

Keeping the League Afloat: The Rockefeller Foundation, Latin America, and the Survival of the League of Nations in the 1930s and the 1940s

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In 1933, Everett Colby, a lawyer and politician, sent a letter to his former classmate John D. Rockefeller Jr. informing him that he “can no longer advocate the entrance of the U. S. into the League.”¹ In 1935, Rockefeller’s son and namesake, John D. Rockefeller III, wrote to Colby expressing concern about his father’s position vis-à-vis the League of Nations (League). He tried to persuade Colby to write again to Rockefeller and to support the international organization.² In a period of political and diplomatic turmoil in Europe and elsewhere, the League’s inability to cope with a rapid succession of crises (Ethiopia, Spain, Manchuria, and so on) seemed to leave the institution’s reputation in tatters. In this context, officers of the Rockefeller Foundation, which had previously supported the League’s activities, revealed that they now doubted the usefulness of the Geneva-based institution.

In 1938, with shadows of war looming over Europe, the American journalist and League champion Arthur Sweetser sent a report about the League’s present situation to Foundation president Raymond Fosdick. His position was cautiously optimistic: “Some feel that the League had a terrible blow, which weakens it greatly; others that there will inevitably be a comeback at a not too distant date.” Foundation officers commented on Sweetser’s report in the margins of the letter. Next to Sweetser’s assertion that the League had been gravely damaged but would recover, an officer remarked, “quite moderate here.” Another officer, Sydnor H. Walker, made a sharply critical general assessment of Sweetser’s report: “Here is some Sweetserian philosophy! He has the soul of a Jesuit in my opinion. This is furthermore my idea of ineffective propaganda.”³

Foundation officers were not alone in expressing doubts about the League. After its failures in the early 1930s, the League lost its luster in the United States even within traditionally internationalist political circles.⁴ Skepticism was also present in Geneva. The political crises of the period led the League officials to focus on so-called technical activities—the committees dealing with issues such as economics, finances, taxation, opium trade, labor conditions, or women trafficking. But this shift of interests was not an easy one either. The collapse of

the global economy since 1929 made it difficult to present the League as an institution capable of dealing with international economic problems. Moreover, both political and economic crises led many countries to abandon the League, causing dire budgetary problems for the organization. In response to these challenges, the League reinvented itself, not only by becoming an organization focused on technical issues, but also by transforming its technical bodies' ideas and field of interests.⁵ The League's economic thought and policies evolved from a desire to recover the golden era of laissez-faire prior to World War I to a more development-oriented ideology that included a wide gamut of social policies (nutrition, peasant welfare) as part of its views on economics. League experts' interests also became wider: the League's technical bodies recast their activities on a global scale, paying more attention to regions such as Asia or Latin America.⁶

Despite its hesitation, the Foundation continued to support and fund League activities in the 1930s and 1940s. Foundation officers and trustees and League experts were part of a coalition of liberal internationalists. The Foundation's support was essential for the survival of the League in the 1940s. Their cooperation helped to shape "embedded liberalism," that is, the idea that international free trade had to allow national states to intervene in their domestic economies to avoid depression and unemployment, which became the prevailing view on international economics after World War II. This cooperation was fraught with tensions, however, that resulted from the weakness of the League, but also from its "reinvention" and the extension of its activities to places like Latin America. Why did the Rockefeller Foundation maintain its support for the League against all odds? How should we interpret the tensions within the liberal internationalist coalition?

Between Science and (International) Politics

The Foundation's support for the League's "technical" activities became more important as the economic depression of the 1930s eroded the League's budget. A

few examples will demonstrate the importance of the Foundation's commitment to the League. In 1933, the foundation apportioned \$125,000 over a period of five years to the Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service of the Secretariat of the League for the accomplishment of its research projects and in 1938 it committed \$98,000 more. Between 1929 and 1942, the Foundation contributed more than \$400,000 to the research tasks of the Economic Intelligence Service of the League.⁷ In the mid-1930s, a Foundation officer noted that "the whole of the activities of the Fiscal Committee (of the League) is now largely financed from the Foundation's grant."⁸ In the 1940s, the Foundation covered at least one third (and probably more) of the budgets of the League's Economic and Financial Section.⁹

This support contrasts with the doubts of the Foundation about the future of the League. Apparently, the political side of the League was a major hindrance. As Foundation officer John Van Sickle wrote in 1931, "The principal objection that might be raised to Foundation aid appears to lie in the danger that a group representing the League of Nations, and consequently fifty odd sovereign states, may not be able to pursue independent research involving criticism of government policy."¹⁰ That is, the Foundation's goal was to support neutral scientific research, independent of political meddling. And yet, Foundation officers showed a constant, if vigilant, sympathy toward the League's activities.

Those who advocated that the Foundation continue to support the League made an effort to distinguish the technical from the political activities of the League and to emphasize the scientific work of the technical bodies. In November 1931, the economist John B. Condliffe, a member of the League's economic secretariat, wrote to Edmund E. Day, director of the Foundation's Division of Social Science: "In the Economic Intelligence Service.... we have quite a considerable degree of detachment from the current political problems which agitate the League and there is a thoroughly familiar research atmosphere."¹¹ Of course, Condliffe was an interested party, since he was working for the League and hoped the Foundation would continue funding the Economic and Finance section, but Foundation

officers held his opinion in high regard. John Van Sickle stated that “in the Economic and Finance Section of the League we have a research center of great potential importance. First-rate scholars are being attracted, and we may well cooperate in the better training of this personnel.” Selskar M. Gunn backed Van Sickle’s opinion: “JVS and I are favorably disposed. Of course, the position of the League has weakened a good deal these past months. This has been particularly on the political side. The League’s technical services may ultimately prove to be its most effective activities.”¹²

Condliffe’s persuasiveness lay in his academic and personal prestige within the Foundation. He had been a Foundation grantee and was particularly trusted regarding the workings of the League’s Economic and Financial Section. The question of scientific expertise was a key criterion in Foundation officers’ decisions and Condliffe was seeking the Foundation’s support in order to continue the League’s research on economic cycles. After the beginning of the economic slump of 1929, growing unemployment became a matter of concern for Foundation officers. The study of the economic cycle promised to offer clues about economic movements and the possibilities for resuming growth and employment. As Van Sickle put it, “The central problem with which they [the League’s Financial and Economic Intelligence Service] are concerned falls squarely within one of our fields of major interests, viz, economic stabilization.”¹³ League bureaucrats, aware of the interests of the Foundation’s directors, had long sought their support for this research. Arthur Sweetser wrote Selskar Gunn a letter in 1930 showing his interest in any aid the Foundation might be willing to extend to an “Institute in Vienna particularly concerned with the study of Trade Cycles” and presented the League as the most adequate body to accomplish much needed research into a critical situation: “the fact that there were ten million men out of work in the Western countries indicated a world crisis fundamental to all nations and pointed to a type of study which the League would seem well qualified to do.”¹⁴

The study of trade cycles brought the Foundation's and the League's interests together. This convergence was based on several commonalities. The first was the claim of both organizations to produce neutral, scientific knowledge or, as the League insisted, the pivotal role of experts in their activities. The statistical data accumulated by the League's technical committees, which the Foundation considered a major achievement, were an important part of this knowledge. This knowledge was aimed at shaping an international liberal order. The League's experts argued against nationalist policies, while the Foundation advocated greater American involvement internationally, particularly during the isolationist 1920s. Second, the network of scientists and academics who provided invaluable advice to the Foundation overlapped with the very network of experts that the League's technical bodies had begun to establish since the 1920s. Condliffe was not an isolated case. The main economist behind the League's study of business cycles was the Austrian Gottfried Haberler, who had also been part of the Viennese economist contacted by the Foundation in 1930. Furthermore, former Foundation grantees cooperated many times with the League's bodies, while the Foundation frequently sought the advice of international economists linked to the League.

The political crises within the League were to some extent challenging for the Foundation because they threatened the relationships between the two institutions. In July 1933, the Frenchman Joseph Avenol was appointed secretary general of the League, replacing the Briton Eric Drummond. Condliffe reported to Van Sickle that Avenol was "an excellent administrator and a very wise man—on the whole an improvement upon his predecessor."¹⁵ On this occasion, Condliffe's insider knowledge could not have been more mistaken. Avenol quickly revealed his fascist leanings and his differences with the liberal internationalism heralded by League experts and Foundation officers.¹⁶ In 1936, Avenol's policies put the League's relationships with the Foundation in jeopardy: "There has gradually been developing under Avenol's direction," a Foundation officer reported, "an increasing resistance, both to cooperation with non-official agencies, and to accepting funds from outside sources for the extension of the

activities of the Secretariat.”¹⁷ The Director of the League’s Economic, Financial, and Transit Department, Alexander Loveday—probably under Avenol’s influence—began to express doubts about asking for funding from the Foundation. He was even reluctant to accept grantees from the Foundation for the Financial and Economic Intelligence Services of the League. The Foundation’s officers were now anxious to keep the relationship alive: “Mr. Loveday’s attitude towards fellowship appointments is also something of a problem to us. As the months go by I am more and more uncertain of the use to which fellowships in the field of international relations can be well put.”¹⁸ The officers of the Foundation even considered the possibility of asking Foundation president Raymond Fosdick, “to take the matter up personally with Avenol.”¹⁹

Since scientists were the channel of communication between the Foundation and the League, they also expressed the tensions between the organizations. In 1936, Condliffe announced that he would resign his position within the Secretariat of the League. The economist expressed to his friends within the Foundation his disappointment with the working of the League and in particular the dominance of politicians over scientists within the organization: “My position in the Secretariat is somewhat peculiar in its semi-detached scientific character. From time to time Loveday has been kind enough to consult me on various points; but he bears the responsibility for the Section and it is not in my province to advise or act except through him . . . in [sic] big administrative machine with delicate political problems, a temporary member of section [sic] as I am cannot do more than act loyally through his Director and the Director has to consider many other aspects of a particular problems than scientific desirability.”²⁰ Condliffe’s correspondence with the Foundation shows how the international network of scientists and experts built by the Foundation enabled those professionals to proceed with their careers while at the same time providing the Foundation with valuable information about the internal working of the organizations they were funded but it also shows the limits of that information. Condliffe’s frustration with the League was related to fact that he was impeded from attending a 1936

Preparatory Meeting of Experts of the International Studies Conference, a gathering aimed at discussing possible studies on raw materials and international trade. Condliffe understood that he was the most appropriate expert to attend that meeting and put the blame for his absence on Loveday and the political machinery of the League. Foundation correspondence shows that disagreements between the representatives of the British Empire and Avenol were also behind this move.²¹ Nevertheless, the tensions between the Foundation and the League ebbed and flowed between 1937 and 1940, related to Avenol's voluble attitude toward the United States and the League's need for funds.

In spite of all the problems, the Foundation was not supporting science for the sake of science and the political character of the League was, in fact, an asset. Sometimes this was explained in paradoxical terms: "The technical organisations of a political body such as the League of Nations are in practice much freer of political influence than almost any other international organisation, for the obvious reason than in a body like the League politics are played on the political field and the time of politicians is not wasted by a futile endeavor to play them elsewhere."²² But the absence of political influence was a way to achieve truly political impact. The measures recommended by the experts in Geneva had to be applied by national governments worldwide. Edmund Day made explicit the Foundation's reasons for being involved in League activities: "If the Foundation wanted simply to stress disinterested objectivity, he could see no reason for supporting organizations like the ILO, the Financial Section of the League or the Institute of Pacific Relations. If, however, the Foundation were interested in the development of research as an aid to administration and policy-making, then it ought to be interested in just such organization as these."²³ These words not only show Foundation officers' interest in shaping national governments' policies, but also their belief in the impact of international organizations on domestic policies. This is key for understanding the Foundation's support for the League.

Of course, this was a technocratic approach to both domestic and international politics, and hence the Foundation's insistence on solid scientific knowledge as

the pillar for any recommendation. This had been a traditional position of the Foundation, which since an early phase backed a more active involvement of the US federal government in the shaping of its society.²⁴ In the international field, the Foundation supported the creation in 1931 of the Public Administration Clearing House and the activities of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences. Both organizations promoted a discussion of politics as the science of administration.²⁵ The global depression of the 1930s brought changed the landscape for the Foundation, both in the international and in the domestic arenas. In the international one, as has been mentioned, the League's experts evolved toward a more active stance in economics. In the domestic field, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration moved government intervention in the economy into a higher gear. Amidst a scenario of waste caused by the economic slump, the idea of planning gained international acceptance.

In 1931, the Foundation's attendee at a Geneva meeting of business and government representatives to discuss the depression expressed surprise at the lack of proposals for greater state intervention to solve economic problems: "I was struck with the fact that few suggestions of governmental action were brought forward."²⁶ One of the Foundation's goals was to persuade representatives of business that planning was a rational policy within a liberal context. Here, again, the agendas of the New Deal, the "reinvention" of the League, and the Foundation converged.²⁷

Roosevelt's new interventionism meant a challenge for big business and it surprised even the Foundation's technocratic-oriented officers. In response to this challenge, some businessmen and some officers of the Foundation resorted to a view of politics as limited to technical and administrative matters. This conception converged with the idea of the need for international organizations. In 1934, Edmund Day, director of the Foundation's Social Science Division, addressed these problems in a meeting of businessmen and notables in Philadelphia. Day shared businessmen's fears about Roosevelt's policies and a new era of mass mobilization. It was necessary to content democratic pressures

by “educating our people to the fact that there are certain problems which can’t properly be resolved by popular referendum.” Yet, the solution was not a return to a laissez-faire order. Planning would remain a permanent feature of modern societies. The goal was to create an able civil service, staffed with competent people, “the right kind of government administration, the right kind of political machinery.” This recipe was not only applicable to domestic policy. In fact, competent administration and planning was key in the international arena, as well. As Day saw it, the discussion was not between free-trade and protectionism, but between rational and irrational positions: “we have to have planning for the simple reason that we must have a measure of reason in the direction of our economic interest.”²⁸

A similar line emerged at the Planning Conference organized by the Public Administration Clearing House in Chateau d’Ardennes (Belgium) in September 1937. The conference discussed the possibilities of conducting political and economic planning without eroding the liberal, capitalist economy. The reporter for the Foundation, Max Nicholson, argued that, in order to accomplish that goal, “planners [must] devote more attention than heretofore to the international aspects of their problems.”²⁹ Domestic economic planning therefore had to be harnessed to an international framework.

The convergence of ideas among the Foundation, the US government, and the League begs the question of who was setting the agenda. This is a difficult issue, because research projects and interests often originated in this very convergence of ideas and as a result of discussions and meetings among experts, academics, and politicians. It is possible to argue that in the 1920s, particularly in the field of health, the Foundation opened the way and that its activities in Latin America constituted a model for League plans for the region. In the 1930s, the Great Depression introduced some novelties. The shifts in the League’s interests influenced—in twisted ways—the programs that the Foundation decided to support. The previously mentioned case of the study of business cycles is one example. Supporting the lines of inquiry designed by the League’s experts fit well

into the Foundation's philosophy of encouraging independent scientific research: "Would be more in accord with principles in RF if we did not designate specific subjects. Simply to prove League with something analogous to a fluid research fund which they could direct. Would institute new machinery to safeguard from political interference."³⁰

There were strong links between the Foundation and US government agencies and officials. In fact, many of the Foundation's trustees and officers had or would have experience as public servants. The political agenda, particularly in the field of foreign affairs, was set by the interaction between government officials and Foundation representatives. The Foundation's connections with the federal government also allowed the organization to gain access to information about the League's activities. For example, in the case of the business cycles study, in March 1931 the League called a meeting in Geneva of representatives of national economic councils and research institutes. Edward Eyre Hunt, the head of a US government committee devoted to tackling unemployment, attended the meeting and reported on it for the Foundation.³¹ Thus, the connections between the League and the Foundation were not only based on scientific activities. On the one hand, the Foundation kept the US government connected to Geneva in a period of isolationist tendencies. On the other hand, the US government had never completely detached itself from the League, and interest in a regime of international governance became more pressing among US authorities in the atmosphere of economic depression and international conflicts of the 1930s.³²

The League had to offer the Foundation attractive projects. It needed the Foundation, and not only for economic reasons. Rockefeller support was also viewed as a way to entice the US government to commit itself to the League. In fact, the Foundation acted as a sort of lubricant between the US authorities and the League's technical bodies. Even during the 1920s, many US experts participated in the League's technical committees, which created important anomalies, since the United States was not a League member.³³ Some of these American experts attracted money for the League for particular activities. Yet the

League's officers resented this phenomenon, probably because it was perceived as an attack on their autonomy. In this sense, Foundation funding was much welcomed since it seemed to finance the projects that the League suggested on account of their scientific relevance. As Selskar M. Gunn reported, "AS [Arthur Sweetser] refers to the RF methods in highly complimentary manner (sic)." During the most critical years for the League, after 1935, US involvement in Geneva may have lent legitimacy to the organization. In 1937, Loveday wanted the Foundation to fund the hiring of some American experts for the League. The Foundation, however, rejected the proposal, reasoning that if the organization engaged in contracts between US citizens and the League, it might be interpreted as the Foundation taking a political stance in support of US membership in the Geneva institution.³⁴ Nevertheless, this was more a question of prudence rather than lack of compromise with the League. In fact, many of the Foundation's officers did indeed understand their support for the League as a way to bring the United States closer to the international organization: "It would appear that if the Trustees were to authorize an appropriation, the terms of which were later to be agreed upon in detail with the League authorities, this would both serve as a demonstration of American interest and would guarantee the specific programs which Loveday has submitted."³⁵

The war in Europe made the League's situation untenable. Many countries were abandoning the organization and the League's budget was in disarray. The fiasco of its commitment with collective security made it many within the US administration and the liberal internationalist circles to consider that the League had to be discarded and that only its technical bodies were worthy of support.³⁶ On the other hand, Loveday aimed to rescue the Economic and Financial Organization of the League by guaranteeing US funding, even if this meant moving the organization to the United States. Moreover, since the EFO was already working in the design of the new world order after the war it seemed a good idea to be located in the country which was destined to shape that world order.³⁷ Thus, in 1940, with the Foundation's support, the League's technical

committees moved to the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton University. To accomplish this move, the Foundation had to overcome Avenol's resistance and obtain approval from the US State Department. The crucial backing of the US government was secured, despite the fact that it was an electoral year and that voters might interpret the installation of League officials in Princeton as a sign of Washington's involvement in the war. Still, Roosevelt was committed to rescuing the League.³⁸ In Princeton, however, the League's technical bodies were in a weak position to develop their own agenda of research. Loveday pursued his ambitious plans and asked for Foundation support for developing research on "economic depressions," demographic problems, and commercial policy, among other issues. Cut off from Geneva, the Foundation became the technical committee's main source of revenue. The League offices in Princeton seemed to live a precarious life.³⁹ Nevertheless, despite the League's clear weakness, the Foundation continued its support. The justification was again the importance and scientific quality of the League's work: "The standard of the work of the Financial and Economic Section, under Mr. Loveday's leadership, has been at a high level. Ten of the most competent members of his staff are now in Princeton." But it was also related to ideas about the postwar world and the need for an international organization, under US guidance: "There would appear to be no other group or institution so well qualified to review and appraise past experience... and to elucidate certain of the lessons of past failures and successes which may be useful for future action. The studies proposed are of strategic importance and would be carried out in collaboration with many of the leading American specialist in these fields."⁴⁰ Even if the League was destined to disappear in the future, the Foundation felt obliged to support it in the present: "The Foundation's role at the present time is to tide over the group financially until its absorption by some form of postwar international organization."⁴¹

Since the late 1930s, the League had toyed with the idea of creating a specific agency for dealing with economic and technical matters, an idea crystalized in the so-called Bruce Report. This was particularly appealing for Foundation officers who wished to separate scientific endeavors from "messy" political affairs. This

might also have been a way to harness the US government to the League, since Roosevelt had already manifested his position in favor of an overhauling of the Geneva institutions and separating the political from the technical bodies. In 1937, “Roosevelt advised Sweetser that the League should abandon its political activities, disband its Council and concentrate on the non-political questions where it had achieved a degree of success.”⁴² In fact, the Bruce Committee, the League’s effort to reform the institution, was, according to Kathryn Lavelle, “a direct response to the letter of Cordell Hull expressing American interest in the League’s technical activities.”⁴³

For both the US government and the Rockefeller Foundation, the separation of the League’s political and technical bodies was a guarantee of an adequate working of international organizations in the postwar period, and it anticipated the autonomous role of the IMF and the World Bank after World War II. But it was also the main consideration of Europeans who wanted to rescue the League from the ashes of the war. The League’s directors emphasized that their knowledge was indispensable for any future organization of the international government.⁴⁴ The League’s experts had two goals. First, by pursuing the very same policies Roosevelt and the US Department of State were recommending, namely, to split the technical committees from the political bodies and, and second, to replace the tainted Council of the League with a new Central Committee. League officials hoped through these two reforms finally to attract the open support of the United States: “The Assembly decision [to divorce the League’s economic and social work of the League from the political side, and to substitute the Central Committee for the Council] is an event of major significance which should ultimately enable nations which will not adhere to the political League to collaborate fully in the economic and social work.”⁴⁵

Another change the League made during the war was to put all its weight on economic and social tasks, believing these to be key for postwar reconstruction. This emphasis was also well attuned to New Dealers’ ideas about the future world order. In January 1941 Roosevelt gave the famous speech in which he listed

“freedom from want” as one of the essential rights of all human beings. League experts also, meanwhile, came to view economics as something more complex than traditional laissez-faire ideas had allowed. In April 1940, the Australian Frank Lidgett McDougall, one of the key figures in the “reinvention” of the League, wrote to Joseph Willits, the Director of the Division of Social Science of the RF, about which points the Allies should discuss when planning the postwar reconstruction. McDougall stressed that they should strive “to secure greater equity between all nations in regard to economic opportunities” and “to secure a progressive improvement in the welfare of the individual, here including standards of living, nutrition, health questions, labor questions, social protection.”⁴⁶

In many of these emerging fields of research, the League was the leading institution: Rockefeller and other foundations, universities, and government were following the trail the League was blazing. The new proposals meant, first, that the League had to pay attention to areas beyond Europe. This was something most liberal internationalist were in agreement on by this time, although it would become a source of tension as well. The new proposals also meant that the new economic order should pay attention to important social needs, a contentious issue.

The Move to Latin America

From the founding of the League to the mid- or even late 1930s, its technical organizations had focused their attention essentially on Europe. The “Old World” had seemed to hold the key to humanity’s political and economic troubles. This Eurocentric stance was resented in Latin America. The global depression of the 1930s and the successive crises of security further strained the relationships between Latin America and the League. Many countries in the region abandoned an organization they considered to be in decline.⁴⁷ As part of its process of transformation in the 1930s and 1940s, the League tried to recover the trust of the Latin American countries by increasing its activity in the region.

The United States government also turned its attention toward Latin America in the 1930s, as its strategy was becoming increasingly global. The first step was to redefine its relationships with Latin American countries. This had already begun under the Hoover administration and became more urgent as the possibility of war in Europe became more likely. Roosevelt's administration showed particular sensitivity to Latin American interests in an approach called the Good Neighbor Policy. These new geopolitical circumstances interacted with the activities of the League of Nations and the Rockefeller Foundation. The US government wanted to preserve the League as a pivotal organization in the global architecture of the future.⁴⁸

The Rockefeller Foundation had collaborated with Latin America governments and the League of Nations since the 1920s. In some cases, as in other domains, the interests and purposes of the Foundation's projects for Latin America and the League's plans for the region overlapped. These convergences, however, were fraught with complexities and tensions. In the 1920s, the League's Health Organization increased the attention it paid to Latin American countries at a moment when some of them were threatening to abandon the international body. In order to gain the sympathies of Latin Americans, the League Health Organization several missions sent to the Americas with the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation's International Health Department (IHD). The IHD also backed a program of doctor exchanges that the League had proposed. The IHD not only provided funding, it also played a major role in organizing the logistics of the projects. The Department had a long tradition of involvement in the health policies of Latin America; it had contributed to the creation of national health systems in several countries of the region. The convergence of interests between the League and the Foundation, however, concealed some tensions. The main focus of the IHD was on fighting epidemics, whereas the League's Health Organization had developed a wider idea about health that included economic and social policies.⁴⁹

Traditionally, public health was the Foundation's main area of interest in Latin America. In 1938 alone, the IHD spent \$400,000 dollars in Latin America—one fifth of its total budget.⁵⁰ In the late 1930s, however, the Foundation felt an acute obligation to broaden its activities in the region. The geopolitical needs of the US government were the clear drive behind this move. In 1937, Foundation officers grew intensely interested in enlarging their program of social science in Latin America. In December 1937, an internal Foundation memo entitled "An RF program for Latin America" stated the reasons for the need of a specific program devoted to the region. The most important were the increased sympathy of Latin Americans toward the United States due to the carrying out of the Good Neighbor Policy, the interests of the US government in Latin America's raw material as has been expressed by President Roosevelt himself and finally the threat of "economic and cultural penetration by fascist countries."⁵¹ Therefore, for some officers of the Foundation, in particular Sydnor H. Walker, the strategic needs of the US Administration and the "conditions" in Asia and Europe imposed greater involvement of the Foundation in Latin America.⁵²

In 1938, the US government began applying significant pressure on the Foundation. The State Department sought the Foundation's cooperation in its new policy toward Latin America when the possibility of war in Europe increased.⁵³ The US administration wanted to preserve the good will of the Latin American republics since it assumed that Latin American raw materials would be essential if the United States became involved in a war. Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace was particularly insistent; in letters to and conversations with Foundation representatives he repeatedly asked the organization to support the government by extending its programs in Latin America, in the hope that those programs would stimulate the transformation of Latin American agriculture and make it more productive, thereby guaranteeing the supply of a "variety of essential materials that we could not produce for ourselves." A further goal was to encourage trade relationships between the United States and Latin America as a way to shore up the region's democratic regimes against the fascist threat.⁵⁴

The pressure from Washington continued until the end of the war, but the Foundation remained hesitant to follow the government's line. Given that the Foundation had already been active in Latin America for a long time, it cannot be assumed that the organization was not interested in the region. Rather, other obstacles stood in the way of its expansion there. First, there was the risk of overreach. The Foundation could not act in every single domain. As one Foundation report put it, "Limitation of Foundation interest is considered necessary."⁵⁵ Second, new activities in the field of social sciences in Latin America provoked tugs-of-war with the IHD, which aspired to a dominant position in the region.⁵⁶ Third, and most important, the Foundation's officers were concerned about the possibilities of obtaining adequate results in the field of social sciences in Latin America due to the scarcity of well-prepared researchers in the region.⁵⁷

Unlike in the field of health, where it was possible to obtain concrete results, expectations were low in the social sciences. In 1941, Frank Fetter, an orthodox economist influenced by the School of Vienna, wrote a report for the Foundation about the possibility of investing in the study of economics in Latin America. His conclusions were blatantly negative: "South Americans have a failing for planning things on a grandiose scale, particularly if someone else is putting up the money. As I see it, it would be a waste of money to set up research institutes along American lines."⁵⁸ But again, these scientific reasons were closely linked to political positions.

The Foundation decided to adopt a cautious attitude toward Latin America and increase its activities only moderately. It would focus on two areas: social security and public administration.⁵⁹ The first was a program developed in agreement with the League (see below). The second demonstrated that the Foundation aimed to use the social sciences as a way to introduce a technocratic approach into the Latin American governments rather than directly shifting the content of economic policy in the continent. The choice of Frank Fetter is highly suggestive in this regard. Wallace, moreover—now the vice president of the United States—made it clear that the Foundation's activities should go beyond what the IHD had

accomplished in the past: “RBF and JAF have talked with Wallace, who sees work primarily in fields of health, broader than that now under way, and in agriculture . . . Program of health by itself not connected with anything to raise the standard of living would result in depressing the standard of living—health by itself not enough—must be supported by agricultural economics.”⁶⁰

Wallace pushed the Foundation to go beyond its traditional health policies in Latin America, toward a posture that converged with the more holistic approach to health and economic issues defended by the League. These demands stirred controversy and anxiety within the Foundation, revealing a major divergence in the liberal international coalition about the meaning of the new policies. The geographer Carl Sauer, who was sent on a mission to Mexico, was particularly critical: “Under Mr. Wallace’s administration the USDA has developed an aggressive political philosophy of the good life to our Latin neighbors . . . I like a fair share of their program, but I think it is necessary to be quite clear that the USDA is primarily a political organization today. Loyalty to the organization is a cardinal virtue; criticism of the best sort if likely to be considered as lack of cooperation.”⁶¹ Although to denounce the Department of Agriculture as an aggressive political body might have been idiosyncratic to Sauer, Foundation officers were not far from that position. The tensions with Wallace continued well into the war. In 1944, Vice President Wallace asked for the Foundation’s support in the search for students and the establishment of a program of fellowships for an Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Science in Costa Rica under the supervision of the Pan American Union. The Foundation did not agree to finance the project because it did not consider it scientifically sound.⁶² The Foundation had to defend itself against accusations that it was not involved enough in Latin America: “The SS policy of low priority for Latin America is being questioned by so many thoughtful persons that call for re-analysis.” In its “re-analysis,” the Foundation presciently argued that it needed to pay special attention to Europe “because RF cannot ‘sing off’ in the attempt to restore the intellectual life of Europe after the war” and Asia “because Asia will, much more than in the past, be the center of gravity of population, markets, social changes, and of influence for

peace or war.” In any event, according to its own narrative, the Foundation was assuming the hard work and avoiding taking decisions on political grounds: “The United States Government and many other agencies have been pouring attention on Latin America, and political considerations will probably mean a continuance of this policy though with a reduced emphasis. We in [the Division of Social Sciences] have assumed that the unpopular role was the right one (sic) for us.”⁶³

The existence of these tensions did not mean that the liberal internationalist coalition ceased to function. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the US government took the initiative in its cooperation with Latin America. In addition to the activities of the Department of Agriculture or the Department of State, in August 1940 Washington created the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics (also known as Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs). Nelson A. Rockefeller, whose business interests in Latin America had given him extensive knowledge of the region, was appointed Coordinator.⁶⁴ The Office of the Coordinator gathered resources from the US government that the Foundation could not match, including significant loans for Latin American countries from the Export-Import Bank. The Office worked to obtain raw materials that the United States needed for its war effort through commerce and cooperation with the Latin American republics. But this also meant paying attention to Latin American needs, including the recognition of the emergence of an industrial sector that should be encouraged. In fact, Nelson Rockefeller devoted a good deal of his time as Coordinator to persuading the US business sector that the industrialization of Latin America was not detrimental to its interests.⁶⁵ In this way, the Office took a development-oriented stance that, as the historiography has argued, would be the dominant view of the US administration and of international organizations after the war, a track that the Rockefeller Foundation had opened. Of course, its chairman was a Rockefeller. It also worked with businessmen via the US Chamber of Commerce. The activities of the Office overlapped with those that the Foundation had traditionally carried out in South America, mostly in the field of public health. But its activities went beyond that: the Office involved itself in a wide gamut of

development enterprises, which emulated the new orientations of the League's technical committees.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the appointment of Nelson Rockefeller to the Office meant that he could take advantage of the Foundation's experience and logistical support, in particular from the IHD. Thus, some experts of the IHD cooperated and advised the Office of the Coordinator in its work in Latin America.⁶⁷ The cooperation between the Office of the Coordinator and the Foundation contrasts with the clashes of the Foundation with other sectors of the US administration.

The Office, being an inter-departmental agency, became involved in a conflict with the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture over their actual prerogatives in some specific projects in Latin American countries, such as food and nutrition programs. In the end the Department of State prevailed, demonstrating that geopolitical considerations were the ultimate rationale for policy toward the Americas.⁶⁸ Ultimately, the Office was replaced by a new Council for Inter-American Cooperation in September 1944, organized as a corporation and controlled by private interests.⁶⁹

Convergences and Divergences within the Coalition: The Cases of the Fiscal Committee and the ILO

Like the US government, the beleaguered League of Nations attempted to regain its legitimacy in Latin America in the 1930 and 1940s. In this move, the Foundation's support was crucial, but at the same time it stirred important tensions in the relationship between the Foundation and the League. The movement to Latin America was also mediated by the actions of the US administration. The convergences and tensions between the League and the Foundation were reflected, among others, in the cases of the activities of the Fiscal Committee and in the expansive role of the International Labor Office in Latin America since the 1930s.

The Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations was created in 1928 to replace a former Committee on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, which dealt with

international taxation issues. The Fiscal Committee studied—among other concerns—problems related to the taxation of companies active in more than one country, such as multinational corporations. The Rockefeller Foundation made its first grant, of \$90,000, to the Committee in 1930.⁷⁰ A close and lasting relationship between the Foundation, some US universities, and the Fiscal Committee was emerging at this time.⁷¹ One important figure in this relationships was Thomas S. Adams, from Yale University. Like Condliffe, Adams was another example of scholars playing an intermediary role between the League and the Foundation. But the Foundation’s history with the Fiscal Committee is also a good example of the Foundation’s intimate relationship with US government and private interests in general. In 1918, Adams was economic advisor to the US Treasury Department and under his influence—and responding to the pressure from the business sector—the government accepted the principle that an American company carrying out activities on foreign soil should pay taxes first in the foreign country. In turn, the Treasury would offer tax credits on the domestic income tax equivalent to the amounts paid abroad.⁷² The Committee on Double Taxation had contemplated this same principle in the 1920s.

One of the novelties of the Fiscal Committee in the 1930s was a renewed commitment to its goals on the part of some sectors of the US elite. Washington had been consistently sending representatives to the various committees on taxation since at least 1926.⁷³ In the 1930s, however, particular individuals and organizations silently worked to anchor the activities of the Committee to US realities. The US Chamber of Commerce and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) were particularly interested in shaping domestic tax policies and also in regulating the international taxation of corporations (the question of apportionment of income in tax agreements between two countries). The US Chamber believed that American participation in the Fiscal Committee might offer an opportunity to deal with both issues, to shape to some extent the very agenda of the Fiscal Committee. Adams, who seemed to act as a speaker for the Chamber, tried to guide the League’s decisions through the allocation of Foundation funds:

The use of the grant if made—i.e., the selection of the problem to be investigated—should be and may safely be left to the Fiscal Committee itself. However, it would be wise to stipulate or to suggest that it be applied in the first instance to the problem noted above and that a portion not to exceed \$15,000 be devoted to the investigation of this question in the United States. The problem exists in an acute form in American State income taxation, and American experience is particularly significant.⁷⁴

To be effective, official US representatives should attend the sessions of the Fiscal Committee—not an easy process since the United States was not a member of the League: “You have probably received by this time from the United States Chamber of Commerce a transcript of the Conference held at Washington February 14th, 1930 . . . The purpose of the conference was . . . to obtain critical suggestions about the best basis of domestic legislation to enable the United States to participate in the international movement to reduce double taxation.”⁷⁵ Again, the Foundation—on this occasion in cooperation with the Chamber of Commerce—tried to shape US domestic policies by harnessing the United States to an international organization.

The exploration of international taxation issues was particularly appealing to US interests and the Foundation had to insist on its support for this activity within the League. Loveday, the Director of the Financial Section, had “reservations” that were linked to the ear-marked features of the Foundation’s grant. Loveday preferred to use Foundation’s funds in a more flexible way for the projects he considered important. Obviously, the study of international taxation was becoming more and more attuned to US and private interests, such as those of the ICC. In March 1933, the Foundation recommended that the ICC invite the Fiscal Committee of the League to participate in a meeting in Geneva organized by Adams because, as the telegram put it, it was “highly desirable to establish friendly cooperation of American enterprises and taxation authorities with fiscal committee.”⁷⁶ As Adams recognized, “The problem of allocation is probably more acute and important in the United States than elsewhere.”⁷⁷ That is, the problem

of deciding how to calculate the taxable benefits of big corporations working in different countries was more pressing for the United States because of the sheer number of American big corporations. The connections between the Fiscal Committee and the United States became apparent when in March 1933 the Fiscal Committee worked in New York and Washington, becoming the first body of the League to hold sessions in the United States. Foundation monies made it possible for the Fiscal Committee to travel to the United States, where the League's experts "listened with an open mind to suggestions made by American business men."⁷⁸

After Adams, the key figure in the entanglement of interests among the US government, the Chamber(s) of Commerce and the Fiscal Committee was Mitchell B. Carroll. The US Department of Commerce had appointed this lawyer, a tax expert, as the American representative to the Fiscal Committee of the League. Carroll was knowledgeable in European as well as American affairs and maintained close connections with the International Chamber of Commerce. He became a key figure in international tax law and founded the International Fiscal Association in 1938.⁷⁹ Carroll typified a usual practice of American internationalism in the interwar period, moving in the grey area between public and private interests. Carroll conceived his projects as being for both Europe and Latin America, which gave him a rare wide perspective on international economics. Moreover, his defense of multilateralism was the reflection of strong personal conviction, and at the same time the result of his experience within the League of Nations Fiscal Committee and his links with the International Chamber of Commerce and the most internationalized US businessmen.

In 1930, Carroll was in charge of the League's studies on double taxation. His salary, over \$54,000 annually, consumed more than half of the Foundation's grant for the Fiscal Committee.⁸⁰ Adams died in 1933, leaving Carroll as the Foundation's main interlocutor in the field. As of the early 1930s, private interests seemed to be the leading voice in the international discussions about taxation. As Van Sickle put it in 1934, "It is apparent that influential groups in all

principal countries have rallied behind the League proposal and there are real possibilities of final success.”⁸¹ Beginning in the late 1930s, however, the agenda of the Fiscal Committee and the US government diverged from the main interests of the Chamber of Commerce and the Fiscal Committee began a different phase in its history.

A number of factors brought about this change. First, the League’s political crisis affected the working of the Fiscal Committee. Loveday’s doubts about a project that seemed to fit US needs too closely have already been mentioned. In 1936, these doubts were reflected in strains between Loveday and Carroll.⁸² Furthermore, these tensions coincided with Avenol’s reluctance to open the League to US influence.⁸³ Nevertheless, Rockefeller Foundation funding was extremely important for the League and it could not be easily dismissed. In 1936, Loveday asked for an extension of the grant for the study on double taxation. At first, taking into account the political crisis of the League that eroded its legitimacy and Avenol’s erratic attitudes, Foundation officers hesitated to continue the support. Paradoxically, however, the fact that Avenol was distancing himself from liberal internationalists persuaded the officers that they should convince the trustees of the importance of the proposal on double taxation: “Our change of attitude is due to the information contained in your excellent report of Avenol’s loathness to receive aid from outside organizations. We now think it might complicate matters unduly if we failed to cooperate at this particular time.”⁸⁴ Hence, the Foundation’s continued backing for research on double taxation was about more than the intrinsic importance of taxation issues. It was also meant to maintain the League in the liberal internationalist orbit.

Second, the Fiscal Committee shifted its interests in parallel with the transformation of the League. Latin America gained in importance, converging with the United States’ geostrategic priorities. From 1937, the League’s Fiscal Committee began sending a series of letters to Latin American governments to canvass their potential interest in participating in a global agreement on international tax regulation, in particular regarding tax evasion and the taxing of

movable capital profits.⁸⁵ In 1939, Carroll asked for a new Foundation grant for the Fiscal Committee. The Foundation responded that a renewal of the support for the research on double taxation could not be considered, as was stated in the grant agreement of 1936. Nevertheless, the Foundation floated the possibility of funding new research projects at a time when the Fiscal Committee itself was considering the possibility of beginning a program aimed at advising Latin American countries on their tax reform plans.⁸⁶ Last but not least, the move to Princeton, supported by the Department of State and President Roosevelt himself, was also a way to reinforce the League's Latin American agenda. From their base in the United States, the League's technical committees, including the Fiscal Committee, established a stronger level of cooperation with some sectors of the US government.⁸⁷

But the Fiscal Committee's new interest in Latin America also related to the strategy of several Latin American governments. As the industrial sector advanced in some of the largest republics in the continent, including Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, their governments sought to refurbish their fiscal systems, introducing the income tax and other direct tax devices and lessening their dependency on unstable taxes on foreign trade. Moreover, as a result of increased urbanization, the rise of middle classes, and the mobilization of popular sectors, the largest Latin American republics sought to introduce more equitable taxes.⁸⁸ Latin American politicians therefore looked to the League's expertise as a source of valuable know-how for carrying out their domestic reforms. Mexican representatives at the League seemed to act "as the spokesman for other South American delegations" in requesting from the Fiscal Committee a special project to study their tax systems.⁸⁹

As a result of the new cooperation between the Fiscal Committee and the Latin American governments, two fiscal conferences were held in Mexico City, in 1940 and 1943, respectively. The Fiscal Committee's goal for these meetings was to pursue the original programs on double taxation begun in Europe in the 1920s. Latin American representatives at these conferences, however, transformed the

discussion. Unlike what had happened in the European countries in the past, the model agreements on double taxation elaborated in particular in the second Mexican conference tilted in favor of capital-importing countries. Furthermore, the discussion evolved from debates about double taxation and taxation of multinational corporations to an exchange about the definition of development issues. Thus, in the 1943 conference, the largest Latin American republics created a Sub-Committee IV on general fiscal problems that went beyond mere fiscal issues. “Taxation,” the conference text stipulated, “was to be geared as to improve the distribution of wealth, and at the same time, not inhibit individual initiative . . . tax problems of the day could not be dissociated from a consideration from long social and economic objectives.”⁹⁰

The League’s Fiscal Committee had been assessing the possibility of establishing a special program for Latin America since before it moved to Princeton. The Committee even considered the option of creating a “small secretariat” in Latin America.⁹¹ As it had with the question of expanding its social sciences programs in the region, however, the Foundation also had serious doubts about supporting this move. Tracy Kittredge warned Loveday that the financial support for the Fiscal Committee depended on him eliminating “from his program . . . any special Latin American project” and “it seems inadvisable for the New York office of the Foundation to provide further funds at this time for any program of the Fiscal Committee specifically related to the special problems.” And yet, the funds were provided. The first Mexican fiscal conference of 1940 was partly funded with monies from the Rockefeller grant to the Fiscal Committee of 1939.⁹²

The Foundation’s halfhearted support for the Fiscal Committee might be related to its fear of overstretching and its reluctance to enlarge its activities in Latin America. Nevertheless, it did, in fact, lend its support. Why? The willingness of the US administration to cooperate with the League’s efforts in this field is the main reason behind this move. Carroll, acting as the official US representative, register the opinion that Latin America “should be put in the forefront.”⁹³ The US government was interested in deepening its commercial and economic links with

Latin America. The growth of US investment in the region also meant that US authorities and businessmen had a particular interest in signing taxation agreements with Latin American states. The role of the Fiscal Committee was therefore likely crucial. The League provided apparently neutral scientific models for international tax agreements that to a large extent reflected US influence. Eldon King, from the Internal Revenue Service, put it in a straightforward way: “a great deal of educational work must be done and... this could be accomplished best by a series of meetings of the Fiscal Committee in Latin America which would be attended by the members and corresponding members of the various Latin American countries.”⁹⁴ Just as the Foundation tried to shape US domestic policies by linking the authorities in Washington to an international organization, the US authorities likewise tried to discipline Latin American governments through an international organization.

Washington backed the Fiscal Committee experiments in Latin America (and therefore the Foundation’s presence) for another reason, as well: Latin Americans’ development proposals fit nicely into an ambitious US program of reconstruction that went beyond mere fiscal policies. Beginning in late 1942 and early 1943, the Allies grew more optimistic about the war effort against the Axis and plans for reorganizing the world economic order after the war gained momentum. “As part of the postwar program” a second conference on taxation was called by the League.⁹⁵ Latin Americans who participated could therefore make a significant contribution to the shaping of the new model of international development heralded by the United States for the postwar period. This model, sometimes called “embedded liberalism,” blended international free trade with domestic interventionism, and was an essential part of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy.⁹⁶

Ultimately, without its involvement in Latin America, the League’s technical committees, and in particular the Fiscal Committee, would have appeared to be completely inactive at its new site in Princeton. If the Foundation had decided to

put its weight behind the League, it would have had to accept the League's Latin American orientation.

Convergences were also divergences; international liberalism had many faces. The Foundation's support for the Geneva institution does not mean that there was a blind confidence. Probably the clearest example of this was the program of social insurance for Latin America promoted by the International Labor Office (ILO). In theory, the ILO was part of the structure of the League of Nations. However, the place of the ILO within the League was complex and the ILO maintained a high degree of autonomy. Any country that joined the League would automatically become a member of the ILO, but this was not true the other way around: a nation could become a member of the ILO without joining the League. This was precisely the case of the United States, which became member of the ILO in 1934.

The Foundation's relationships with the ILO, from an early date, were strained. Foundation officers believed the ILO, like the League of Nations itself, might be a useful tool for advancing important research projects in the field of labor and industry. In fact, the Foundation wanted the ILO to be transformed into a research center. As usual, the Foundation's goal was more than scientific curiosity. Joseph Willits, for example, hoped that the ILO might become a "pulpit from which to stimulate the extension of collaborative experiments in industry."⁹⁷ In this, the aims of the Foundation and those of the ILO converged. But there were also obstacles in the way of a fruitful cooperation between the two bodies. In 1927, Willits asserted that the ILO was under the strict control of French socialist Albert Thomas, who considered any cooperation with the American foundation to be "politically dangerous."⁹⁸ Willits's criticism of Thomas was based on scientific criteria. Professional economists linked to the Foundation, such as the Swede Bertil Ohlin, accused Thomas of selecting inadequate personnel—"favorites," without "personal competence"—to work on research projects the ILO was carrying out, including a comparison of international costs of living or statistics about wages.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, Foundation officers expressed contradictory views

about the ILO's scientific competence. Among other examples, in 1937, a Foundation memo stated: "The International Labor Office has unique experience and materials relating to the problems to be studied. It has built up, over a period of years, a staff of competent experts. The Economic Section . . . includes a number of able young economists, five of whom held Foundation fellowships."¹⁰⁰ Such conflicting statements suggest that the differences between the ILO and the Foundation went beyond issues of knowledge and expertise.

After the global economic meltdown of the 1930s, the ILO became more concerned with economic research and this stimulated its interest in working with the Foundation. In 1936, Harold Butler, then director of the ILO, hesitantly opened negotiations with the Foundation regarding funding. Butler's hesitation emerged out of a divergent conception of the study of social problems. According to Tracy Kittredge, the Foundation officer who negotiated with the ILO, "Butler apparently wished to avoid any merely economic study of such problems, for example, as shortening hours of labor, the increase of social insurance benefits, etc."—while the Foundation sought to keep the scope of economic studies narrow.¹⁰¹ This divergence of philosophy overshadowed Rockefeller-ILO relations through the following decade.

In contrast to Butler's hesitation, the Foundation seemed committed to financing an ILO research project on the impact of national economic policies on standards of living, wages, and the economic security of the working classes. Behind the scientific discourse, an attempt to curb labor demands emerged. Edmund Day expressed it clearly: "he [Day] would like to see how far an organization with a frankly labor mandate and labor backing was able to push disinterested appraisal or national policies . . . this procedure would teach labor interests to stand back and analyze situations which they were trying to remedy."¹⁰²

Despite the Foundation's interest, the ILO ultimately withdrew its request for funding. The reasons varied, but Day's statement played a role here. Apparently, European labor representatives suspected that Rockefeller Foundation money

“stood for the defense of capitalism.” But the attitude of American labor delegates was more important than the European position. According to Kittredge, Butler changed his mind toward the Foundation after American labor union pressure resulted in the United States joining the ILO.¹⁰³ US labor resented the possible influence of Foundation funding and Butler heeded their position: “American participation in the ILO was Butler’s ‘baby’ and that he was desperately afraid that anything which alienated American labor might lead to American withdrawal.”¹⁰⁴ The ILO was therefore the site of a subtle domestic conflict between the US labor movement and the Foundation at a time when the New Deal was expanding workers’ rights. American support for the ILO was not, moreover, a minor point. As a member nation, the United States contributed significantly to the ILO’s budget.

Some officers at the ILO, on the other hand, fretted about possible Rockefeller Foundation interference in the policies advocated by the international institution. Edmund Day’s words sounded truly threatening: “Butler has quoted EED’s remark . . . that the Labor Office project for economic studies was welcomed by the RF because it might teach Labor a few useful lessons about the economic impossibility of parts of their social policy program.”¹⁰⁵

Another factor involved was Butler’s fear of pressure from the fascist powers that were subject to ILO criticism.¹⁰⁶ This helps to explain why the Foundation continued to support the ILO, despite their differences. As with the League of Nations as a whole, the Foundation decided to shore up the organization as part of its general response to the international political crisis. And as it had done for the League’s technical committees, the international crisis led the ILO to increase its interest in Latin America. In part, this was a reaction to the creation of a labor office within the Pan-American Union.¹⁰⁷ It was also, in part, a response, as it had been for the Fiscal Committee, to demands from Latin Americans, who called for the introduction of new systems of social security in their countries and who hoped to learn from the ILO’s European experience and knowledge.¹⁰⁸

The ILO needed Foundation support to accomplish its program of study and of advising Latin American governments about social security issues. Foundation funding might have been perceived as indirect American backing for the ILO's programs and would therefore minimize the threat of a rival Pan-American social security project. Rockefeller aid was also essential for carrying out the project. In 1937, ILO official Adrien Tixier contacted the Foundation to explore the possibilities for future cooperation, in particular regarding funding for Latin American experts and politicians to travel to Geneva and other cities to receive training in the field of social security. The conversations between Tixier and Rockefeller Foundation officer Sydnor Walker revealed the differences between the organizations. Tixier remarked that "the foundations, not only the Rockefeller but others, had mental reservations about the type of work to which the ILO is pledged, that is, accomplishment of social progress through legislation and public programs" and explicitly criticized Rockefeller Foundation health policies for using a "voluntary or charitable organization [in order] to accomplish social change— [Tixier] indicated that we were working with the background of a different philosophy from that of the ILO." In her response, Walker recognized that many trustees of the Foundation had suspicious feelings about "the desirability of social legislation and public action in regard to an increasing area of life." Nonetheless, Walker felt confident that the Foundation might support the ILO's proposal for Latin America, since they were interested in "satisfactory administration of social legislation."¹⁰⁹ Therefore, Walker hope to transform social policies into social administration, and therefore tone down some of its more threatening features.

The tensions between the Foundation and the ILO regarding the social security program were already established and would persist until the end of World War II. In fact, Walker was probably the most sympathetic officer within the Foundation toward the proposal of the ILO, perhaps because of her experience in the field of social policy. Part of the problems were related to the growth of activities in Latin America and the possible conflicts with the Foundation's own

IHD. Walker proposed a collaboration with Latin American social security officials as part of the new social science programs for the region that she advocated. It is revealing that she emphasized that this was a field in which Latin American themselves wished to invest their efforts. Yet, Raymond Fosdick recommended first approaching the IHD.¹¹⁰ Although it did not fund a specific ILO program for Latin America, the Foundation did begin financing ILO activities in the field of social security. In 1938, the Foundation paid for Edgardo Rebagliati, Director of the Peruvian Social Insurance Fund to travel to Geneva to visit ILO headquarters along with several European countries and the United States in order to learn from these countries' experiences with social insurance. To avoid any misunderstanding with Washington, the Foundation reported this trip to the US State Department.¹¹¹

Despite this rapprochement, the suspicions about the ILO's projects persisted and forced the Foundation to struggle with permanent contradictions. To some extent its support for Roosevelt's liberal internationalist policies clashed with the interests of some of the trustees and even with some members of the Rockefeller family themselves. In 1939, Nelson Rockefeller made a business trip to Venezuela to care for the interests of the Creole Petroleum Corporation, a subsidiary of Standard Oil, the Rockefellers' flagship. Before his trip, several Standard Oil executives prepared a report on conditions in Venezuela. The report warned of the "danger of unions becoming strong political organizations," using the Mexican case as an example of excessive labor power. It also reported that with the help of three "experts" (sic) from the League of Nations, the Venezuelan government had been drafting a new labor code and social security law. Although the law had not been enacted, the reporter expressed deep fears about this possibility: "This draft is extremely dangerous, calling for contributions from employers and to a lesser extent from employees to build up a fund which the Government would administer for taking care of all cases of sickness and accidents . . . the payment of partial or full time pensions as a result of such accidents and sickness."¹¹² Of course, the report transmitted the Standard Oil Company's concerns about its investments in Venezuela. But it might be also

understood as an indirect allusion to the controversial Social Security Act introduced by Roosevelt in the United States in 1935. The idea that social security payments were to be financed by contributions from the employers was a “dangerous” one either in Venezuela or in the United States. In any event, Nelson Rockefeller himself—though in his capacity as director of the Inter-American Office—financed the 1942 Conference of Latin American States on social security problems, in which the ILO played a significant role.¹¹³ What had changed was that the United States had entered World War II.

The crisis of the League also affected the ILO. League funding was slashed and the ILO was forced to rely on American contributions more than ever.¹¹⁴ In its own process of reinvention, the ILO drew closer to Latin America. As had happened with the larger League, Latin American demands and the deepening of industrialization in the region were behind this shift.¹¹⁵ But geopolitical reasons were even more important. In 1940, the ILO moved its headquarters to the American continent. The Labor Office officers’ first choice was Washington. But this was not a politically palatable option for many US politicians and notables. The Foundation itself gave the idea a lukewarm reception. The ILO ultimately settled on Montreal. Once in Montreal, the ILO became closer to Latin America.

The internal controversies over financing the ILO became acute during the organization’s Canadian sojourn. Kittredge and especially Willits were adamant opposed to collaborating with the Labor Office. Willits argued that there was a sort of implicit agreement between the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations: the former was in charge of financing the ILO, while the latter took care of the economic section of the League.¹¹⁶ It is true that the ILO traditionally received larger sums from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace but this had not prevented the Rockefeller Foundation from funding the Labor Office in the past. The most common arguments, however, were the usual ones, those that challenged the scientific competence of the ILO to carry out its research projects or questioned the logistics of expanding Foundation involvement in Latin America. Willits proposed a general assessment of the institution before

committing the Foundation to further support: “What is the degree of competence from the point of view of research? What are its limitations? For what type of work is it competent?”¹¹⁷

Of course, political motives also played a major part in this conflict. Willits considered that the proposal of the ILO “was not convincing in itself,” considering that it was going to be used to “promote social insurance in Latin America and to codify labor legislation.”¹¹⁸ Not everyone shared Willits’s hostile attitude toward the Labor Office. Raymond Fosdick, for one, wondered whether “we are on sure ground in taking a negative position in relation to the ILO.” The reason was that the ILO, like the League, was “one of the agencies whose research seems to have a real and vital meaning in terms of the kind of world we are going to live in after the war.”¹¹⁹ Indeed, this was precisely the key issue. Beyond an apparent consensus on the world in which they wanted to live after the war, major disagreements remained within the international liberal coalition and its allies (such as some Latin American governments). The discomfort of some trustees with the study of social policies has already been mentioned. In 1943, the Foundation helped to organize a visit by British economist William Beveridge to the United States. Beveridge reached notoriety as the creator of a report on social security that would become the blueprint for the construction of the welfare state in Britain after the war. On the occasion of Beveridge’s visit, a Foundation trustee, Eli Whitney Debevoise, wrote Fosdick complaining about Beveridge proposals. An officer of the Foundation summarized Debevoise ideas: “freedom from want which D. does not think is according to the American way life,” and “D. fears that the Beveridge plan is not a good idea for the U.S. He thinks it may have disastrous results.”¹²⁰

The Foundation’s cooperation with the League’s technical committee and the ILO—even after the beginning of the war in Europe—was based on a common expectation of contributing to shaping the future international economic order. Both institutions, and the US government as well, shared ideas about what economic recovery and development should look like after the conflict. Liberal

internationalists in the United States and in Europe believed economic security was fundamental to global peace and stability. This converged with the Atlantic Charter and Roosevelt's speech about freedom from wants. Yet visions of development among these actors could also diverge. As early as 1938, the ILO's Lewis L. Lorwin wrote to James T. Shotwell of the Carnegie Peace Endowment with a thorough project of international organization. Lorwin, following US ideas about separating the economic and social bodies of the League from the Council, proposed to establish a World Economic Development Organization. The new organization would promote "economic development in different parts of the world with a view to raising the standards of living of the masses." Lorwin's document paid special attention to the future Third World, which he referred as "to-be-developed countries." Development, he argued, could not be based on "the old forms of international lending." Nor was international trade any guarantee of peace and stability. An international economic organization should take into account the "best economic and social interest of the people of both the developed and to-be-developed countries."¹²¹ This proposal highlights the extent to which ideas about the role of international organizations evolved in the 1930s and also the extent of differences among the very actors who defended the need for these international organizations. In 1942, Foundation officers reflected on these transformations with some perplexity about the contentious meaning of words, asking, "Does the 'well-being of mankind throughout the world' take on a different form and definition than it did a decade ago when we conceived our objectives in terms primarily of the extension of knowledge?"¹²² Liberal internationalism clearly had many faces, and in the postwar era the World Bank and the IMF had to allow some room for the United Nations Economic and Social Council, as well as for the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Conclusion: What Are International Organizations Good For?

In 1946, at the moment of the League's dissolution, the Rockefeller Foundation's Joseph Willits asked Henry Luce, publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune

magazines, to dedicate some attention in his publications to the history of an institution that had played a major role in combatting nationalism.¹²³ The historiography of the League of Nations has devoted hundreds of pages to the issue of its failure or its relative and short-lived successes. Yet, in a period of economic collapse, ideological extremism, and total war, what is most striking is the League's capacity to survive. The Rockefeller Foundation's (and the US government's) support for its activities were key to that survival. In the 1940s, to some extent, the Geneva institutions became American institutions. Beginning in the late 1930s, both the League and the International Labor Office recovered their positions in Latin America, regaining legitimacy and, most importantly, connecting many Latin Americans experts and politicians with a future international organization.¹²⁴

Without these American pillars, the League would not have survived until 1946. Why did the Foundation help the League to weather the storm? Willits's letter to Luce suggested that the League was a weapon of war. In fact, even before the United States entry into the war, the Foundation had the discussion of the future global order in mind. That discussion was part of debates that took place among the Allies during the war and it helped to cement a coalition of liberal internationalists in the Americas and Europe. Once it became clear that imperial strategies were doomed, it was also clear that a global order would lack a foundation without international organizations. And in the 1940s, the League and its satellites were the only international organizations. International organizations also helped to influence domestic policies both at home and abroad. Nevertheless, it might be erroneous to think of the international liberal coalition as monolithic. The fight against the Axis and then the Cold War polarization of the debate around the issue of Communism-Anticommunism hide important disagreements within the coalition and within their allies in Latin America. The Rockefeller Foundation networks of experts and international bureaucrats helped to build its capacity of influence and thus contributed to shape the aspirations of the United States to international hegemony.¹²⁵ Yet, this view oversimplifies the entanglements of the Rockefeller Foundations, the

scientific experts, the League of Nations and the Latin American countries. Important power and ideological struggles were going on, even within the networks. These struggles reveals significant differences about how to think about development, progress, and human welfare. The international liberals in their interaction with Latin Americans produced diversity rather than an hegemonic project of economic development, what would be labeled later on theory of modernization.

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¹ Everett Colby to John D. Rockefeller Jr., January 16, 1933, Folder 203, Box 24, Series Q, World Affairs, FA 326, Officers of Messrs. Rockefellers records, Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter RAC).

² John D. Rockefeller III to Everett Colby, November 2, 1935, Folder 203, Box 24, Series Q, World Affairs, FA 326, Officers of Messrs. Rockefellers records, RAC.

³ Arthur Sweetser to Raymond Fosdick, Geneva, October 4, 1938, Folder 1136, Box 154, Series 300, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 308, RFR (hereafter RFR), RAC. The reference to Sweetser as having the soul of a Jesuit is striking, since the Foundation can easily be compared with the Jesuits in its attempts to “convert” other people through the demonstration effect of scientific knowledge. See Jonathan Spence, *To Change China: Western Advisers in China 1620–1960* (New York: Penguin, 1969), chapter 1.

⁴ Ludovic Tournès, *Les États-Unis et la Société des Nations (1914–1946): Le système international face à l'émergence d'une superpuissance* (Berne: Peter Lang, 2016), 66.

⁵ See Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁶ See the interesting reflections about the role of the League’s technical bodies in the discussion about food security and the extension of these preoccupations to Asia in Sunil Amrith and Patricia Clavin, “Feeding the World: Connecting Europe and Asia, 1930–1945,” *Past and Present* Supplement 8 (2013): 29–50.

⁷ Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations, Folder 148, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1. 1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC. Some comparisons will demonstrate the magnitude of the Foundation’s support for the League. Between 1935 and 1944, the Yale Institute of International Studies received \$276,500; between 1927 and 1947, the Council of Foreign Relations obtained grants for the amount of \$443,000 from the Foundation; and the Institute of Pacific Relations, one of the greatest recipients, received \$950,000 from the Foundation. See Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 69, 77, and 86.

⁸ Tracy B. Kittredge to EH, March 27, 1936, Folder 162, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

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- ⁹ John H. Willits, Inter-Office Correspondence, July 3, 1940, Folder 153, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁰ John Van Sickle to Selskar M. Gunn, "The Financial and Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations," Geneva, December 21, 1931, Folder 148, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹¹ J. S. Condliffe to Day, Geneva, November 16, 1931, Folder 148, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹² Memorandum. Interview with J. S. Condliffe, Geneva. By JVS, November 26, 1931; Selskar M. Gunn to Day, Cádiz, December 31, 1931, *ibid*.
- ¹³ John Van Sickle to Selskar M. Gunn, "The Financial and Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations," Geneva, December 21, 1931, *ibid*.
- ¹⁴ Arthur Sweetser to Selskar M. Gunn, Geneva, December 13, 1930, Folder 148, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁵ John Van Sickle to Sydnor H. Walker, Paris, December 2, 1933, Folder 148, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁶ On Avenol, see James Barros, *Betrayal from Within: Joseph Avenol, Secretary General of the League of Nations, 1933–1940* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).
- ¹⁷ Tracy B. Kittredge to John Van Sickle, New York, December 31, 1936, Folder 150, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁸ "TBK's Recent Geneva Visit," TBK memo, February 3, 1936, Folder 150, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid*. Fosdick had cooperated with Eric Drummond and Jean Monnet in 1919 in the process of forming the League of Nations. Back in the United States he became a champion of the League, creating the League of Nations News Bureau and the League of Nations Associations to encourage the popularity of the organization among his fellow citizens. See Kathryn C. Lavelle, "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in International Organizations: US Involvement in the League of Nations," *Revue of International Organizations* 2 (2007): 376.
- ²⁰ Condliffe to Van Sickle, Geneva, January 27, 1937; Tracy B. Kittredge to Van Sickle, Geneva, January 23, 1936, both in Folder 150, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ²¹ Tracy B. Kittredge to John Van Sickle, New York, December 31, 1936, Folder 150, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ²² Memorandum on the Enquiry into Economic Depression, Folder 148, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ²³ Interviews: JVS, International Labor Office: Economic Research Problem, April 21, 1937, Folder 973, Box 108, Series 100S, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ²⁴ Parman, *Foundations*, 6.
- ²⁵ See Stefan Fisch, "Origins and History of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences: From its Beginnings to its Reconstruction after World War II (1910–1944/47)," in *IIAS/IISA Administration & Service 1930–2005*, ed. Fabio Ruge and Michael Duggett (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2005), 41–47.
- ²⁶ "The Business Depression: Memorandum of Meetings of Representatives of Economic Council and Research Institutes," by Edward Eyre Hunt, Geneva, March, 4, 1931, Folder 148, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ²⁷ That was not the general position among businessmen. See, for example, the recommendations of the members of the International Chamber of Commerce, which were closer to orthodox laissez-faire, in "World Recovery through World Trade, Address by Mr. F. H. Fentener Van Vlissingen before the Advertising Club of New York," February 14, 1935, Folder 162, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

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- ²⁸ “Address by Mr. Edmund E. Day and Discussion, Adelpia Report Bureau, Hotel Adelpia, Philadelphia,” March 4, 1934, p. 18, Folder 91, Box 9, Series 2, FA 054, Joseph H. Willits Papers, RAC.
- ²⁹ John Van Sickle Diary, Max Nicholson Political and Economic Planning, London, September 27, 1937, Box 482, Series Officer Van Sickle, R. G. 12 S-Z, Officers’ diaries, FA 394, RFR, RAC.
- ³⁰ Staff Conference (Edmund E. Day report), March 31, 1933, Folder 148, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ³¹ “Confidential. Miscellaneous notes made in the sessions of the League conference on the course and phases of the business depression,” Geneva, March 2–4, 1931, by Edward Eyre Hunt, Washington DC, March 14, 1931, Folder 148, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ³² On the relationships between the United States and the League of Nations, see Tournès, *Les États-Unis et la Société des Nations*.
- ³³ S. M. Gunn’s diary, July 31, 1928, Folder 148, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ³⁴ Sydnor H. Walker to Alexander Loveday, December 4, 1937; Loveday to Walker, Geneva, December 1, 1937, Folder 150, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ³⁵ Kittredge to Willits, Paris, March 16, 1940, Folder 153, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ³⁶ A good example of this is an article published by Arthur Sweetser, “The Non-Political Achievements of the League”, *Foreign Affairs*, October 1940.
- ³⁷ See Clavin, *Securing the World Economy*, 260 and ff.
- ³⁸ On the move to Princeton, see Harold W. Dodd, President of Princeton University; Carl Tan Broeck, Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and Frank Aydelotte, Institute for Advanced Study to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, Princeton, June 11, 1940, Folder 8, Box 1, Series 4, Director Herbert Spencer Gasser, FA 813, Rockefeller University records, RAC; John H. Willits, Inter-Office Correspondence, July 3, 1940, Folder 153, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC; “Extract from the Report of the Director to the Trustees of the Institute for Advance Studies,” October 14, 1940, Folder 154, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ³⁹ See Loveday’s correspondence with the RF; for instance: Loveday to Willits, Princeton, October 17, 1941, Folder 155, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁴⁰ League of Nations, Central Committee, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, 12/3-4/1940, Folder 148, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁴¹ Resolved RF 44023, April 4, 1944, League of Nations, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, Folder 156, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁴² Lavelle, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,” 381.
- ⁴³ Kittredge to Willits, Paris, March 16, 1940, Folder 153, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁴⁴ Loveday reminded Willits that “if any sort of international organization is to be built up again after the war, it ought to be built in the light of that experience [the League]—of past successes and past failures,” Loveday to Willits, March 12, 1941, Folder 155, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁴⁵ McDougall to Willits, London, April 23, 1940, Folder 153, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid. On McDougall and the League, see Clavin, *Securing the World Economy*, 165 and ff.

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- ⁴⁷ Thomas Fischer, *Die Souveränität der Schwachen: Lateinamerika und der Völkerbund, 1920–1936* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2012).
- ⁴⁸ See, for example, Department of State, “Confidential Release for Publication in Afternoon Newspapers of Wednesday February 22, 1939,” February 21, 1939, Folder 163, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁴⁹ See Marcos Cueto, ed., *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Martin David Dubin, “The League of Nations Health Organisation,” in *International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918–1939*, ed. Paul Weindling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 56–80.
- ⁵⁰ Raymond B. Fosdick to Douglas S. Freeman, October 31, 1938, Folder 1177, Box 160, Series 1938/300, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 308, RFR, RAC.
- ⁵¹ “An RF program in Latin America,” December 30, 1937, Folder 1097, Box 148, Series 300, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 308, RFR, RAC.
- ⁵² Sydnor H. Walker to Eyler Simpson, January 11, 1937, Folder 1097, Box 148, Series 300, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 308, RFR, RAC; “Interview: Sydnor H. Walker,” December 14, 1937, Box 264, Officer Irving A. Leonard, R. G. 12, F-L, Officers’ diaries, FA 392, RFR, RAC.
- ⁵³ See, e.g., Cordell Hull to David H. Stevens, May 24, 1938, or June 22, 1938, Folder 1178, Box 160, Series 1938/300, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 308, RFR, RAC.
- ⁵⁴ Stacy May, November 9, 1938, Folder 1180, Box 160, Series 1938/300, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 308, RFR, RAC. See also: Carl O. Sauer, n.d., Folder 63, Box 10, Series 323, R. G. 1.2, projects, FA 387, RFR, RAC; John Collier, Office of Indian Affairs, Department of Interior, to Stacy May, October 27, 1938, Folder 1180, Box 160, Series 1938/300, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 308, RFR, RAC.
- ⁵⁵ “Report on Latin American Interest in Social Sciences and Humanities, Agreement of SHW, SM, IAL, and DHS on statement of present divisional interests in work in Latin American countries,” n.d. [1938?] Folder 120, Box 15, Series 300, R. G. 1.2, projects, FA 387, RFR, RAC.
- ⁵⁶ “IHD and the Administration of SS Projects in South America,” August 25, 1943, Folder 120, Box 15, Series 300, R. G. 1.2, projects, FA 387, RFR, RAC.
- ⁵⁷ “Latin American Program in the Social Sciences and Humanities, based on discussion of DHS, SM, IAL, and SHW,” March 28, 1938, Folder 120, Box 15, Series 300, R. G. 1.2, projects, FA 387, RFR, RAC; Raymond B. Fosdick to Douglas S. Freeman, October 31, 1938, Folder 1177, Box 160, Series 1938/300, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 308, RFR, RAC.
- ⁵⁸ “A Memorandum on the Development of Economics in South America,” by Frank Fetter, January 7, 1941, Box 8, Series 300, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁵⁹ “Report on Latin American Interest in Social Sciences and Humanities, Agreement of SHW, SM, IAL, and DHS on statement of present divisional interests in work in Latin American countries,” n.d. [1938?] Folder 120, Box 15, Series 300, R. G. 1.2, projects, FA 387, RFR, RAC.
- ⁶⁰ Staff Conference, February 18, 1941, Folder 63, Box 10, Series 323, R. G. 1.2, projects, FA 387, RFR, RAC.
- ⁶¹ Carl Sauer to Willits, Tuxpan, Jalisco, March 12, 1941, Folder 63, Box 10, Series 323, R. G. 1.2, projects, FA 387, RFR, RAC.
- ⁶² Wallace to Fosdick, Washington, October 9, 1944; Earl N. Bressman to Fosdick, Washington, October 17, 1944, Folder 1855, Box 270, Series 1944/300, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 758, RFR, RAC.

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- ⁶³ J. H. Willits, "Latin America and SS," February 21, 1944, Folder 120, Box 15, Series 300, R. G. 1.2, projects, FA 387, RFR, RAC.
- ⁶⁴ See Nelson A. Rockefeller, article for Kiwanis Magazine, Folder 61, Box 12, Series A, Activities, FA 338, Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers, RAC; Nelson A. Rockefeller, "To Open the New Frontiers," *Think Magazine*, October 1940. Rockefeller argued that the relationships with Latin America would bring "noncompetitive imports" to the United States. See Nelson A. Rockefeller, "Will We Remain Good Neighbors after the War?" *Saturday Evening Post*, 1943, clipping in Folder 61, Box 12, Series A, Activities, FA 338, Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers, RAC.
- ⁶⁵ See among many others, Nelson A. Rockefeller, "Industrialization of Central and South America will benefit American business," 1944, Folder 61, Box 12, Series A, Activities, FA 338, Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers, RAC.
- ⁶⁶ See *History of the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs: Historical Reports on War Administrations*, Washington DC: United States Printing Office, 1947; Rockefeller, "Will We Remain Good Neighbors after the War?"
- ⁶⁷ W. A. Sawyer to Nelson A. Rockefeller, April 9 and May 1, 1942, Folder 1578, Box 227, Series 1942/100, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 758, RFR, RAC.
- ⁶⁸ James D. Lecron to Nelson A. Rockefeller, September 2, 1943; Floyd E. Dominy to Nelson A. Rockefeller, February 10, 1944, Folder 155, Box 24, Series A, Activities, FA 338, Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers, RAC.
- ⁶⁹ "Statement of Council for Inter-American Cooperation Inc.," prepared for Rockefeller Brothers Fund, December 1946, Folder 60, Box 8, Series Q, World Affairs, FA 326, Office of Messrs. Rockefeller records, RAC.
- ⁷⁰ League of Nations, Fiscal Committee, May 15, 1936, Folder 160, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC. On the history of Fiscal Committee activities regarding Latin America, see José Antonio Sánchez Román, "El multilateralismo como intervencionismo: Estados Unidos y la Sociedad de Naciones en América Latina (1930–1946)," *Revista Complutense de Historia de América* 41 (2015): 47–69.
- ⁷¹ Christophe Farquet, "Expertise et négociations fiscales à la Société des Nations (1923–1939)," *Relations internationales* no. 142 (2010): 12; Treasurer, April 28th, 1936, LON R 4607, 10C/23198/18665.
- ⁷² Sol Picciotto, *International Business Taxation: A Study in the Internationalization of Business Regulation* (London: Weindenfeld & Nicholson, 1992), 13.
- ⁷³ The Foundation was constantly preoccupied by the participation of US Treasury in the fiscal discussions of the League. See "Participation of the United States Treasury in the Movement to Prevent the International Double Taxation," 1933, Folder 161, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁷⁴ T. S. Adams to E. E. Day, New Haven, December 13, 1929, Folder 160, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁷⁵ T. S. Adams to Day, March 17, 1930, Folder 160, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC. Adams, on behalf of the US Treasury Department, invited Edmund Day from the Foundation to participate in the aforementioned conference in Washington. Revealingly, the conference was held at the site of the US Chamber of Commerce. See Adams to E. E. Day, New Haven, February 1, 1930, Folder 160, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁷⁶ Telegram from the Rockefeller Foundation to Loveday, New York, February 4, 1933, Folder 161, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁷⁷ Adams to E. E. Day, November 8, 1932, Folder 160, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁷⁸ James R. Knapp to John V. Sickle, New York, March 8, 1933, Folder 162, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC. See also Arthur Sweetser to E. E. Day, March 6, 1933, Folder 161, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC. In 1934, at the Bankers Club of New York, a group of important businessmen offered Alexander Loveday a luncheon, apparently paid for by the Chamber of Commerce. See J. V. Sickle, "Memorandum: League of Nations Double Taxation Study," November 26, 1934, Folder 161, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁷⁹ Piccioto, *International Business Taxation*, 28.

⁸⁰ [Arthur Sweetser?] to Raymond Fosdick, Geneva, October 30, 1930, Folder 160, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁸¹ John Van Sickle, Memorandum, League of Nations Double Taxation Studies, November 26, 1934, Folder 161, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁸² Tracy B. Kittredge, "Appropriation for Fiscal Committee, L. of N., Paris," March 20, 1936, Folder 162, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁸³ E. E. Day to John Van Sickle, April 24, 1933, Folder 161, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁸⁴ John Van Sickle to Tracy B. Kittredge, February 25, 1936, Folder 162, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁸⁵ "Observations des Gouvernements sur les propositions du Comité tendant à empêcher l'évasion fiscale en ce qui concerne les revenus des capitaux mobiliers (Communications reçues au 4 septembre 193), " LON R4617 F/Fiscal 95; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (Bolivia) to General Secretary of the League of Nations, La Paz, January 24th, 1938, LON R 4617, 10C/27557/27557.

⁸⁶ Interviews: SM, Mr. Mitchell B. Carroll, United States Representative and President of the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations, Paris, January 10, 1939, Folder 163, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁸⁷ Lavelle, "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty," 384; Clavin, *Securing the World Economy*, 260 and ff.

⁸⁸ See Sánchez Román, "El multilateralismo como intervencionismo"; Report for the period August 30, 1938, to September 1, 1939, on work done under Rockefeller appropriations nos. RF.33023, RF.37116 and RF.33004, and under the arrangement regarding statistical study tours, Folder 152, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁸⁹ [Loveday?] to Carroll, Geneva, January 10, 1939, Folder 163, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC. See also Interviews: SM, Mr. Mitchell B. Carroll, United States Representative and President of the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations, Paris, January 10, 1939, Folder 163, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁹⁰ "League of Nations. Fiscal Committee. Second Regional Conference in Mexico, July 19–29, 1943. Account of the Proceedings by the Secretary," LON C 1645 Record Group 8 (Princeton Office). Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service. Fiscal Committee. Registered Files of Correspondence and Memoranda, 1940–1946.

⁹¹ "League of Nations, Fin. And Ec. Intelligence Service of Secretariat, Geneva," July 8, 1941, Folder 152, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁹² TBK Paris memo, March 16, 1940, Folder 153, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC; Kittredge to Loveday, La Baule, March 20, 1940, Folder 153, Box 18, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

⁹³ [Loveday?] to Carroll, Geneva, January 10, 1939, Folder 163, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

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- ⁹⁴ Mitchell B. Carroll to Sydnor Walker, New York, October 11, 1939, Folder 163, Box 19, Series 100, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ⁹⁵ Mitchell Carroll, “A Clipping on the First Conference of the Commission of Inter-American Development,” May 11, 1944, LON C 1645 Record Group 8 (Princeton Office). Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service. Fiscal Committee. Registered Files of Correspondence and Memoranda, 1940–1946.
- ⁹⁶ On the concept of “embedded liberalism” see John Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transaction, and Changes: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1985): 379–405. The Bretton Woods agreements seemed to encapsulate these ideas. Traditionally, this phenomenon has been analyzed as part of the Anglo-American entente that sought to restructure international economics, and even a recent—and important—contribution, Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013) sticks to this interpretation. The influence of Latin Americans in the shaping of this embedded liberalism has been rescued by Eric Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). Still, Helleiner pays little attention to the power hierarchies among the actors shaping this embedded liberalism.
- ⁹⁷ Joseph H. Willits, “The Year 1927–28 in Europe,” Folder 16, Box 1, Series 1, FA 054, Joseph H. Willits Papers, RAC.
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁹ John Van Sickle Diary, January 6, 1930, Box 482, Series Officer Van Sickle, R. G. 12 S-Z, Officers’ diaries, FA 394, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁰⁰ International Labor Office, July 4, 1937, Folder 973, Box 108, Series 100S, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC. Fosdick was particularly supportive of projects aimed at building bridges between capital and labor. See Raymond B. Fosdick to John D. Rockefeller Jr., May 14, 1928, Folder 199, Box 24, Series Q, World Affairs, FA 326, Office of Messrs. Rockefeller records, RAC.
- ¹⁰¹ Tracy B. Kittredge, Research Activities International Labor Office, October 2, 1936, Box 108, Series 100S, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁰² Interviews: JVS, International Labor Office: Economic Research Problem, April 21, 1937, Folder 973, Box 108, Series 100S, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁰³ J.V.S., “Resumé of negotiations between officers of the Foundation and the Director and Members of the Staff of the I.L.O.,” July 29, 1937, Folder 973, Box 108, Series 100S, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁰⁴ Interviews: JVS, Geneva, September 10, 1937, Folder 973, Box 108, Series 100S, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁰⁵ International Labor Office Project, Conversation TBK with L. L. Lorwin, Geneva 14, 1937, Folder 973, Box 108, Series 100S, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁰⁶ Interviews: JVS, Geneva, September 10, 1937, Folder 973, Box 108, Series 100S, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹⁰⁷ Lisa Singleton, “The ILO and Social Security in Latin America, 1930–1950,” in *América Latina y la Organización Internacional del Trabajo: Redes, cooperación técnica e institucionalidad social, 1919–1950*, ed. Fabián Herrera León and Patricio Herrera González (Morelia: Universidad Michoacana, 2013), 243–274.
- ¹⁰⁸ Already in 1933, Mexican representatives were forcing the Pan-American Union to deal with social policies; see Singleton, “The ILO and Social Security,” 245.
- ¹⁰⁹ Excerpt from letter from S. H. Walker to R. B. Fosdick, June 2, 1937, Folder 973, Box 108, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.

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- ¹¹⁰ SHW: Collaboration with Social Security Officials in South America, November 5, 1937, Folder 56, Box 6, Series 323, R. G. 1.1, projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
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- ¹¹² R. C. Wells to T. R. Armstrong, Inter-Office Correspondence Standard Oil Company (notes in connection with Mr. Nelson Rockefeller’s forthcoming trip to Venezuela), New York, March 16, 1939, Folder 1571, Box 144, Series A, Activities, FA 338, Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers, RAC.
- ¹¹³ Singleton, “The ILO and Social Security,” 266.
- ¹¹⁴ Tracy B. Kittredge to J. H. Willits, May 1, 1939, Folder 973, Box 108, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
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- ¹¹⁶ J. H. Willits to Raymond B. Fosdick, January 12, 1942, Folder 978, Box 108, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC; J. H. Willits, Inter-office Correspondence, October 3, 1940, Folder 973, Box 108, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
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- ¹¹⁸ J. H. Willits to Raymond B. Fosdick, January 12, 1942, Folder 978, Box 108, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹¹⁹ Raymond B. Fosdick to AK, December 31, 1941, Folder 1451, Box 206, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 758, RFR, RAC.
- ¹²⁰ Eli Whitney Debevoise to Raymond B. Fosdick, May 13, 1943, and October 7, 1943, Folder 1669, Box 241, Series 1943/100, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 758, RFR, RAC.
- ¹²¹ Lewis L. Lorwin to James T. Shotwell, Carnegie Peace Endowment, February 1, 1938, Folder 973, Box 108, Series 100, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹²² Officers’ Conference, October 7, 1942, Folder 1570, Box 226, Series 100/1942, R. G. 2, General Correspondence, FA 758, RFR, RAC.
- ¹²³ Willits to Henry Luce, July 24, 1946, Folder 159, Box 19, R. G. 1.1., projects, FA 386, RFR, RAC.
- ¹²⁴ For the case of the ILO, see Singleton, “The ILO and Social Security,” 262.
- ¹²⁵ This is the view of Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century. The Ford, Carnegie, & Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).