Research Reports
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American Psychology and the Transformation of the School in Postwar America

by Catherine Gavin Loss

In July 2002, I conducted research at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) for my dissertation, "American Psychology and the Transformation of the School in Postwar America." My project examines the intersection of psychological expertise and American public education and traces the ways in which psychological language and practice — what scholars refer to as a therapeutic ethos — became institutionalized in the nation's system of public schooling. While my dissertation focuses on how these developments were manifested after the Second World War, my research at the RAC has enabled me to explore the inextricable connections between the postwar rise of a therapeutic culture in American public education and the early twentieth-century private initiatives in — and professionalization of — child guidance. During my research visit, I examined the RAC's rich and diverse collection in child studies, and more specifically, in mental hygiene and child guidance. I mined the Commonwealth Fund Archives and its holdings on the Program for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, the National Committee of Visiting Teachers, and the English Mental Hygiene Program, as well as the General Education Board Archives and its materials in teacher training and child development studies.

My research has enabled me to better understand the professional and philanthropic origins of child guidance and their profound influence on the postwar institutionalization of psychological expertise in public schools, at the same time that it has helped me to clarify my thinking on a number of important issues that are central to my project: the connections among the social sciences, progressive reform, child guidance, and the encroachment of psychological expertise into the public school; the pathologization of misbehavior and delinquency, changing conceptions of the "problem" child, and the attendant professionalization of child guidance; the emergence of parent-blaming, and more specifically mother-blaming, as a viable — and dominan — explanation for psychological distress in children; and the more subtle diffusion of psychological authority into the major institutions of American life. The rise of child guidance is a story of both continuity and change, and the collections at the RAC have helped me to better understand how this complex narrative has unfolded throughout the twentieth century.

That child guidance was an outgrowth of the early 20th-century child-saving movement and the larger Progressive commitment to the "whole child" is of central importance to my dissertation, for it was during this time that the enduring relationship between the public school and the inner life of the child was first forged. In light of newly enacted compulsory education laws, progressive educators believed that the public school was uniquely suited to solve society's most intractable social problems and contended that schooling, when done correctly, could ease the

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tensions created by rapid urbanization, immigration, and industrialization. The altered landscape of American culture, progressive reformers believed, provided the school with a new opportunity — indeed, an urgent responsibility — to play a leading role in adapting the nation to unprecedented social and economic change. Thus while public health doctors and dentists volunteered their professional services to local schools, and women's clubs and settlement workers provided free breakfasts, vacation schools, and playgrounds to local immigrant children, philanthropic foundations such as the Commonwealth Fund supported basic and applied research in medicine and the social sciences and directed their attention to the psychological "adjustment" of children through the mental hygiene and child guidance movements.

The child guidance movement sought to prevent psychological maladjustment and mental illness in children by establishing a network of community guidance clinics that spread during the 1920s and worked in tandem with public schools and other medical, judicial, and social welfare agencies. An outgrowth of earlier initiatives in childhood psychopathology, juvenile delinquency, and mental hygiene, the child guidance movement reinforced the progressive belief in preventive interventions in the life of the child — in its early years, the immigrant, lower- and working-class child — by funding advanced training fellowships in child psychology and psychiatry, and by establishing well-integrated guidance clinics composed of psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers. As one of the leading private philanthropies funding child health programs in the first half of the 20th century, the Commonwealth Fund was deeply influenced by the early 20th-century child-saving *esprit de corps*, and therefore supported work aimed at improving the physical, moral, and emotional life of children. Its first major program in this area was the Program for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency.

The Commonwealth Fund officially adopted its Program for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency in November of 1921. Building upon the earlier work of William Healy and Augusta Bronner and embracing a psychiatric model of childhood maladjustment and delinquency, the Program for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (PPJD) divided its work into four major areas: the New York School of Social Work; the National Committee for Mental Hygiene-Division of the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency; the National Committee on Visiting Teachers-Public Education Association of New York, and the Joint Committee on Methods of Preventing Delinquency (JCMPD). Through these four divisions, the PPJD supported social work education in child guidance by establishing student fellowships and supporting a Bureau of Child Guidance; funded the development of demonstration guidance clinics in cities across the country, including Norfolk, Dallas, and St. Louis; furnished visiting teachers (school case workers who referred for treatment children exhibiting signs of emotional and psychological distress, "predelinquency" or "maladjustment") to many school districts, providing them with professional development opportunities; published scholarly articles; and disseminated information widely on juvenile delinquency and child guidance. By aligning itself with leading social scientists and reformers such as Bernard Glueck, Graham Taylor, Julia Lathrop, Thomas Salmon, and Ralph Truitt, the Commonwealth Fund's Program for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency was among the earliest philanthropic efforts to redirect social scientific thought toward the prevention of childhood "pathologies," and to claim the inner life of the child as a worthy and important area of study.

As the collections of the RAC reveal, the troublesome outward behaviors of children that pointed to an inner psychic problem changed over time, as did the population that was targeted for intervention. During the early work of child guidance practitioners, petty crimes and youthful mischief were the primary reasons for guidance referrals; stealing, lying, running away, and overall defiance were the kinds of "acting-out" behaviors that became sources of concern for those working in the field. As the scope of child

guidance work expanded to include the white, middle-class population, so too did the troublesome behaviors that were sources of concern and seen as outward manifestations of intrapsychic distress. During the 1930s and 40s, parents themselves increasingly brought their children to guidance clinics for personality "disorders" such as shyness, nervousness, withdrawal, and troublesome habits such as daydreaming, thumbsucking, bedwetting, and masturbation. School problems such as poor academic performance and failure, learning delays, and chronic truancy were cited as the chief reasons for referral and as such, the school was often the site where these behaviors, "maladies," and "pathologies" were first identified.

Another crucial development that emerged in the 1930s is the extent to which peer relations became a gauge of the extent of one's personal adjustment in school. While most studies provide a top-down analysis of these changes, I propose a bottom-up perspective, one that considers the role that children, and the youth culture they helped to create, played in "normalizing" adolescent behavior. Children that got on well with their peers — who were well-liked and "popular"— were rarely labeled "troubled." Socially awkward children, on the other hand, who were rejected by their peer group and did not "fit in," became suspect. This notion of the peer group as the arbiter of personal adjustment persisted and became even more pronounced when an independent youth culture emerged after the Second World War.

If the way in which children got along with their peers was a source of concern for child guidance professionals, so too was the relationship they had with their families, and more specifically, their mothers. One example of the connections that child guidance practitioners and visiting teachers drew between troublesome youth and their maladjusted mothers is taken from the case of "P." "P" was a "friendly" and "bright" thirteen-year-old boy who was identified as emotionally troubled by a visiting teacher at school because of his poor academic performance, chronic truancy, and "reckless abandon to auto-erotic sex practices for which he was repeatedly corrected in the classroom." "P's" mother, a "young, affable, and well-possessed woman," was separated from her husband, ran a boarding house to make ends meet, and, the visiting teacher believed, overly-indulged her son to compensate for her own role in tearing the family apart. The visiting teacher suggested that "P's" actions in school were indicative of his psychological maladjustment and a deeper probe into his home life would reveal the underlying cause for his troublesome behavior. As the visiting teacher's report went on to reveal, "P" and his mother shared a makeshift bedroom in the parlor, where she walked around "in the rather unusual and extreme décolleté provided by a slip-on gingham house-dress" and frequently entertained male boarders "until late in the night." These tight and, according to the visiting teacher, disturbingly inappropriate sleeping arrangements, combined with "P's" already troubling attachment issues, led to his compulsive masturbation and generalized sexual confusion. "P", according to the report, made tremendous strides through his guidance visits yet he could not be considered fully adjusted until his mother attended therapy sessions of her own to deal with her unresolved emotional and sexual problems. In short, child guidance professionals insisted that the only way to truly heal a child of his psychological distress was to first cure the mother of her own emotional problems. This practice of mother-blaming persisted and became increasingly harsh after the Second World War, when "Momism" and other maternal "pathologies" were directly tied to "maladies" in youth ranging from homosexuality in boys, sexual precocity in girls, and autism in "rejected" children by their "refrigerator" mothers.

As the case of "P" reveals, psychological experts looked well beyond the individual patient for the sources of, and solution to, psychological maladjustment. My research at the RAC has helped me better understand how professional psychological language and practice moved between and among patients, families, schools, and the wider community in the attempt to

diagnose and cure troubled student behaviors. By locating the source of the patient-student's maladjustment in a broad social context, then, psychological experts helped to create a climate whereby the school necessarily became an extension of the clinic.

To be sure, there is a rich body of literature that has explored the origins of mental hygiene and the child guidance movement, and my study builds upon — and has benefited enormously from — these important and groundbreaking works. These studies, however, end where my story begins: the end of the Second World War, when the major institutions of American life began to increasingly frame their most pressing problems in psychological terms. By examining precisely how the rise and subsequent professionalization of child guidance led to these postwar developments, I now understand how the school took up the work of the clinic, the mainstream public schoolteacher assumed the work of the visiting teacher, and psychological expertise became so deeply enmeshed in the language and daily practices of the American public school.

The Rockefeller Programs for the Disadvantaged and Federal Educational Programs

By John Groutt

"The President's Review" in the 1963 Annual Report of the Rockefeller Foundation noted that Rockefeller corporate philanthropies had invested more than $66 million "in the cause of Negro education" since the formation of the General Education Board in 1902. A resolution passed that year by the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) determined to make this cause one of the RF's major program areas. An important part of this endeavor was to help stimulate educational opportunities for the disadvantaged, with special emphasis on higher education.

When the Civil Rights movement raised the issue of educational inequality and opportunity, some educational institutions responded by searching for ways to confront the issue. As educators began to admit the extent of the problem, they also realized that solutions were unexplored territory. It was no secret that few minorities were entering or were prepared to enter the top-flight institutions of higher education. In 1964, Princeton had a total of twenty "Negro" students among its 3,166 undergraduates, and it averaged only one to three Negro graduates a year in classes that awarded 755 bachelor degrees. Most, if not all, of the top-ranked schools had equally abysmal records of minority enrollment and graduation.

The unequal and segregated primary and secondary school systems in many parts of the country insured that this grossly distorted situation would continue unless major changes occurred at all levels of the educational structure. Segregation and poorly financed secondary schools in minority neighborhoods were only part of the difficulty. Few resources were available to help poor youth pay the costs of private education. This too had to be addressed if any realistic solutions were to be expected.

In the early 1960s, philanthropic foundations began to receive inquiries from colleges, universities and a few community organizations seeking support to help underwrite the costs for experimental programs designed to explore solutions for these problems. The three major foundations, Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller, took different approaches to the issue. The Ford Foundation began to address the problem as an extension of its work to prevent juvenile delinquency. Its funds began to support programs designed to test the opportunity theory and related ideas found in Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin's book, *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs* (1960). They theorized that antisocial behavior was largely the result of a lack of socially positive opportunities and that gang membership supplied those opportunities. If something replaced the opportunities offered by delinquency, then socially constructive behavior would be the more likely outcome. The option of going on to college was seen as one alternative which might provide this opportunity. How to make this option

operational for economically disadvantaged and educationally under-prepared youth needed to be examined, and in the summer of 1964 Ford agreed to test this theory with grants to fund pre-college summer programs for "deprived students" at several colleges and schools.

The Carnegie Corporation of New York approached the problem from another direction. An *ad hoc* committee of the American Council

From the Rockefeller Foundation Archives

A participant in the ABC program at Oberlin College in 1964. Photograph by Arthur Rickerby of Life Magazine.

on Education had been discussing the problem since 1963 and concluded that the solution for improving the educational level of blacks lay in two major areas. One was the poorly trained faculty and inferior curriculum in the predominantly black colleges. The second major problem, they believed, was that the majority of students entering these predominantly black colleges and universities were poorly prepared by their segregated and weakly financed secondary schools. The overwhelming majority of black college students in the U.S. were being educated in the black colleges. If these youngsters were to be helped, the process must start with helping the black colleges and universities improve their faculty, their curriculum and the quality of entering students.

These discussions led the group to establish the nonprofit Educational Services Incorporated (ESI). Headed by Jerrold Zacharias, a physicist at MIT, and Herman Branson of Howard University, ESI received Carnegie funding to offer training opportunities for faculty from black colleges to help raise standards and thus help improve the educational experience for black college students.

The second effort to improve the educational level of black colleges was to improve the pre-college preparation of these entering students. Again with Carnegie funding, the ESI began to develop pre-college curriculum materials in mathematics and English for use in summer programs for inadequately prepared entering freshmen. They planned to test these materials in programs for high school graduates during the summer of 1966 in such schools as Dillard, Fisk, Howard, Texas Southern, Morehouse, and Webster College in St. Louis, the only predominantly white school in this group.

The RF chose to take a pragmatic approach to the problem by funding a broader range of experimental programs in an effort to find out what would work. As RF president George Harrar wrote in his "President's Review" in 1964, "relatively little is known as yet of the most effective ways in which disadvantaged students can achieve equal access to higher education." The files on these programs in the Rockefeller Foundation archives are filled with letters and memos documenting the experimental designs and variations that were tested. Should the selection of students emphasize students from families in poverty, students at academic risk, lacking in motivation, unmistakable but untapped talent, or some other personal quality of the youth? At what age and grade should the students be chosen to participate? Would placement in a high-quality college preparatory school best achieve the goal? What should the

curriculum look like? How many weeks should the summer program operate? Was follow-up for an academic year needed in addition to the summer? Should the programs be all male or all female, or coeducational? How many years should students be enrolled in these programs? What subjects should be included? How should the days and evenings be structured? Should they emphasize academics or counseling? How was contact to be made between the colleges and the students? How much and how should families be involved? What are the most effective program designs for different cultures? The programs were designed to test the effectiveness of these unending variables.

Over the next decade, the RF funded more than twenty distinct programs as it explored various methods to enlarge and academically improve the pool of disadvantaged and minority youth applying to colleges. In 1963, the RF awarded its first grants for this new effort to Princeton University, Oberlin College and Dartmouth College. Each was awarded $150,000 three-year grants for residential summer programs offering intensive academic and cultural opportunities for selected secondary school students, both black and white. Each program was designed to test the effectiveness of a different design.

The Princeton and Oberlin projects were somewhat similar. Both encompassed summer residential programs, academic classes with small enrollments, college students as live-in counselors, off-campus trips, and social activities. Students were to return to their home schools in the fall. Princeton's would be an eight-week program for disadvantaged boys who were high school juniors or seniors from urban schools in New Jersey. Oberlin's program extended only for six weeks and was designed for a coeducational group of seventh and eighth graders. In the resolution to fund these three programs, the RF board expressed its hope "that the experience of one summer would substantially change the

From the Rockefeller Foundation Archives

Baseball great Jackie Robinson (right) visits with participants in the ABC program at Dartmouth College in 1964. Photograph by Heinz Kluetmeier.

students' study habits and expectations would undergo substantial change…and a considerable number of them should have both the motivation and the ability eventually to qualify for entrance to first-rate institutions of higher learning." Letters and reports from these "programs for the disadvantaged" show that this hope reflected a naïve understanding of the depth of the disadvantages bred by poverty and racism. However, the basic configuration of the Princeton and Oberlin programs, along with the six Carnegie-funded programs, offered the primary models for the largest national pre-college program that ultimately emerged: Upward Bound.

The Dartmouth program had a radically different design. Conceived by Dartmouth's associate dean, Charles Dey, it initially included the active involvement of thirty of the most selective private preparatory schools in New England, including Andover, Choate, Hotchkiss, Mount Hermon and the George School. It offered an eight-week summer session with remedial classes and cultural enrichment for a group of previously identified talented but disadvantaged boys from the ninth and tenth grades. Each student in the program would be offered admission and a scholarship to one of the cooperating preparatory schools upon successful completion of the summer program. He would then continue his high school career and college preparation in the rarified atmosphere of a selective residential preparatory school. In the fall of 1965, sixty-three poor black and white young men from the urban ghettos and rural South arrived on the campuses of some of the most exclusive prep schools in the nation.

The Dartmouth experiment was administered by a new independent entity, the Independent Schools Talent Search Program (ISTSP). It received continued RF support as well as generous help from other foundations and the corporate world. As more prep schools joined its ranks, the program came to be known as the ABC, A Better Chance Program. The initiative grew rapidly, and by the 1968-69 school year the ABC Program had 306 students placed in 240 independent prep schools and 66 in the public school component.

The public school component had been launched as a new approach in 1966, also with RF support. This effort consisted of identifying promising minority high school students and housing them in special group homes established and staffed by ABC in communities with excellent public schools. This program continues to operate and enables talented minority students from districts with inferior schools to attend superior public schools across the nation. It is another system designed to offer talented students an opportunity to enhance their chance of entry and success in selective colleges and universities.

Today the ABC program continues to support minorities using both of these approaches begun in the 1960s. Its placement of a high percentage of its graduates in highly competitive colleges is excellent. However, it no longer looks for the high-risk student, but appears to focus on gifted minority youth, not necessarily, or often from, disadvantaged backgrounds. Its current contribution thus focuses on race, rather than class.

National events began moving at lightening speed late in 1963 and soon overwhelmed these fledgling experiments. John F. Kennedy was assassinated and Lyndon B. Johnson became president in November. Johnson believed that providing educational opportunity for the poor should be the concern of the entire nation and especially of the federal government In the first few months of his administration, he pushed through one of the most unusual pieces of federal legislation ever passed, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which established an administrative agency for Johnson's "War on Poverty," the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). The law itself provided an almost unlimited opportunity to provide services and build imaginative programs to eliminate poverty.

Providing new opportunities for poor youth to enter and succeed in higher education became one of those services. In 1965 several projects, funded by each of the three foundations, were included in the seventeen pilot projects that the OEO organized to operate that summer. Along with Head Start, this new Upward Bound program became one of the earliest "national

emphasis" programs. Its purpose was to explore how talented poor and minority youth could be encouraged and helped to enter and succeed in higher education. The experimental educational programs begun by the foundations brought a wealth of knowledge and experience into the new efforts of the federal government. Due partly to the knowledge and momentum gained from the foundation programs, and partly to the exploding realization that something of this type was desperately needed, the OEO was able to expand the Upward Bound experiment in its second year to serve 20,233 students in 218 programs at colleges and schools across the country. One of the most successful and recognized of the OEO programs was off to a spectacular start.

As RF grantees sought continued funding from the foundation for their pre-college programs in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they were referred to OEO as a possible source of funds through the Upward Bound initiative. New applicants to the RF received the same advice. This was both a blessing and a trap. As the war in Vietnam escalated, the monies for the domestic War on Poverty became more limited, while the demands for OEO financial support for a myriad of programs were increasing. The initial exuberance and optimism of OEO officials had raised the hopes and expectations that their programs would be expanded and that the agency would receive substantial increases in funding. Many programs were competing for diminishing federal funds. In spite of the difficulties, additional RF-supported pre-college programs made the transition to Upward Bound and continued with government support, thus providing functioning models for the new developing federal program to incorporate as it searched for its own model of services.

Three of the 1965 OEO pilot programs in the pre-college initiative were originally RF-funded projects. One was located at Western Washington State College in Bellingham, Washington. Tom Billings, director of the RF-funded program there, took a leave of absence to become assistant national director of the Upward Bound office in the OEO. Two years later he succeeded Richard Frost, who had served as first national director. Frost had been recruited from Reed College in Portland, Oregon, where he was serving as academic vice president. Frost had been actively involved in writing and supervising the RF pre-college grants at Reed, which had been designed to serve black Americans and received a second RF grant that enabled it to focus on Native Americans, Mexican Americans and poor whites, most of whose families had traveled from the Ozarks to work as migrant workers.

Thus the first two national directors of the Upward Bound programs single-handedly set the policy for the new Upward Bound effort. Consequently the influence of the RF experiments on the new national initiative was enormous.

Another of the original 1965 Upward Bound pilot programs was the RF-funded ABC preparatory school program. These programs included a residential program extending through the summer and academic year, and by 1968 they cost about $5,000 per student, compared with the less than $1,500 per student cost in the regular type of Upward Bound program. In 1965 OEO had begun by supporting 100 students in this component, and the following year it agreed to support an additional 300 new students. Plans for the following year anticipated even higher enrollment. The future looked bright for this component and it produced euphoria among the participating schools until 1968, when OEO announced that it would no longer support ABC under the Upward Bound effort. The schools were left with the responsibility of supporting students already enrolled in their residential high school programs. Thus the OEO/ABC program was to end before it even got a respectable beginning. Finally a compromise was reached under which OEO agreed to continue to support the students already enrolled in the program but would not fund any new students. The prep schools and RF officials scrambled to salvage the wreckage.

A program initially funded by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF) took a very different approach from that used by either Upward Bound or ABC. ASPIRA, Inc. was a community organiza-

tion established by Puerto Rican activists in New York City to provide opportunities in their neighborhoods. Its many services included tutoring, helping with applications for college and financial aid, and eventually, parent education.

The Higher Education Act of 1965 had begun a small program with very similar aims. Eventually known as Educational Talent Search, it operated within the U.S. Office of Education. In 1969 it became a part of a new Division in the Office of Education along with Upward Bound, which was transferred from OEO, and a new program called Special Services for Disadvantaged Students. The goal of the latter was to support underprepared students already enrolled in the nation's colleges. These three federal programs — Upward Bound, Educational Talent Search, and Special Services for Disadvantaged Students — began to be called the "TRIO" programs and retain that name to the present, although there are now five distinct programs. Each was designed to help different populations of disadvantaged and "first-generation" college students prepare for and succeed in college, from middle school to the doctoral degree.

When the RBF began to withdraw its support from the ASPIRA programs, that organization found a very sympathetic ear from administrators in the federal Talent Search program. ASPIRA appears to have shifted easily from RBF support to the TRIO family of federal programs. It brought to TRIO its extensive experience in dealing with the particular problems faced by Latino youth in preparing for postsecondary education.

Another significant contribution toward increasing the numbers of disadvantaged and minority youth were the RF "student assistance" grants to several southern and five highly selective private colleges in the North and West (Duke, Emory, Tulane, and Vanderbilt in the South along with Carlton, Grinnell, Oberlin, Occidental, Reed, Swarthmore, and Antioch). The problem of inadequate preparation for college was paired with the problem of paying for higher education by youngsters living in "disadvantaged" families. Colleges themselves could not underwrite the substantial funds required to support the growing number of students from new populations who began to apply to formerly all-white institutions. The RF began to work with these schools in 1963 and continued throughout the next decade. In addition to providing financial aid, RF support aimed to encourage the schools to seek out minority and poor applicants, an effort that normally never would have been a part of their targeted recruitment efforts. The RF also required plans for the continuation of this effort after the grants expired.

The struggle to improve educational opportunities for minorities was not an easy one for elite schools with virtually no experience working with this population of students. Further complicating the situation was the increasingly confrontational tactics of the Civil Rights movement. Among the final documents in the RF grant file for Swarthmore College are the reports of the struggles between faculty, administration and students regarding the efforts to improve recruitment of blacks and the occupation of the admissions office by members of the Swarthmore Afro-American Student's Society. In the midst of a very difficult winter, Courtney Smith, the president of Swarthmore, who was genuinely working to bring about a solution, suffered a heart attack and died. In May of 1969 the RF grants officer called Dean Dey at Dartmouth, the original architect of the ISTSP/ABC program, to report that the RF officers had decided they could not recommend the proposal for a ten-college consortium to deal with equal educational opportunity. "Dey was sad and distressed," the RF officer reported, "because a small minority of students at Dartmouth [had] just occupied the administration building and ejected college officials. It [was] apparent that they [would] have to be removed by police action."

In spite of such serious problems brought on by integration in the colleges, the RF programs achieved nearly undreamed of results in greater access and support for minorities and poor students. Reports indicate that the experience of these programs were replicated across the nation in previously all-white colleges. The programs contributed significantly to the desegregation of

the elite institutions in American higher education.

As foundations explored ways to improve college financing for the disadvantaged, the Great Society of Lyndon B .Johnson initiated federal efforts through the College Work Study Program and the Economic Opportunity Grants. For the first time ever, federal monies were awarded based on financial need. Colleges used these new unexpected funds as a part of packages of financial aid that included RF funds. In actuality, the combination often resulted in RF funds helping support more students than originally proposed. The selective colleges learned how to work with a population wholly foreign to them. In the process, they frequently reported that they learned as much from the new poor and minority students as the students were learning from them.

Today, the federal TRIO programs serve almost 750,000 participants and are approaching the billion-dollar level of federal funding. Federal funds for student financial aid will exceed $10.9 billion in 2003. In so many ways, the rather small seeds planted by the RF and RBF, along with Ford and Carnegie, have expanded into substantial private and federal efforts that continue to enable poor youth to escape from poverty through higher education. They began to teach institutions of higher learning how to work with talented but poorly prepared youth. Their contribution to the intellectual, spiritual and economic wealth of the nation has proven that the initial investments were well made.

Clean Milk and the Emergence of Public Health in Mount Desert, Maine, 1910-1930

By Martha A. Eastman

I visited the Rockefeller Archive Center in June 2002 as part of my ongoing dissertation research about the local dynamics of rural public health in Maine from 1910-1950. I am particularly interested in the interaction between early health officials and the rural public and why local people came to accept public health recommendations, such as the importance of keeping milk clean. Mount Desert, Bar Harbor, Tremont and Southwest Harbor are the towns on Mount Desert Island, located on the coast of Maine in Hancock County. Seal Harbor, where John D. Rockefeller, Jr. had a summer home, is one of several coastal villages located in the town of Mount Desert.

I reviewed documents in the Seal Harbor section of the Homes Series in the Rockefeller Family Archives. These materials have highlighted the public health contributions of summer residents, particularly their efforts to ensure a safe milk supply. Social class interests figured prominently in these activities in Seal Harbor, since the summer residents were mainly concerned with their own milk supply and not with the milk supply of the year-round residents. Although summer residents were initially looking out for themselves, their efforts raised the standard of clean milk on Mount Desert Island. In 1930 they supported Bar Harbor's organization of a local health department and this development no doubt led to cleaner milk for both summer and year-round island residents.

From the Rockefeller Family Archives

"Bismarck directing a whirlwind campaign!" Mary Dows Dunham, a civic leader among the summer residents of Seal Harbor, Maine, inscribed this picture of herself on the Village Green when she sent it to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., ca. 1929.

Accustomed to urban communicable disease epidemics, Mount Desert summer residents in the early 20th century recognized the need for public health services and supported these activities with their expertise, time and money. Several prominent Seal Harbor summer residents

did not favor pasteurization of milk and expected their milk supply to be handled properly so that the bacteria counts would remain low without it. For many summer residents, clean milk was among the amenities in Seal Harbor that provided them respite from the many problems of urban life at a time when milk-borne diseases were prevalent and the science of bacteriology had not yet filtered down to rural farms. While summer residents worried about their milk supply, many local, year-round residents did not have access to clean milk.

By the end of the 19th century increasing numbers of wealthy summer residents spent a few weeks or months between May and October in the villages of Mount Desert Island. Over time, many became involved in community activities to improve sanitation, to create recreational facilities, to support local public health nursing services and to build a hospital. They formed village improvement societies with volunteer committees that dealt with garbage and raised funds for community projects.

Summer residents were the major players in village improvement societies and the sanitation committees' volunteer service preceded official public health inspections. Over time they influenced the development of an official health department in Bar Harbor in 1930 and instigated formal milk inspections by a trained professional. In the 1910s and 1920s, though, members of the Sanitation Committee of the Seal Harbor Village Improvement Society conducted private milk inspections. Apart from this work, a group of summer residents, including John D. Rockefeller, Jr., provided loans to a farmer who agreed to follow their instructions for supplying the Seal Harbor summer residents with clean milk.

In 1910 Rockefeller purchased and expanded "The Eyrie," a large summer home in Seal Harbor. The records at the Rockefeller Archive Center provide a snapshot of the activities of the "summer colony" in Mount Desert during the early twentieth century, as well as of the summer residents' relationships with their "native" neighbors. Many of the year-round residents worked as maids, cooks, gardeners, chauffeurs and laborers for the summer residents and many year-round residents depended on income from summer residents for their livelihood throughout the year. Public health was a concern in part because the population of Mount Desert Island expanded so much each summer and the safety of the milk supply was important to summer residents and visitors.

The correspondence between Rockefeller and his friend Mary Dows Dunham about their village improvement activities, particularly about their efforts to maintain a clean milk supply for Seal Harbor summer residents, illustrates the summer residents' upper-class position in relation to their local, year-round neighbors. Many members of the local community in Mount Desert were grateful for the financial assistance, philanthropy, advice and jobs that summer residents like Rockefeller and Dows Dunham provided, but most still lived in poverty and had difficult lives during the fall, winter and spring. Both the summer residents and the year-round local residents in Mount Desert were dependent on each other — the locals for work and the summer residents for services — and they each had their own agendas. The local, year-round residents regularly inflated work prices for summer people, which led summer residents to believe that the locals were often dishonest. Despite the fact that living on Mount Desert Island year-round required hard work, frugality and resourcefulness, summer residents believed that the locals were in general less intelligent and needed supervision. The summer residents believed that no farmer on the island was capable of producing milk that was clean enough without their knowledgeable guidance.

Coming from New York City, Rockefeller and Dows Dunham were aware of the potential health hazards of a dirty milk supply. Numerous newspaper articles in the city discussed the dangers of diseases carried in milk, especially during warmer months. By 1910 urban people, particularly those with some knowledge of bacteriology, understood that healthy persons could be typhoid carriers and that safeguarding public health required an organized effort, including health inspections, regulations and enforcement. In addition to their high expectations, some summer

residents of Mount Desert from New York and other cities brought their public health knowledge and their increasing technical expertise in laboratory procedures.

The New York City Health Department at this time was a model for the whole country. The science of bacteriology led to increasing professionalization in public health, requiring more training and experience than the average lay board of health member had in rural areas. Physicians and public health officials relied on laboratory tests for determining the safety of water and milk supplies. Also, expert panels, such as New York's Milk Commission, developed standards and policies to apply this science to improving the milk supply. In comparison with the public health services to which summer residents from New York were accustomed, Maine's public health services must have seemed quite limited in the 1910s. Since local boards of health in Maine at this time had limited functions and resources, the summer residents saw the need to improve public health surveillance in Mount Desert.

Dr. Edward K. Dunham, an 1886 graduate of Harvard Medical School, was a professor of pathology at the Bellevue Medical College of New York University. He was also a bacteriologist who had studied in Robert Koch's laboratory in Berlin and who had built a laboratory at his Seal Harbor summer home. Dunham tested the milk from several farms in Mount Desert, and during the first two decades of the 1900s, he served as chairman of the Sanitary Committee of the Seal Harbor Village Improvement Society. As early as 1903 that committee adopted the guidelines of the New York County Medical Society for the certification of milk as their standard for maintaining the safety of the summer milk supply in Seal Harbor. This included regular bacteriological examinations of the milk and dairy inspections.

When Vesta Clement, the milk supplier for many Seal Harbor residents, died suddenly in 1919, the summer residents were especially concerned about their future milk supply. Clement, unlike most other Mount Desert Island farmers, had paid careful attention to sanitation at her dairy. The summer residents wanted to make sure that their milk remained clean. Because of the increased risk of disease during the warmer months, they hoped to find an adequate milk source before the next summer season.

After some correspondence and planning, this group, including Rockefeller and Dunham, loaned money to Pearl S. Richardson in 1920 so that he could start a dairy farm. The loans helped him to clear land for crops and to build a barn and a milk house. Since Richardson was willing to accept direction from the summer residents about his farming techniques, the fact that the farm was not yet properly equipped was a minor issue. Correspondence indicates that despite the amount of work needed to develop the farm, the financiers were initially convinced that Richardson would work with them to maintain the sanitary standards that they required.

Richardson did his best to implement their suggestions, but farming on Mount Desert Island turned out to be very hard work. Richardson's farm did not have electricity and was located on a poor road that made milk delivery difficult during winter and spring. Setting up and maintaining a sanitary milk operation under less than ideal conditions and doing his best to please his financial supporters, Richardson struggled to establish his farm as his debts grew.

Mary Dows Dunham was familiar with milk inspection because she had assisted her husband in obtaining milk samples, preparing the cultures, and counting the bacteria under the microscope. Despite her lack of formal public health training, Dows Dunham's experiences prepared her to function like an official milk inspector. Only a few months after her husband's death in 1922, she began checking the bacterial content of the milk supply in Mount Desert during the summer.

By 1926 Dows Dunham was very involved with supporting and supervising Richardson's farm, doing just what her husband had done. She tested the milk regularly and visited to observe the sanitary conditions in the barn and milk house. When Richardson's milk house burned down, she advocated for assisting him to rebuild his milk house, which added more to his debt. Dows Dunham understood the necessity of the milk house to facilitate safe handling of the milk.

Since the milk house was not rebuilt until two years later, Richardson no doubt needed to work even harder to maintain the low bacteria counts in the milk during that time.

By the late 1920s Richardson's milk was very clean in comparison to the rural milk supply in general. Dows Dunham frequently highlighted this point in her correspondence to Rockefeller and others by quoting the bacterial counts in Richardson's milk and the counts of other farmers' milk on the island. "I was in my laboratory at half past seven Sunday morning," she reported to Rockefeller on June 30, 1928, "counting the milk cultures I had put in the incubator on Friday. Richardson's milk was not above 3000, and Stanley's was 5000. This very low count is largely due to the cold weather, constant rain and so, lack of dust. I also examined Salisbury's milk, just for my own interest. He is the man who is delivering milk now to the natives; his ran about 25,000, just under certified milk. I was surprised to find it as good as it was, for the man has had no instructions as yet in caring for the milk. I think that with a little help and a few suggestions, his milk can be kept reasonably clean."

Dows Dunham functioned as a volunteer milk inspector for Seal Harbor, and she was pleased to report that the farmer she supervised had the cleanest milk. Richardson by this time had given up supplying his year-round customers with milk and was supplying milk only to the summer residents. Salisbury had picked up these local customers and many of them were not pleased with the quality of his milk in comparison to Richardson's.

Despite the low bacteria counts in Richardson's milk, his farm received an unfavorable rating in the *Report to the Milk Committee of the Seal Harbor Village Improvement Society* that Dows Dunham's son, Edward K. Dunham, Jr., compiled in November 1929. Richardson was still in debt to his financiers for $5,000, despite the fact that Dows Dunham and her sister had each canceled his notes to them totaling $3,233. The report judged that Richardson's barn was too small and that the poor drainage created an unsanitary situation. In order to supply more summer residents with milk, Richardson had started buying milk from other farmers to deliver to his customers, leading to the need for supervision of those farmers, too. The report argued for "simplification of sanitary supervision," suggesting that a better option than supporting Richardson would be to hire a particular college-educated farmer who had demonstrated his "intelligence" and "initiative" by staying out of debt. Since this man had sold his farm and was not available at that point to become their milk supplier, Richardson remained the top choice "by default."

By 1929 four different farmers were supplying milk to the summer residents in Seal Harbor, and the work involved with monitoring the safety of the milk from these farms was becoming too much for Dows Dunham. In her sixties by that time, she was well known throughout the island for her milk examination and sanitation expertise, and she was reluctant to stop her work until other milk inspection services were available.

Correspondence indicates that the summer residents considered various options for relieving Dows Dunham of her inspection tasks. Finally, in May 1930, after studying the feasibility for a year, the town of Bar Harbor decided to hire a full-time health officer. With $2,000 in contributions from summer residents, they employed A. A. Robertson, who had trained at Harvard and M.I.T. and who had worked in public health for nine years in Quincy, Massachusetts. Dows Dunham turned over the task of the Seal Harbor milk examination to him the following year.

Documents at the Rockefeller Archive Center illustrate how important Dows Dunham and other summer residents were in the development of public health services in coastal resort communities. By having influential connections at prominent universities, hospitals and research facilities, summer residents were valuable participants on Village Improvement Society committees. The summer residents had high expectations for how clean their milk should be, and although their efforts helped to improve the milk supply, they also kept their primary milk supplier in a dependent position by giving him interest-bearing loans that he had difficulty repaying. Desiring milk that was pure enough not to require pasteur-

ization, they subsidized Richardson, who agreed to follow their instructions. He struggled with his debt and worked under difficult circumstances, but Richardson's farm produced and delivered clean milk. This was not good enough in the end, though, because the upper-class values of the summer residents led them to wish he were more "intelligent" and able to pay his debts as well as produce clean milk.

Prior to the onset of official milk inspections and routine pasteurization, this group of Seal Harbor summer residents collaborated to ensure a clean milk supply for themselves, but they were not as concerned about the safety of the year-round residents' milk supply. Although the private milk inspection services led to the development of an official health department with a qualified health officer in Bar Harbor, the summer residents' goal was to keep themselves healthy rather than to promote the health of the whole community. The summer residents' upper-class position and their insistence on proper milk handling made pure milk and health accessible to the "summer colony" while the essentials of basic sanitation necessary to keep milk clean were absent on many of the island's farms. However, even though they were looking out for themselves, the summer residents made a significant contribution to rural public health in Mount Desert, Maine between 1910 and 1930.

The Office of Inter-American Affairs and the Latin American Mass Media, 1940-1946

by Gisela Cramer

I visited the Rockefeller Archive Center for a second time in July 2002 to continue research on a project that explores U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America during World War II and, more precisely, policies concerning cultural relations, the mass media and the communications sector. (See her report in 2001 issue of *Research Reports*).

The Second World War induced U.S. policymakers to launch a massive campaign to secure Latin America's goodwill, an effort that aimed to impress not only the ruling elites but society at large. This campaign to "win the hearts and minds" of the people was to a large degree the operational field of a wartime agency led by Nelson A. Rockefeller. Founded in August 1940 by executive decree, the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics, later called the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and, by 1945, the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA), has left a wealth of sources that are located primarily in the National Archives (II) in Washington, but also in other research institutions such as the Rockefeller Archive Center.

Initially, my research focused on the structural setup of OIAA operations. Very soon after its inception, the OIAA discovered that goodwill and propaganda campaigns had to be tailored to local conditions to increase effectiveness. To a considerable degree, OIAA operations were therefore decentralized and rested on the organizational capacity, experience and resourcefulness of local Coordination Committees which, while centered in the larger cities, maintained outposts that reached deep into the hinterland.

One example of the value of these local committees to the OIAA's work is their work in radio. Radio programs produced in the United States — although produced by savvy radio personnel and guided by experienced public relations and advertising managers — found mixed responses south of the Rio Grande due to differences in taste, customs or national and regional "sensibilities." But radio programs produced by local Coordination Committees found larger audiences and, in some instances, very high ratings. Indeed, some of the programs produced locally proved to be so successful that radio stations offered to broadcast them free of charge.

In contrast to the structural setup, the contents of the OIAA's goodwill and propaganda campaigns are much more difficult to analyze. The OIAA certainly spent considerable effort defining and evaluating propaganda contents and their possible effects, and accordingly issued content guidelines to its various branches. Yet such guidelines — while interesting in

themselves — hardly reflect the full scope of operations. It is therefore necessary to have a close look at the "products" themselves (that is, the print media, radio programs, films, and cultural programs) and relate them to local conditions, which is a rather time consuming endeavor given the vast output of the "Rockefeller Shop."

Moreover, while the objective of OIAA's operations may be loosely described as "winning the full-hearted cooperation" of Latin America, it is by no means obvious what exactly this entailed. Certainly, some of the policy objectives can be isolated in a rather straightforward fashion. Thus, during the early stages of the war, one of the clearly apparent objectives was to convince Latin American elites and public opinion at large that the Axis powers would not win the war, in spite of their apparently overwhelming successes on the battlefield. Hence, reports about the military capabilities of the United States and the Allies made up a large percentage of the content of early materials produced by the OIAA. Other programs served to buttress this message: Inviting scores of politicians and journalists from Latin America to tour the U.S. and visit defense industries, for example, was considered to be one of the more effective methods toward this end. During the later stages of the war, a clearly discernible objective was to neutralize local misgivings about economic dislocations and shortages produced by the increasing absorption of Latin America's economies into the U.S. war effort.

Yet much of the actual output was directed toward a more diffuse goal of generating sympathy for "the American way of life." The OIAA's central headquarters and (probably more so) its local representatives were aware of long-standing misgivings prevalent in Latin America, including cultural stereotypes, that stood in the way of "whole-hearted cooperation." To change the "Latin American mindset," the OIAA endeavored to present a "favorable" picture of North American civilization. A vast array of channels was employed toward this end, ranging from radio quiz shows and sentimental "radionovelas" to sponsoring surgical training (using medical training films produced in the U.S.) or classical concerts and art exhibitions (the latter to combat a widespread perception among Latin America's educated middle classes and elites that the United States was devoid of "culture"). Yet there did not exist such a "homogeneous mindset" to be worked upon, and the perception of what was apprehensible about North American civilization was equally as diverse as the ideas of what should be considered as "favorable." Again, such efforts to instill a positive perception of the "American way of life" to some degree relied on the local committees and their advice as to what strategy would actually "work" in a given environment.

In Argentina, for example, where the local committee perceived a fervent nationalism directed against "Yankee imperialism," propaganda contents were consciously rephrased to accommodate nationalist "sensibilities." Thus, instead of simply distributing booklets on America's "great men," their philosophies and historical contributions to Western Civilization and the "American way of life," the committee published its own versions which presented the founding fathers of the United States and of Argentina as parallel pairs and milestones of "Pan-American civilization." Locally devised essay contests invited schoolchildren to reflect not so much on the United States (as contests elsewhere did), but on Argentina's greatness and place in the Americas. Locally produced — and quite successful — radio shows dramatizing the life of U.S. inventors and benefactors of mankind were carefully crafted to show the benevolent impact they had on human well-being in Argentina. Toward the later stages of the war and particularly after the military coup of June 1943, when OIAA productions were frozen out of Argentine networks by state censorship, radio shows written by Uruguayan staff members and transmitted from Montevideo extolled the principles of Argentine nationhood for their essential "American-ness" and their incompatibility with fascist doctrines.

Measuring the effect of such efforts is intrinsically difficult, if not impossible. The OIAA itself tried to gauge the effects of their efforts, yet usually could not go beyond parameters such as "radio listener ratings" or "percentage of distributed information and propaganda materials

actually reprinted in local newspapers," which — while certainly not useless — do not give a clear indication as to "effect." It is possible, however, to reconstruct the reaction of local authorities.

No Latin American government was indifferent to the activities of the OIAA and its local outposts. While some seemed to have reacted rather passively, others tried to control and restrict incursions into the communications and cultural sectors, or to use OIAA activities for their own purposes. Thus, Argentine authorities used heavy-handed censorship, a fact that is hardly surprising given the severe deterioration of bilateral relations during the war, but so did the Brazilian government, an important ally of the United States. While the former tried to restrain and even repress U.S. incursions into the local communications sector and cultural arena (which finally led to the partial outsourcing of the U.S. information and propaganda systems directed at Argentina to Uruguay), the latter managed to gain a certain level of control via cooperation. Brazilian censors not only controlled the output and activities of local coordination committees but also reached deep into OIAA structures in the United States. Even OIAA short wave programs produced in the United States were not beyond the reach of Brazilian censors. In order to gain access to Brazil's state-controlled broadcasting system, the OIAA employed a Brazilian censorship official who monitored such programs at the source.

At first sight, there seems to have been little reason for a government like that of Brazil to try to control U.S. propaganda and information activities. Following the logic of international relations, "goodwill campaigns" directed at Brazil were, at least during the early stages of the war, as much a "pro-Vargas" as a "pro-Roosevelt" crusade since they were directed at strengthening the pro-Allied orientation of the Vargas administration against internal critics. Hence, "flattering" Vargas and portraying him in most favorable terms to the Brazilian public became part of the strategy chosen, particularly at the local level. Locally produced radio shows featuring Vargas and broadcast on his birthday, for instance, seem to have been a highly

From the Rockefeller Family Archives

Nelson A. Rockefeller during a radio broadcast in Mexico, 1945.

successful way of reaching broad audiences while earning such favorable responses from official Brazilian quarters that "other foreign colonies bit their nails in vexation at not having thought of the project," as the Brazilian Division proudly reported.

Yet not all of what the OIAA and other agencies produced was to the liking of the Vargas government. Portraying the military strength of the Allies by referring to the Soviet armed forces' power and important contributions to the war effort, for instance, was not a message that Vargas (as well as other authoritarian governments siding with the U.S.) was willing to allow into the country. Hence, Brazilian censors carefully eliminated any such references until internal political realignments provided for a major policy shift in 1945.

At the beginning of my research I expected U.S. campaigns directed at garnering support in the struggle against fascism to be a rather simple, straightforward issue. The blatant racism, the brutal subjugation of smaller nations, or the violation of international law by Nazi Germany, it seemed to me, would have provided ample and sufficient material for such campaigns. However, while these issues did play a role in the activities of the OIAA and other agencies, their use was limited. As the OIAA was well aware, pointing to Nazi racism, for example, was bound to raise questions about racism in the United States. Efforts to handle the subject by insisting on improving race relations or by demonstrating the contributions of black soldiers and communities to the U.S. war effort, on the other hand, were not necessarily to the liking of Latin American elites, and therefore touched upon another "sensitive issue." Likewise, extolling the virtues of democracy against Axis authoritarianism or totalitarianism touched upon a "sensitive issue" in much of Latin America where cooperative — but authoritarian — governments held power. Hence, the design of propaganda contents was not a simple, straightforward matter.

International Health, The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America during the 1940s

by Marcos Cueto

The Rockefeller Foundation (RF)played an important role in the redefinition and growth of international health activities in Latin America during the 1940s. The increase in these activities at the beginning of the decade was due to a combination of reasons. First among them were humanitarian reasons and self-protection for the United States. The U.S. was concerned that increased contact with less-developed countries heightened the risk of imported infections in their territory. Improving international health was also a means to protect American soldiers, businessmen and others who traveled abroad. A second reason was productivity. Latin American export economies and markets for American goods were crucial for the U.S. during the war. Improving international health was thus also a tool for protecting and increasing the economic productivity of regions under American influence.

Rockefeller activities in Latin America increased during the early 1940s when the foundation's work in Western Europe was closed after the Nazi invasion. At the same time, China, a long-time interest for the foundation, was caught in the middle of a civil war. The RF transferred some resources and personnel to Latin America, so that in 1945, Rockefeller Foundation appropriations to Latin America were greater than those earmarked for all other regions of the world combined. The reallocation of resources continued even after the war ended. However, this trend in favor of Latin America was reversed in the late 1940s when officers of the foundation resumed contact with European institutions.

During this period the foundation reorganized the work of its International Health Division (IHD) in Latin America by creating field offices in the main capital cities. One of the most important was the Buenos Aires office. This office, established in 1939, was in charge of the Rio de la Plata and Andean Region and operated in seven countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay and Paraguay. It was very active until 1949 when, partly because of tensions with the populist government of Juan Perón, it closed its doors. The director was Lewis W. Hackett, an experienced RF officer who worked on malaria in Italy. The work of this office was considered a diversification of the foundation's public health interest in the region. The office supported a variety of programs on malaria control, medical research, nursing education and promotion of full-time positions in the Ministries of Health.

During the 1940s the Rockefeller Foundation began to compete with other health agencies, such as the Office of Inter-American Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. This office was created

















A public health pamphlet published in 1944 for the Inter-American Education Foundation by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Nelson A. Rockefeller.

From the Rockefeller Family Archives

after a proposal by Nelson A. Rockefeller, who had earlier developed strong business and cultural interests in Latin America. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Rockefeller as the head of the new office to organize a series of economic, health, and educational projects. The office's work in health was organized through specialized institutions, called *Servicios Cooperativos de Salud Pública*. Usually part of the Ministries of Health, these *Servicios* tried to work through demonstrations and provided full-time salaries.

Some tension, duplication and overlap developed among the American agencies working in Latin America. For example, a Rockefeller

Foundation officer complained about the attitude of the Institute of Interamerican Affairs in Uruguay: “It rapidly occupied the fields in which we might have operated . . . . They employed all our fellows, but did not conceal from us or the Minister their opposition to having us around.” Some of the officers of this office believed that the IHD excluded them from their work and discouraged the integration of Rockefeller programs with local official institutions.

Another international agency strongly influenced by the prior work of the foundation was the Pan American Sanitary Bureau. Created in the early 20th century, the bureau increased its prestige, resources and power under the leadership of Fred L. Soper, a former RF officer stationed for many years in Brazil. In 1947 he became director of the bureau, a position he retained until 1959. Soper organized major campaigns to eliminate malaria in the hemisphere, offered fellowships to train Latin Americans in U.S. medical and public health schools, and obtained a magnificent building for PAHO in Washington, D.C. He launched a plan to eradicate malaria from the Western Hemisphere that was strongly influenced by the RF’s experiences with hookworm, yellow fever and malaria in the region.

A remarkable event for international health that has received little attention occurred at the end of the 1940s: the Rockefeller Foundation decided to close its International Health Division. In terms of staff, autonomy and resources, the IHD was the most important of the RF’s five divisions: IHD, Medical Sciences, Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and Humanities. In 1951, the IHD was officially merged with the Medical Sciences Division to create a new Division of Medicine and Public Health. At the same time the foundation de-emphasized public health and concentrated on agricultural development. In April of 1950 the foundation appointed a commission to review the IHD with Rockefeller officers and trustees, officers of other foundations and health agencies, and academics and agricultural experts.

Several reasons were given for closing the IHD. First, the foundation considered that its work on yellow fever was done, and that it was basically a success story. This meant that the origin of the disease had been identified, an effective vaccine was available, and a practical method for its manufacture on a commercial scale had been worked out. However, the elimination of the disease, envisioned by the foundation in the 1910s, was impossible since there was a natural reservoir of disease in the jungle. Yellow fever was not then considered a menace for ports and urban areas. In addition, in 1951 one of the main characters in the yellow fever story, George K. Strode, former director of the IHD, retired after 34 years of work with the foundation.

Secondly, the foundation believed that other health agencies and bilateral assistance programs that appeared in the late 1940s (such as PAHO, the World Health Organization, and the Kellogg Foundation, among others) had more resources than the IHD and were doing the same work. It was also considered difficult for the IHD to operate with independence. There was a perception that the world where the foundation used to lead philanthropic endeavors had been dramatically changed by events such as the tension between Argentina and the U.S., the emergence of the “Iron Curtain,” and the revolution in China in 1949, which ended Rockefeller philanthropy and capitalism there. The inauguration of the Cold War made it difficult to continue the Rockefeller style of maintaining a low profile, humanitarian aims, and formal independence from political goals. To some politicians it was clear that international health should become an instrument of the Cold War. In terms of Latin America, this meant the development of modernization schemes directed at preventing the emergence of social movements and communism.

There was also a strong tradition in the foundation for pioneering undertakings. This was also instrumental for a validation of the IHD as the matrix from which many of the efforts of the time grew. According to the Scientific Directors of the IHD, agencies such as the World Health Organization (created in 1946) could not have come into existence “had it not been for the IHD which had the original concept and blazed the

trail." Finally, the decision to terminate the IHD received support as a result of the desire to integrate all of the foundation's activities, to avoid overlap and duplication of effort, and to diminish internal tensions. One source of internal tension was the fact that the IHD received a significant annual lump sum used by its own Board of Scientific Directors, and that it was the only operating division in the foundation; the other divisions had controlled budgets and were grant-making agencies that were not directly engaged in running field programs.

Another consideration that played a role in the decision to terminate the IHD was the concern about overpopulation in underdeveloped countries. In a meeting of the commission reviewing the IHD, the RF president underlined this concern, noting "the increasing amount of criticism of public health work because there is no corresponding limitation on birth rate." Another Rockefeller officer was more blunt: "In some quarters, the finger is being pointed at the IHD something like this: You are going into… backward countries where… you are reducing the death rate while the birth rate is remaining high, and you are adding to the social and economic burden."

It was certainly a paradox that the Rockefeller Foundation had a strong influence yet at the same time was absent in the new international health framework that appeared in the late 1940s. One aspect of this framework that needs more research is the process of Americanization of Latin American public health and medicine. It was during the Second World War that the European influence was cut off from Latin America, and medical graduates no longer spent time in Paris or Berlin. In the decades after 1940, graduate training in the U.S. became a must for advanced Latin American health professionals. American visiting professors and medical textbooks in English reinforced this trend. It appears that Americanization was not resisted by local institutions. Moreover, there was competition among institutions and professionals to take advantage of the new opportunities in technology and funding. Using some of the valuable materials of the Rockefeller Archive Center, I hope to investigate further the response of Latin Americans to the changes in international health during the mid-20th century.

Termination or Transformation? The Fate of the International Health Division as a Case Study in Foundation Decision-making

By Paul Weindling

When the Second World War ended, there was no sign that in the space of a few years the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) would fundamentally reappraise, restructure, and reduce its international health program. I examined the reasons for the abrupt closure of the RF's International Health Division (IHD), which resulted in the disappearance of a major feature in the landscape of international health agencies. "Very few of us really know what was in the Trustees' minds when they took this decision," R.S. Morrison reflected in May 1951. The rationales for a momentous decision by the foundation raise internal issues of administrative structure and policy-formation, as well as providing insight into the reappraisal of the RF's place in world affairs.

During the Second World War there was every sign that the RF's pre-war concerns with public health and preventive medicine would be resumed with renewed vigor. In 1944 the IHD official John B. Grant was commissioned to study the provision of medical care on a universal basis. He reported to the Scientific Directors in September 1946, taking a judicious social science approach to the politically controversial medical care issue. In September 1948 he continued to see major opportunities for foundation funding of social and community medicine in Europe. The RF contemplated pilot experiments analogous to its support for inter-war health demonstrations. One notable scheme — which also manifested a commitment to funding without racial bias — was

support for social medicine at the Durban Department of Family Practice in South Africa. Grant went on identifying demonstration schemes for support until the mid-1950s.

The appointment of Chester Barnard as president of the Rockefeller Foundation to succeed Raymond Fosdick in July 1948 signalled a fundamental reappraisal of the foundation's substantial commitment to international health work. By February 1949 the foundation was in the throes of a major evaluation of its policies, and the International Health Division came under close scrutiny. In March 1950 Barnard requested that scientific consultants review fundamentally the role of the IHD — a task completed by June 1951. Public health experts were asked to reconsider the IHD's potential for promoting improved health in comparison with other disciplines (notably nutrition and sciences concerned with human reproduction and population growth), and whether it was now an anomaly with the founding of the World Health Organization. The WHO Director-General expressed consternation at rumors of the withdrawal of the IHD, pointing out the limitations of an inter-governmental organization.

In organizational terms within the RF, the IHD was presented as an anomaly: It was an operating division rather than being primarily a grant-dispersal agency, and it was the only division to have its own Board of Directors. The IHD was deemed costly at a time when Barnard saw the foundation as having diminishing resources, while government support for international health training, research and implementation was rising. What was not taken into account was that the IHD personnel exercised considerable influence which went far beyond the constraints of what could be financed.

Yet the review commission took the view that a central IHD aim of initiating permanent government public health agencies could be regarded as largely fulfilled by 1949. Noting that a third of the IHD's budget was spent on its field offices, it was decided to retain only a small field staff resident in foreign countries. The commission recommended the fusion of the IHD and Medical Sciences as a unified Division of Medicine and Public Health. This retained support for medical education, medical care (to include field demonstrations), the epidemiology of virus diseases, and new initiatives in population control (euphemistically called "human ecology"). The expectation was of a new linkage between preventive and curative medicine.

Factors militating for change included financial constraints with a substantial fall in the value of the dollar, and generational change among the RF's program officers who were reaching the age of retirement. At a senior level came the retirement of George K. Strode, who was on the foundation staff from 1916 to 1951, and Lewis Hackett, whose career with the RF spanned 1914 to 1949. Alan Gregg, employed by the foundation since 1919 and director of the Medical Sciences Division since 1931, was elected a vice president of the foundation until retirement in 1956.

The new Division of Medicine and Public Health came under Andrew J. Warren, formerly an associate director of the IHD. Grant kept the community-based social medicine program alive, but dispensed with the costly IHD regional offices. That changes were implemented before the final report of the review body was issued suggests that Barnard, in association with the trustees, had already decided on the restructuring. Rather than run its own staff for applying new innovations, the foundation's restructuring gave it a central role in what was considered a "free enterprise community" of academic grant-holders.

The momentum for change gathered force with a board of scientific consultants re-appraising the totality of the foundation's programs. Whereas in April 1949 Barnard envisaged restructuring taking several years, it was in fact in the space of a year that the major changes were accomplished. By the time the commission reported on 1 November 1951, the trustees had imposed crucial changes.

Barnard from the outset stressed population (along with communication and cooperation) as one of the three major sectors of foundation policy. He was attracted by the opportunity of human ecology, notably in agriculture and population

Rockefeller Foundation Archives

The directors of the International Health Board's work in Brazil, 1921. From left to right: Mario Pernambuco, Fred L. Soper, George K. Strode, W. G. Smillie, Lewis W. Hackett, John H. Janney, M. J. Faria, Alan Gregg, and Samuel Uchoa. The IHB careers of Soper, Strode, Janney and Gregg lasted until the 1950s, and Hackett retired in 1949.

control as underdeveloped areas of immense significance for the welfare of mankind.

Warren canvassed suggestions from program officers in December 1951. From within the Division came internal criticism, as from R.R. Struthers, its assistant director, who continued to urge effective implementation. After disengaging from such areas as malaria control and the teaching of psychiatry, a program was formulated centering around mental illness, human genetics and virology on the scientific side, and health care studies, professional education and population control on the applied side. The Division of Medicine and Public Health was itself re-appraised in 1955, and was split once again with the appointment of Directors for Medical Education and Public Health, and for Biological and Medical Research, suggesting that a single, combined division had been unwieldy.

What was the impact of the intensifying Cold War on this restructuring? Its effect is discernible explicitly in the views of the foundation president, and by inference among the trustees. Raymond Fosdick placed his faith in world unity and tried to sustain funding in Eastern Europe. By way of contrast, Barnard was fully attuned to the Cold War. National security was increasingly thrust onto the foundation's agenda, and the President's Report for 1949 opened with a statement on the Iron Curtain.

The Cold War saw a generation of trustees involved in U.S. foreign policy, notably John McCloy (who returned as trustee after being High Commissioner for Germany), Dean Rusk (RF president from July 1952 until January 1961) and John Foster Dulles (RF trustee, 1935-1952, and Secretary of State from 1953). The latter was strongly in favor of a program concerned with moral development in 1951, and ethics also came onto the foundation's agenda. The idea was to provide rationales for a free society. John D. Rockefeller 3rd joined with other trustees to support an inter-disciplinary agenda for population studies. By December 1953 the foundation was able to provide a coherent statement of its activities in the context of a world torn between totalitarianism and liberty. The RF identified its interests as food supply, population and reproduction, basic biomedical science and the provision of medical care. It set these within a Cold War political discourse.

The Cold War also elicited a defensiveness among RF officers who were keen to demonstrate the rectitude of foundation principles of making grants without reference to race or politics. The foundation was indignant with

accusations (*e.g.* in Greece) that it was an arm of US imperialism. The IHD reviewed its policy about Iron Curtain countries in 1948, favoring caution. Between 1948 and 1958 the foundation had to draw up policies on how to deal with communist scientists and governments. It was under some pressure to do so — fiscal penalties imposed by Congress were feared, and no officer wanted a particular program to collapse because of one "injudicious" grant.

The decision to wind up the IHD provides a revealing insight into foundation structures and the policy-making process. The one-year basis of staff appointments meant that the foundation had always the potential for radical change of policy, but had rarely exercised this option. The trustees and president emerge as strongly interventionist, overriding the program officers who had outlined the achievements of the IHD. The verdict on the IHD is historically enlightening as to the fundamental rationales for foundation activities. I have drawn attention to generational factors, a sense of a completed program, and to increasing pressures for interventions in population and nutrition among trustees, who showed a new appetite for intervening in global politics. As Gregg reflected in 1951 "the personal and the adventitious seem to me to have entered into what foundations actually do rather more than historians realize."

The Concept of Totalitarianism and Theories of Modernization and American Democracy

By David Ciepley

In June 2002 I visited the Rockefeller Archive Center to trace the impact of the social scientific image of totalitarianism upon American democratic theory and modernization theory. In the late 1930s, "totalitarianism" emerged as a new political category, and the contrast drawn between democracy and totalitarianism became the new organizing principle for American social science. According to the empirical theory that developed, totalitarianism stood for value absolutism, ideological conformity, and concentrated power, with initiative starting at the top and animating a passive social body below. Democracy, on the other hand, stood for value-skepticism, pluralism, and dispersed power, with initiative starting from the many social groups of society and working upwards to animate an otherwise passive government.

The story of the crystallization of this schematization was first told by Edward Purcell, and various details have been filled in by David Ricci, Thomas Lifka, and other scholars. But almost no attention has been given to the fact that this dichotomous framework was appropriated by scholars of the "new nations," and after being retrofitted with a few intervening categories on a continuum from democracy to totalitarianism, was used to classify these nations, their social systems, and their cultures.

At the forefront of this theoretical appropriation was Gabriel Almond, chairman of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) from 1954-1963. The framework he developed in conjunction with other members of the committee dominated the literature on political development and modernization for a generation. As part of this appropriation, the totalitarian/democratic dichotomy was projected onto the traditional/modern dichotomy, such that many traditionalist features of the new nations, such as patronage systems and religious parties, were classified as quasi-totalitarian, with the implicit evaluation that these were obstacles to democracy and ought to be eliminated in a properly secular, pluralist, democratic state.

My project was, first, to shed more light on the crystallization of the social scientific image of totalitarianism and the democracy/totalitarianism dichotomy; second, to document the influence of this dichotomy upon modernization theory; and third, to examine some of the practical consequences of this influence for the nature of public and private American involvement in Africa and Latin America.

The Image of Totalitarianism

The first phase of the project — namely, the effort to find in the archives of the Rockefeller

Foundation and of the SSRC materials with which I might reconstruct the efforts of American social scientists to flesh out the democracy/totalitarianism dichotomy — led to more dead ends than positive results. I undertook three principal investigations: into a proposed Committee on Totalitarianism, a projected study on Nazi Economics, and the Totalitarian Communication Studies (on Nazi propaganda techniques).

Committee on Totalitarianism

The Minutes of the SSRC's Committee on Problems and Policy for October 19 and December 7-8, 1940, record initial investigations into the possibility of a study of "Totalitarian Order" using refugees and émigrés as informants, with a view to "illuminating differences in totalitarian and democratic processes." Mr. Mosely was charged with preparing a memorandum on totalitarian research, and he attended the meeting of the American Committee for International Studies' subcommittee on Nazi Germany as part of this effort. The Minutes for January 25, 1941 record Mosely's progress. He evidently reported on a bibliographical survey of materials available for a study of Nazi Germany being undertaken by Ralph H. Lutz of the Hoover War Library and soon to be available in mimeographed form. Note was also made of plans by Lasswell and MacLeish to undertake a study of trends within the regime, and that Calvin Hoover had suggested a small conference to discover what research was currently underway at universities and other organizations on the topic of totalitarianism. The Minutes of March 28, 1941 record that "At a recess session of P&P on March 30, it was VOTED to establish a committee on Totalitarianism." However, despite these tantalizing beginnings, no further mention of such a committee is found in subsequent minutes, nor are there any records of such a committee elsewhere in the SSRC archives.

Project on Nazi Economics

In 1941, Douglas Miller was given a grant of $17,500 from the Rockefeller Foundation for the study of Nazi economics. Miller, a former commercial attaché at the United States embassy in Berlin, was widely regarded as the best-suited person for such a study. His office in Berlin had produced thousands of reports during his tenure, and Miller's annual reports were being mimeographed and used as source material in American classrooms. In the initial months Miller was occupied in rushing to press a little volume entitled, "You Can't do Business With Hitler," a piece intended for a popular audience and excerpted in the July 1941 *Atlantic Monthly*. But before his scholarly work could commence, Miller was called to Washington for work on the Coordination of Information, and he gave up the RF grant and the research project.

Totalitarian Communication Studies

I obtained more positive findings by looking through the Totalitarian Communication Studies folders. While most of these contained specific studies of various components of German propaganda, the "Research Program" submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation by the directors of the study, Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, in March, 1941 contained some noteworthy conceptual contrasts between totalitarian and democratic uses of propaganda, including the following: "Propaganda in totalitarian states is to a higher degree planned and centrally controlled than is propaganda in a democracy. Propaganda is an indispensable part of the totalitarian practice of domination and social management, while in a democracy it does not aim at subjugating the individual and at controlling men permanently." Also developed is the notion that, while the modern state everywhere controls the techniques of physical violence, the totalitarian state has extended this control over the techniques of mental violence: "Totalitarian propaganda presents not only a case of 'extended strategy' in waging war against foreign enemies, but also one of extended sovereignty — sovereignty encroaching upon the minds of the subjects."

Among the more interesting papers in this collection is one by Kris, dated November 1941, on the character of news in democratic and totalitarian societies. Kris's main argument is

that "the character of mass communication and the part which it plays are largely determined by the form of government under which it operates; totalitarian and democratic mass communication are almost as different from each other as are the two forms of government." "*News in a democracy is a commodity,*" he continues. "It is marketed in various stages of production; its gathering, presentation and distribution are highly organized. The trade is competitive to an extreme degree; the news must be 'hot,' accurate and exciting, for such is on the whole the consumer's demand." In a totalitarian state, he argued, news "is not only rationed but also monopolized. In a democratic state there is a customer who wants to learn from the news, while in a totalitarian state there is a subject to be indoctrinated by what he is told in the disguise of news. *News in a totalitarian state is therefore not a commodity, it is a communiqué.*"

What is perhaps most intriguing about this new praise for the market principle in the news is its striking contrast with prewar attitudes, when it was held that "capitalism itself was the main distorting factor of information in a democratic society," with newspapers in the pocket of paying advertisers.

Influence of Totalitarian Image upon Modernization Theory

More positive results were attained in the second phase of my research project. Examination of files from the Committee on Comparative Politics in the SSRC archives confirmed the massive influence of the democracy/totalitarianism dichotomy in thinking about the new nations. Gabriel Almond was not only the chairman of the committee, but it clearly emerges that he also was its intellectual leader; by (1) introducing the structural-functionalist terminology that came to dominate modernization theory, (2) perpetuating the use of the contrast between democracy and totalitarianism as the organizing principle for comparative work, and (3) upholding, against the misgivings of other committee members, the equation of the Anglo-American political system with "modernity" and the totalitarian political system with "traditionality."

First, Almond was a pioneer among political scientists in translating the categories of liberal constitutionalism into those of structural-functionalism, for the purpose of facilitating the comparison of Western and non-Western regimes. "[I]nstead of the concept of the 'state,' limited as it is by legal and institutional meanings, we prefer 'political system'," he wrote in *The Politics of Developing Areas* (1960) with co-editor James S. Coleman; "instead of 'powers,' which again is a legal concept in connotation, we are beginning to prefer 'functions'; instead of 'offices' (legal again), we prefer 'roles'; instead of 'institutions,' which again directs us toward formal norms, 'structures'; instead of 'public opinion' and 'citizenship training,' formal and rational in meaning, we prefer 'political culture' and 'political socialization.'" Perhaps the earliest expression of this move on the part of Almond can be found in the SSRC archives in a paper from May 1954 entitled "Trade Unions and the Political Process: The Italian Case," where the terminology of "role" and "political system" is introduced.

Second, Almond accepted the democracy/totalitarianism dichotomy as the organizing principle for comparative work. Although he criticizes the democracy/totalitarianism schema of early comparativists such as Carl Friedrich for being exclusively focused on Western political systems, his own typology retains the dichotomy and simply tacks on two new categories which amount to mixed modes. As introduced in "Comparative Political Systems" in 1956, Almond's typology distinguishes "the Anglo-American . . . , the Continental European . . . , the pre-industrial, or partially industrial, political systems outside the European-American area, and the totalitarian political systems." The first and last of these reproduce the standard democracy/totalitarian dichotomy, while the middle two lie somewhere in-between.

Third, Almond adopted the pluralists' account of the American political system, which he used not only to distinguish democracy from totalitarianism, but also to distinguish a "modern" from

a “traditional” political system. Indeed, it is in comparative work that the postwar status of American democracy as a norm becomes most clear. What passes domestically as an objective description of existing institutions becomes overseas the ideal terminus of a process of political modernization.

The keystone of Almond’s ambitious analytical framework is the pluralist ideal of a political system that is maximally open and responsive to the (non-ideological) interests of the populace — one that smoothly translates multifarious narrow demands into uniform, moderate public policy. On this model, political initiative originates from outside government, is carried into it by interest groups, and is converted, through bargaining, into public policy. Input, conversion, output. Government becomes purely responsive — a kind of energy conversion mechanism. The image is of society acting upon itself. State autonomy, bad; state “openness” and responsiveness, good. Whether speaking of the difference between “traditional” and “modern” political systems, or between totalitarian and democratic ones, the central contrast Almond draws is in the fluidity of this conversion. Particularly helpful in tracing the crystallization and propagation of these positions are the minutes of the 1959 Conference on Political Modernization held at Dobbs Ferry, New York.

Of course, not everyone in the field of modernization theory accepted the American political system as the telos of history. The most important dissent came from Samuel Huntington in *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968). But the polemical thrust of this work itself testifies to the dominance of the teleological assumptions in the field. It is interesting in this connection to find in the SSRC archives for November 1961 successive memoranda from Joseph LaPalombara, Robert Ward, James Coleman, and Lucien Pye to the other members of the Committee on Comparative Politics expressing reservations about the assumption of unilinear development in the direction of the American political system. Almond replied with a memo of his own that encouraged the conversation yet at the same time assimilated all his colleagues’ reservations to his teleological framework, in a manner that appears to have allayed most of the misgivings within the group. But even of those expressing these reservations, most still accepted the relativist, pluralist characterization of a “modern” nation, and only questioned whether there was a straight line leading to it.

Modernization Theory and U.S. Foreign Aid Programs

Regrettably, I did not have sufficient time during my visit to make much headway on the question of whether and how modernization theory influenced U.S. foreign aid programs; nor can the archives, by their very nature, provide more than hypotheses which must then be checked against Congressional and executive agency records. Nevertheless, I discovered evidence that directors at the SSRC, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation, as well as scholars at allied research institutes, were from the beginning interested in freeing what came to be called Third World countries from their status as staging grounds for Cold War conflicts. A letter from Frederick S. Dun of the Yale Institute of International Studies to Joseph H. Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation, dated April 8, 1948, includes the following paragraph: “As mentioned in the report [“Report of the Institute of International Studies for the Year 1946-1947”], the Institute has recently received from the Carnegie Corporation a grant of $21,000.00 per year for two years to aid in carrying out some of the work of the Institute. This grew largely out of some conversations which I had with Pendleton Herring and some others during the Brookings Seminar at Hanover last summer. One of the questions we discussed was the ways in which the countries of the ‘in-between’ world might be restored to an ind ependent position so that they would cease to provide an arena where the United States and the Soviet Union would come into conflict. The purpose of the grant is to enable us to undertake some new studies in this field.”

However, this desire to free the developing world from the Cold War struggle does not necessarily mean that the categories social

scientists would use to understand these countries were freed of the influence of the ideological struggle against totalitarianism. In other words, the existence of this desire in no way contradicts the account of the social scientific gaze given above. The influence of this gaze on the actual implementation of economic aid programs remains to be investigated.

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Rockefeller Foundation Archives

A field laboratory of the International Health Division's yellow fever study expedition in San Vicente de Chucurí, Santander, Colombia, ca. 1941. The work of this division of the Rockefeller Foundation in Latin America during the 1940s and the foundation's decision to disband the division in the 1950s are the subjects of research by Marcos Cueto and Paul Weindling (see their essays on pp. 17 and 20).

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