehnert, "'Politik als Wissenschaft' Beiträge zur Institutionalisierung einer Fachdisziplin in Forschung und Lehre der." *Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (1920-1933): Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 30: 3 (1989), pp. 443-465; and Alfons Söllner, "Gruppenbild mit Jäckh: Anmerkungen zur 'Verwissenschaftlichung' der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik während der Weimarer Republik." In Gerhard Göhler and Bodo Zeuner, editors, *Kontinuitäten und Brüche in der deutschen Politikwissenschaft*. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991, pp. 41-64.

¹⁹ I used "Rockefeller philanthropy" to refer to the two Rockefeller institutions (Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and Rockefeller Foundation) that supported the work of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHfP). While it should not overshadow the differences between the two institutions before the general reorganization of Rockefeller philanthropic institutions in 1929, "Rockefeller philanthropy" is a useful term to distinguish the philanthropic support from Rockefeller sources received by the DHfP from other U.S. philanthropic supporters, specifically the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

²⁰ August W. Fehling to Beardsley Ruml, January 31, 1926, Folder 537, Box 51, Record Group (RG) 3.6, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM) Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York (RAC).

²¹ No scientific biography of Jäckh exists. While Jäckh's autobiographical writings offer valuable information on his life, they require critical reading because of the author's conscious "editing" of his own actions. Jäckh's autobiographical volumes are *The War for Man's Soul*, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1943; *Der Goldene Pflug: Lebensernte eines Weltbürgers*. Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954; and *Weltstaat. Erlebtes und Erstrebtes*. Stuttgart, Germany: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1960.

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- ²² Ernst Jäckh, *The New Germany*. London, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1927; Ernst Jäckh, “The Spirit of the New Germany.” *The Survey* 61 (1929), pp. 551-553; Steven D. Korenblat, *The Deutsche Hochschule für Politik: Public Affairs Institute for a New Germany, 1920-1933*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, Illinois, 1978, pp. 76-83.
- ²³ Walther Simons to Beardsley Rumml, July 29, 1925 and Ernst Jäckh to Beardsley Rumml, February 12, 1926, Folder 537, Box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM, RAC; Ernst Jäckh to Beardsley Rumml, January 9, 1926, Folder 537, Box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM, RAC.
- ²⁴ Ernst Jäckh to Beardsley Rumml, January 9, 1926, Folder 537, Box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM, RAC.
- ²⁵ Beardsley Rumml to Ernst Jäckh, January 14, 1926, Folder 537, Box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM, RAC.
- ²⁶ Ernst Jäckh to Beardsley Rumml, January 14, 1926, Folder 537, Box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM, RAC.
- ²⁷ Ernst Jäckh to Beardsley Rumml, January 24, 1926, Folder 537, Box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM, RAC.
- ²⁸ Beardsley Rumml to Hans Simons, March 18, 1926, Folder 537, Box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM, RAC.
- ²⁹ Hans Simons to Frank B. Stubbs, June 11, 1927; Ernst Jäckh to Beardsley Rumml, November 29, 1927, Folder 537, Box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM, RAC.
- ³⁰ August W. Fehling to Edmund E. Day, May 3, 1928, Folder 537, Box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM, RAC.
- ³¹ Beardsley Rumml to Ernst Jäckh, April 6, 1928, Folder 537, Box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM, RAC.
- ³² Martin Bulmer and Joan Bulmer, “Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Rumml and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1922-1929.” *Minerva* 19 (1981), pp. 381-382.
- ³³ Ernst Jäckh to Edmund E. Day, April 9, 1929, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, Rockefeller Foundation (RF) Archives, RAC.
- ³⁴ Edmund E. Day to Ernst Jäckh, May 17, 1929, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.
- ³⁵ Board of Trustees of DHfP to Rockefeller Foundation, Department of Political Science, March 14, 1930, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.
- ³⁶ Hans Simons to Thomas B. Appleget, July 21, 1930, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.
- ³⁷ Thomas B. Appleget to Hans Simons, August, 12, 1930, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC; Edmund E. Day to H. Simons, September 26, 1930, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.
- ³⁸ Martin Bulmer and Joan Bulmer, “Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Rumml and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1922-1929.” *Minerva* 19 (1981), pp. 397-398.
- ³⁹ Ernst Jäckh to Edmund E. Day, April 9, 1929, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.
- ⁴⁰ The entries of Thomas B. Appleget’s Officer diary in March 1930 detail the (failed) attempt to support the DHfP through the General Education Board (GEB). See Thursday, March 4, 1930 and Thursday, March 6, 1930, Box 13, RG 12.1, RF, RAC.
- ⁴¹ Appleget diary, Monday, July 20, 1931, Box 13, RG 12.1, RF, RAC.
- ⁴² Selskar Gunn to Edmund E. Day, February 4, 1932, Folder 612, Box 76, Series 700S, RG 2, RF, RAC.
- ⁴³ Edmund E. Day to Selskar Gunn, February 4, 1932, Folder 612, Box 76, Series 700S, RG 2, RF, RAC.
- ⁴⁴ Selskar Gunn to Edmund E. Day, March 10 and March 15, 1932, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.
- ⁴⁵ Norma S. Thompson to Ernst Jäckh, April 15, 1932, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.
- ⁴⁶ See Ernst Jäckh, “Das Dritte Jahr.” (Staat und Wirtschaft—Wissen und Wille.)” *Berichte der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik* 1: 1 (1923-1924); and Hans Simons, *Politische Schulung und Hochschule: Nach einem im Deutschen Auslandsinstitut in Stuttgart gehaltenen Vortrag*. Berlin, Germany: Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, 1926.
- ⁴⁷ Detlef Lehnert, “‘Politik als Wissenschaft’ Beiträge zur Institutionalisierung einer Fachdisziplin in Forschung und Lehre der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (1920-1933).” *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 30: 3 (1989), p. 453.

⁴⁸ In March 1929, an anonymous author of an article in *Der Tag* attacked Johann Strunz's "Civic Seminar" for under-representing the intellectual right (after which a dispute erupted between Martin Spahn and Hans Simons). Anonymous, "Hochschule für Partei-Politik?" *Der Tag* (March 19, 1929); Martin Spahn to Hans Simons, March 23, 1929; and Hans Simons to Martin Spahn, March 28, 1929; Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (GStA PK), I.HA Rep. 303 Nr. 176. In May, Strunz's "Seminar" came under attack again and the conservative German National People's Party (DNVP) inquired about a stronger nationalist course at the DHfP. Kleo Pleyer to Johann Strunz, May 10, 1929; and Johann Strunz to Kleo Pleyer, May 11, 1929, GStA PK, I.HA Rep. 303 Nr. 166; and DNVP to Martin Spahn, June 11, 1929, GStA PK, I.HA Rep. 303 Nr. 176.

⁴⁹ For the case of Rumml and the LSRM see Martin Bulmer and Joan Bulmer, "Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Rumml and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1922-1929." *Minerva* 19 (1981), pp. 371-377.

⁵⁰ On the Abraham-Lincoln Stiftung see Malcolm Richardson, Jürgen Reulecke, and Frank Trommler, editors, *Weimars transatlantischer Mäzen: die Lincoln-Stiftung 1927 bis 1934: Ein Versuch demokratischer Elitenförderung in der Weimarer Republik*. Essen, Germany: Klartext Verlag, 2008.

⁵¹ These claims are also part of Jäckh's egotistical attempt to place himself at the center of all major political events. See Ernst Jäckh to Beardsley Rumml, January 9, 1926, Folder 537, Box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM, RAC; and Ernst Jäckh, "Beiträge zum Locarno- und Kellogg-Vertrag." In Ernst Jäckh, editor, *Politik als Wissenschaft: Zehn Jahre Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*. Berlin, Germany: Verlag Hermann Reckendorf, 1931, pp. 1-12.

⁵² Giuliana Gemelli, "Europe-U.S.A. American Foundations and European Scientific Integration: Actors and Networks (1920's-70's)." *MEFRIM* 114: 1 (2002), pp. 412-413.

⁵³ Geert J. Somsen, "A History of Universalism: Conceptions of the Internationality of Science from the Enlightenment to the Cold War." *Minerva* 46 (2008), pp. 361-379.

⁵⁴ Paul Forman, "Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar Physicists: The Ideology and Its Manipulation in Germany after World War I." *Isis* 64: 2 (June 1973), pp. 157-168.

⁵⁵ Theodor Heuss, "Denkschrift zur Errichtung einer Deutschen Hochschule für Politik." In *Politische Bildung: Wille, Wesen, Ziel, Weg. Sechs Reden gehalten bei der Eröffnung der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik* Berlin, Germany: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1921), p. 33.

⁵⁶ Wilhelm Haas, "Auslandsarbeit." In Ernst Jäckh, editor, *Politik als Wissenschaft: Zehn Jahre Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*. Berlin, Germany: Verlag Hermann Reckendorf, 1931, pp.256-263.

⁵⁷ John Van Sickle to Edmund E. Day, February 22, 1933, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.

⁵⁸ John Van Sickle, "Memorandum on DHfP and conversation with Wolfers in Paris on March 30, 1933." Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.

⁵⁹ John Van Sickle to Edmund E. Day, May 10, 1933, Folder 177, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.

⁶⁰ John Van Sickle to Edmund E. Day, May 12, 1933, Folder 178, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.

⁶¹ John Van Sickle, "Report on Rockefeller Foundation Activities in Germany, Social Sciences." June 21, 1933, Folder 736, Box 93, Series 717, RG 2, RF, RAC.

⁶² John Van Sickle, "Conversation of JVS with Dr. Jäckh, Paris, July 17 and 18, 1933," July 18, 1933, p. 2, Folder 178, Box 19, Series 717S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.

⁶³ Tracy B. Kittredge, "Memorandum on Conversation with Jäckh in Paris on February 10-11, 1935." February 13, 1935, p. 2, Folder 980, Box 74, Series 401S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.

⁶⁴ Tracy B. Kittredge to Edmund E. Day, June 24, 1935; John Van Sickle to Tracy B. Kittredge, July 10, 1935; Thomas B. Appleget, "Memorandum regarding grant for Jäckh." July 18, 1935; and Tracy B. Kittredge to Stacy May, August 3, 1935, Folder 980, Box 74, Series 401S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.

⁶⁵ Grant-in-Aid RA SS NO 4059, Folder 3793, Box 319, Series 200S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.

⁶⁶ JHW [Joseph H. Willitts] to Thomas B. Appleget, August 14, 1940, Folder 3793, Box 319, Series 200S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.

⁶⁷ Grant-in-Aid, action no. RA SS 4410, Folder 3794, Box 319, Series 200S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.

⁶⁸ Martin Bulmer and Joan Bulmer, "Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Rumml and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1922-1929." *Minerva* 19 (1981), pp. 399-403.

⁶⁹ Thomas B. Appleget, "Memorandum regarding grant for Jäckh." July 18, 1935, Folder 980, Box 74, Series 401S, RG 1.1, RF, RAC.